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 &c.


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P U B L I C K A F F A I R S,

The Remonstrance of 1641; The PLACE-BILL, or Self-denying Ordinance of 1647; The Parties, Politicks, *Petitions* and *Instructions* of those Former and these Latter Times, are occasionally consider'd and compar'd.

To which is added,

The humble Confession of an experienc'd
English Republican.

Non civium ardor prava jubentium. H O R.

L O N D O N:

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A N

Historical Essay, &c.

IN many of our late political Pieces, such as, *Exhortations*, and *Addresses*, to *Electors*; *The Livery-Man's plain Thoughts*, &c. we have been referred to the Citizens of *London* for a compleat Pattern of Patriotism and Policy; and one *, though indeed a most profligate Writer, has gone so far as to say, "*They have always been in the Right, and have always prevailed.*"

A 3

Though

* The Champion.

Though *great Examples* will attract Notice, not without some Degree of Influence, *good ones* only can authorize our Imitation of them. Since then, among the several Artifices made use of to heighten the Opposition, by alienating the Minds of the People from the present Government and Administration, Inferences drawn from *certain Appearances* in the *City of London* are none of the least; we shall do well to consider *those Appearances* narrowly, and see if fairly and judiciously examined, they will be found to prove what they are brought to affirm, *viz.*

1. *This is the Sense of the Londoners on publick Affairs.*
2. *They have always approved themselves the best Judges in Cases of this Nature.*
3. *Therefore, It is our Duty to conform ourselves to their Sentiments and Measures.*

And indeed, granting the two former Positions, the latter is something of a Consequence. But, if either of them fails
in

in Point of Truth, the whole Argument falls to the Ground. And is not this, what Mr. *Locke* calls an Argument *ad Verecundiam*; of all others, the farthest from being conclusive? Is not the Question here doubly begged, and *two Things* taken for granted, *both which* want to be proved?

First, *Humour*, the Effect of Envy, Avarice, Ambition, Disappointment, a Desire of Revenge, &c. is so often substituted as a governing Principle, in the Place of *Opinion*, that Persons are not unapt to impose upon themselves by it; no wonder, therefore, if others should mistake their *Passions* for their *Sense of Things*.

Farther, If by the Sense of *the Londoners*, we are to understand (what should be understood by it, before it can be urged as an Authority) the united Opinion of all, or a competent Majority of the most considerable, that is, the wealthiest and wisest, and best principled, (by which I mean) *best affected* to the Person and Government of his *present Majesty*, and to the *Constitution*, it may well be asked in this divided Age, In what Instances hath this Union, or this Majority, so clearly appeared? A little Consideration,
with

with some Knowledge of that great and opulent City, will convince us, that when People talk of the Sense of *the Londoners*, Nothing can possibly be understood by it, more than the *Appearances of a Party in the City*. I shall therefore, accordingly so consider it. And using the Term, *Londoners, Citizens, &c.* indiscriminately, not for the *Whole*, but a *Part*, and considerable Number of them, I shall go near to prove them so far from having been *always* in the Right, as to shew, (altho' they did prevail) *when they* were *very often*, and *very materially* in the Wrong. If then, in the Course of this Consideration, it should appear that *the Party*, which seems, at present, predominant; which, certainly, makes the greatest Noise in *the City of London*, pretending to Patriotism, has copied pretty much after *those* their Predecessors, in many Instances, wherein *they* were judged most blameable, politically speaking; the Presumption is, that some of *this PARTY* do not mean *the true Interest of their Country*; that *NONE* of them are promoting it; altho' the Credit and Character of most of them may be very passable in all other Respects. Nor can this be thought so much a Paradox, when it is considered, that the Magick of Party has, for many Ages, been such (especially since

hope to find their Account in raising and cherishing a Spirit of Murmuring and Discontent. Thus I remember, a most wise and necessary Precaution, in the Legislature, of the utmost Importance to the whole Kingdom, and to the *City of London* particularly (the Pest Act) treated by *Citizens* (in the Language of the present Opposition) as an *execrable Scheme*, a vile Plot against the Liberties of the People, more terrible, in its Consequences, than the Plague itself. What could be the Meaning of this; when the Citizens most certainly were not without a Sense of Danger from the Contagion, nor yet averse, we may be sure, to their own Preservation; when the Act was justly timed, and gave no more Power to the Government than was judged absolutely necessary for that End? *Some*, who were not ignorant of all this, had *other Ends* in making wrong Representations of the Matter, which, *in the Spirit of Party*, were too readily swallowed down.

As then it is so difficult, it can't surely be thought necessary for the People always to be governed, exactly, according to their own Will or Sense of Things: Because, through their frequent Controversies, Mistakes, Prejudices and Perverseness, Government

vernment would be impracticable, and the End of it totally inverted.

Nor, if it was necessary, is it so easy to understand the real Will, and to know the true genuine Sense of any People, from common Occurrences, (respecting Government and Politicks) such as we see and hear, and read of in the News Papers; because, where a People are divided into Parties, Things will put on very different Aspects, according as *Persons* happen to preside, and *Parties* prevail, *here* or *there*. Thus it comes to pass, that, in *London*, a Place large and populous, as well as rich, tho' abounding with a Variety of contrary Notions and Humours, and Interests, the Effects of a Cabal is often miscalled, by some, in Course, mistook, for a Kind of Instinct, the natural Voice of the People; and the Noise of a predominant Party represented as universal Approbation and Consent.

But as the Testimony of universal Consent is of vast Weight; and an Opinion of it, tho' not wellgrounded, like a strong Torrent, is ready to bear down all before it, *that* is a Reason why we should be more cautious of admitting Things for general, which are, in Truth, but partial;

tial; and how we allow, for Maxims, Points very uncertain and precarious, if not the Reverse of Truth.

Notions which suit the Purposes of a Faction, Writers, on their Side, never fail to propagate with the greatest Assurance, whatever Absurdity or Falshood attends them; 'tis no Matter; they go on with the utmost Effrontery, to treat their Readers, as if they had neither Memory nor Understanding. And, indeed, I wish they had not too much Encouragement for their so doing; that the Generality were not too apt to run in with the Cry of the Day; without looking backward or forward; without considering or respecting, at least, the Nature and Tendency, the Truth and Connection of Things.

Much has been said * to excite and justify the meddling of individual private Persons, of all Bodies of Men, especially, and particularly, the *Londoners*, in publick *Affairs*. Some Instances have been cited, to shew where they did it properly, and with good Effect; not distinguishing between ordinary and extraordinary Cases; be-

* The Liveryman's plain Thoughts on publick Affairs.

between the Government in its natural, and in an unnatural State: That, only in the latter Case, Recourse lies to the *City of London*, as nearest at Hand, most largely interested in, and best able to secure the Peace of the Kingdom; that, at all other Times, they are in the common Case of Subjects; without a Negative upon, or any Jurisdiction over, the *Legislative* or the *Executive* Power. But this Distinction we have seen overlooked by our Pamphleteers, &c. of late; and almost an unlimited Power assigned to the *Londoners*, of directing and controuling *whom*, and *as* they please; under a Pretence, forsooth, of their superior Knowledge, and certain, immemorial, unbiassed Integrity. As the Faith of History is the best Testimony we can refer to in this Case; as the present * Advocates for these Notions have attempted to support themselves from thence: As the unhappy Reign of *Charles* the 1st, is a Period of Time, from which a present PARTY of LONDONERS seem to have transcribed, not a little, and in which their Defenders, I might have said, Prompters also, have appeared willing to join Issue—— Be the
History

* Liveryman, &c.

History of those Times the Test of the present as well as former Rectitude of their Conceptions and Conduct.

The Misgovernment of the first Fifteen Years of that Reign was such, that a Person who is *really* moved with the present Cry about Liberty, need but compare the History, or a Catalogue of the Grievances *then* complained of, with what he knows and observes now, to be fully convinced that the Clamour is wholly groundless. Weak Persons may perhaps mistake the License and Impunity of antiministerial and anticonstitutional Writers, for real Faults in the present Form, and the Administration of our Government; when the Truth is, that the *one* is only strictly, *i. e. scrupulously legal*; the other, (as all History will attest) beyond Example, *mild*.—— But if all Persons can't consider this, nor reflect, that *Country-Party*, and *Country-Interest* are mere *cant Terms* and *Names*, which the Chiefs of any Faction may assume at-Pleasure; tho' they can with *no Propriety* be given to them; it is less Matter of Wonder, if some should be ready to be carried away with Arguments urged from *certain Examples* in the *City of London*. This therefore,

fore, is a Case that deserves somewhat a more particular Consideration.

If the Beginning of the *civil War*, or *grand Rebellion* (which cost near 100 Millions of Money, besides the infinite Spoil and Havock of *Plunder* and *free Quarter*, and, in which (*horrible Remembrance*) an Ocean of *English* Blood was spilt) may be dated from the passing the Remonstrance in 1641: And if that dismal Catastrophe, in the Conclusion of it, (*for which, as a Nation, we justly take Shame to ourselves, once a Year**) the Murther of the King and our whole Constitution, may be derived from another and the next great Crisis, which was the new modelling the Parliament Army by Means of the self-denying Ordinance in 1644; and, if in each of these particularly, as well as almost all along, we find a *Party* of *Londoners* to have been very deeply engaged in *Measures*, and so have conducted themselves in a *Manner*, which unprejudiced Posterity can now clearly perceive, as well from the Nature of Things, as from the Event, to have been erroneous at least; then may it be thought with me, that the
City

* Jan. 30.

City of London, like any other Part of the Kingdom, is subject to *Faction* and *Frailty*; that its Number of wise and worthy Members, tho' at all Times considerable, has not always been able to stop the Eddy of an overflowing popular Fury, raised by the Breath of ill-designing artful Clamour.

One of the great Failures in the Beginning of the Reign of King *Charles* the 1st, and the Mother of all the Grievances thereof, was a *Disagreement* with, and *Disuse* of Parliaments. Indeed the King had, by those Means, brought himself into great Difficulties, as well as his People under many real Hardships. To cure all which, and prevent the like for the future, upon a Change of his Councils, and seemingly of his own Sentiments too, a Parliament was summoned to meet *November* the 3d, 1640. This every one pretended the People expected; and he, for his Part, promised *it should not be his Fault, if Things had not a good and a happy Issue.*

At their first sitting down to Business, proper Committees were appointed for all Things; and a select one, for making and preparing a Remonstrance of all the
several

several Grievances of the Nation, arising from the past Misgovernment, and wrong Policies of that and the foregoing Reign. But upon the King's shewing a sufficient Condescension, even more than was expected, it was judged proper to be laid aside. However, upon the Turn of the Tables; as Extremes are generally repaid *in Kind*; so the *Puritans* having been oppressed by the *Episcopal Party*, and the just Temper of Toleration not yet entertained by *any*, nothing less could content the *former* than the total Extirpation of *Episcopacy*; when, among others, *the City of London*, (by which we are to understand a *Party from the City*) gave into the *Parliament* a Petition against *Bishops*, containing, according to the Fashion of those Times, twenty-eight Grievances from that *Apostolical Order* in the Church, of which the twelfth, and not the least pertinent, was *the Multitude of Monopolies, and Impositions upon all Kind of Commodities*.

The Impeachment of the *Lord Strafford* being turned into a Bill of Attainder, and not passing readily the House of Lords; a great Number of *Londoners* petitioned both Houses against him; and * as a bet-

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* Clarendon.

ter Argument to the Lords speedily to pass the Bill, the Members of the House of Commons, who had dissented to that Act, had their Names written in Pieces of Parchment or Paper, under this Superscription STRAFFORDIANS, or *Enemies to their Country*, and those Papers fixed upon Posts, and other the most visible Places about the City. Thus those *Champions for Liberty* were guilty, my Lord Clarendon observes, “ of as great and destructive a Violation of the *Privileges* “ and *Freedom* of Parliament, as can be “ imagined.” If modern Faction has not run the same Course exactly, we have seen very near Approaches to it, in many Instances; that of stigmatizing a Fellow-Citizen* for a *Vote* in *Parliament*, must be thought an extraordinary Procedure, which unprejudiced and undeceived Posterity, I am inclined to think, will as generally condemn, as they now do, the former Behaviour of *some factious Citizens*, in the Affair of my Lord Strafford, and whose Irregularity in that Case, had no Bounds.

For, the King having signified to both Houses, that he could not in Conscience,
con-

* Sir G——e Ch——on.

condemn the *Lord Strafford* of *Treason*, though he thought him guilty of Misdemeanours, a Multitude of *Londoners* undertook to force the Lords to what *they* called *Justice*. “ These unheard-of Acts “ of Insolence and Sedition continued “ many Days,” till about half the Lords, who were present at his Trial, being terrified out of their Attendance, the Bill passed. In the same manner did they afterwards treat the King at *Whitehall* to induce his Compliance. He was inclined to oblige, and had gratified the angry Patriots in almost every other thing; and, in hopes, I suppose, to appease them fully, was ill advised to consent to this also: But the Sequel will tell us, that Condescensions to Demands quite unreasonable, is not satisfying and quelling, but inviting and provoking a Spirit of Incroachment and Innovation.

Within the first nine Months of this Session, every Grievance, publick and private, being redress'd, the *Parliament* had seemingly nothing to detain them from returning into their respective Countries, to have reaped the Fruits of their Labours, thus far right and honest, for the most Part, and to have received the Compliments of their Neighbours and Coun-

trymen accordingly. — But that suited not the Designs of *them all*. Some were timorous about the Article of Liberty; *others* big with the Thoughts of Reformation, as they called it, in the Church; and a concealed Party, under *their Wing*, wished an entire Subversion of every Thing *civil* and *sacred*; for the *two latter*, Matters were to be prepared by Degrees; and the *former* were to be made useful to *them*, by cherishing their Suspicions and Fears, and thence engaging *the House* to take proper Steps to lead them to *their End*; which was yet a Secret to many of the Members.

Through another unhappy Concession of the King's, the Parliament could not be dissolved or prorogued, without a Vote of both Houses; so that was to be prevented at any rate: And having little or no Work left upon their Hands, *some* was to be cut out that should be *suitable to their Designs*. What then did these Gentlemen betake themselves to, but to draw up a Remonstrance of the former Grievances of the Nation, very particularly enumerated, and greatly exaggerated: Not address'd to the King, but to the People; yet to be presented to his Majesty along with a Petition; and (that no Circum-

stance

stance of Incivility might be wanting) ordered to be printed and actually published, contrary to the King's express Desire, before they could receive his Answer either to the *Petition*, or to the *Remonstrance*; of which latter Mr. *Whitelock* says, " That
 " it was roughly formed, both for the
 " Matter and Expressions in it, and met
 " with great Opposition in the House;
 " infomuch as the Debate of it held from
 " Three a Clock in the Afternoon, till
 " Ten a Clock next Morning; and the
 " sitting up all Night caused many,
 " through Weakness and Weariness, to
 " leave the House; and Sir *B. R.* to compare it to the Verdict of a starved Jury." It was not carried by many; and some, tho' that was judged unparliamentary, protested against it. Thus it was plainly the Effort of a Cabal, or particular Faction, which never promises good to a Nation. That it was of a desperate Nature, *Cromwel's* Declaration shews, (who, tho' not much taken notice of as yet, appears to have been very deep in this Affair) saying, as soon as it was over, *that if it had miscarried, he would have sold his Estate immediately and left the Kingdom.**

That

* Clarendon, Rapin.

That a *Party* of *Londoners*, again, had no small Hand in promoting this *Remonstrance*, which, when presented to the King, was to be accompanied with a *Petition* (*they vastly favoured*) against *Prelacy*, Mr. *Whitlock* will inform us, who says, “that during this Time, divers of
 “ the City came in great Numbers and
 “ Tumults to *Whitehall*; where, with
 “ very unseemly and insolent Words and
 “ Actions, they incensed the King, and
 “ went from thence in like Posture to
 “ *Westminster*; behaving themselves, with
 “ extreme Rudeness, towards some of
 “ the Members of both Houses” (*those who had been against the Remonstrance, and were for Episcopal Church Government*) one of their principal Cries being, *no Bishops!*

The *Lords* having tried in vain to appease these Tumults, desired the *Commons* to join with them, in publishing a Declaration against them; which was but asserting the Dignity, the Privilege and Freedom of Parliaments. But the *Commons* (which explains the whole Affair) denied their Concurrence. In short,* “ it
 was

* Rapin.

“ was evident that some leading Mem-
 “ bers did not desire these Tumults
 “ should be so soon ended.” Mr *Pym*,
 one of them, was affirmed to have answered to one persuading him to endeavour to prevent them,† “ *God forbid the People*
 “ *should be hindered from obtaining their*
 “ *just Desires.*”

Rapin says, indeed, the House in general, could not be accused of taking any Resolution to encourage these Tumults. But my Lord *Clarendon* tells us, that several Speeches were made in Justification and Commendation of them; which puts beyond Dispute, *Rapin's* Account, viz.
 “ that they were caused by the Intrigues
 “ and Directions of *some* of the leading
 “ Members of the *opposite Party to the*
 “ *King.*” And it was these Tumults, in the End, which produced a Step on the King's Part, through ill Advice, the most unpolitick, and fatal to his Affairs that could be; and, in its Consequences, fatal to the whole Kingdom too; namely, that of accusing a Lord and five Commoners of *High-Treason*; which, with some subsequent Proceedings in that Affair, equally violent and irregular, was (says *Whitlock*)
 the

† *Clarendon, Rapin.*

the *first visible and apparent Ground of the ensuing Troubles*. “ The King (he says) “ did it upon Information, that some “ Members had countenanced the Tumults from the City, which *were such, that it was a dismal thing to see and hear them.*”

Tho’ this then might be the *first visible and apparent Ground of the following Troubles*; for the *real original Ground* we must look back to the Affair of the *Remonstrance*; “ It was not very strange, “ that the King should be highly displeased with what was properly but a Series “ of Reproaches for his past Conduct, “ and against his Government; not directed to himself, but to the Publick; the “ Authors whereof only meant to incense “ the People against him, and which was “ made at a Time, when it seemed to be “ most necessary; accordingly the Beginning of the Breach between the King “ and the Parliament is properly to be dated from this Time, though, on both “ Sides, some Measures were yet kept.”†

“ Many thought it needless to reproach “ the King with Grievances, to the Redress whereof he had, without Sollicitation,

† Rapin.

“ tation, given a full Consent; and that,
 “ besides the Usefulness of the Remon-
 “ strance, it would serve only to open old
 “ Wounds, to which a Cure had been
 “ applied, and infallibly make the Breach
 “ wider between the King and Parliament.
 “ But this very Reason was precisely that
 “ which excited the others to cause the Re-
 “ monstrance to be approved; they want-
 “ ed a Dissention with the King, in order
 “ to obtain a *Diminution of the Regal*
 “ *Power.*” *

The Lord *Charendon* says, “ Such and
 “ so many Acts had been passed in this
 “ Parliament for the Benefit of the Sub-
 “ ject, as will be acknowledged, by an
 “ incorrupted Posterity, to be everlasting
 “ Monuments of the King’s fatherly Af-
 “ fection to his People; and such an Ob-
 “ ligation of Repose and Trust from his
 “ Majesty in the Hearts of his Subjects,
 “ that no Expressions of Duty and Confi-
 “ dence from them could have been
 “ more than a sufficient Return on their
 “ Parts.”

We have seen what the first Return
 was; than which nothing could have
 been more ungenerous and uncivil, even
 D among

* Rapin,

among Equals; much less was it to be justified from Subjects to their Sovereign. This Proceeding is such a Blemish upon our Ancestors as cannot be wholly excused, whatever may be said to extenuate it. If the King's Condescension, at the first Meeting of the Parliament, was Inducement sufficient for waving the Remonstrance at that Time; nothing could be more needless, after the Grievances were redress'd, had it not been intended on purpose to quarrel with him. This appears still farther in the Affair of the five Members, in which he soon became sensible of his Mistake, and sent a Message to both Houses (plainly shewing he repented of what was done, and in some measure confessing his Fault) * *capable of pacifying all, had there not been a settled Design against him.*

The King, it's true, through a Neglect of *Parliaments*, had given great Occasion of Complaints to his Subjects, during the first fifteen Years of his Reign; so that there were very few Members in *this*, who were not dispos'd to redress past Grievances, and prevent the like for the future: So far *all*, in a manner, were agreed. *Some* were for stopping there; *Others* (as there

* Rapin.

there will be in all Parliaments, who are for making things better than well) were for proceeding farther: Of these, some, through Excess of Caution only, not out of any Malignity to the *King*, or to the *Constitution*, in the main, but under a Notion of the greater Security (who of these were the *wisest* and the *truest Patriots*, let known Proverbs, as well as the Event, say.) But there were also *others*, who had yet more extensive Views, the total Change of Church - Government in particular. To accomplish which, they well knew it was necessary to deprive the King of a Power, which they saw he would not fail to exert (agreeable to his *Principles*, as well as *Coronation Oath*) in Opposition to their Design: And they had no better Way, than by cherishing a general Distrust in the Members; or rather, to gain a sufficient Number of these who were well affected and most moderate, but timorous and suspicious in the Article of Liberty. “ This was the Reason that
 “ such Care was taken to aggravate every
 “ Incident. This was the Cause of so
 “ many Efforts to exclude the Bishops,
 “ and that so many Mortifications were
 “ given to the King, to induce him to
 “ take some Step which should give an
 “ Advantage against him.” †

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† Rapin.

His Majesty fell into the Snare; and every Scheme against him and the Constitution, had, in its Turn, a Prospect of succeeding; till, at last, *Lord Clarendon* observes, “ a handful of Men, much inferior in the Beginning, in Number and Interest, came to give Laws to the major Part, and by a Plurality of Voices, in the End, *converted* or *reduced* the whole Body to their Opinions.” It is true (he says) “ they had some Advantages that gallant Men cannot give themselves leave to entertain, even for the Prevention of that Mischief, which others intend.” These Advantages, which were uniformly pursued from the Beginning to the End of those distracted Times, were (*and I wish I could say they are not, at this Time, too much in Use*) a Habit of Ill-Nature and Disingenuity; absurd *ridiculous Lying*, to win the Affections, and corrupt the Understandings of the weak; *bold Scandals* to the wilful;—gross *abject Flatteries* and Applications to the Vulgar.” Hence Libels and (the Consequences of them and other Intrigues) Mobs, at the Heels of Petitions, which, (like our Modern *Instructions*) were a mere Farce, first dictated by Members, and then received into

Par-

Parliament, as if they had come naturally from the People; and not unlike them in the much Disingenuity practised, in Order to gain Hands.

Besides the Methods already observed of converting Members by Mobs and Libels; by which some were intimidated out of their Attendance, as in my *Lord Strafford's* Case; others, through a false Shame or want of Courage to be unpopular, either complied with the Violence of the Times, or became indolent and unconcerned; for which *Lord Clarendon* greatly blames them; I say, besides these, the prevailing Party had another Method of *reducing* both Houses, so long as both subsisted, to their Opinion; which was, from time to time, either by some *Vote* or *Ordinance*, or else by mere *military Force*, excluding such as were not for their Purpose. And thus, the Parliament, which, from the first breaking out of the War, could not be considered as an entire Parliament, (many of both Houses having left them for the King's Service) was so continually wasting, that they were, at last in Derision, called the *Rump*; alluding to a Fowl consumed all to that Part. And indeed, considering their Transactions, it is for the Credit of the Nation, that they
were

were not a fuller Representative of it.
To return,

Nothing is more plain, than that those Mobs and Tumults, with Petitions, from the First Beginning, were so far from being casual and natural, that they appear to have been raised by *Art*, and conducted with some Sort of Regularity. One *Cornelius Burgeſs* was at the Head of them; “ *he called them his Bandogs; ſaid he could* “ *ſet them on and take them off;**” and ſo he did.— But that was juſt as he had the Word from Mr. *Pym*, and ſome other eminent Men in the *House of Commons* at that Time; *Gentlemen*, who, at firſt, did not mean to involve their Country in Blood and Ruin, had not taken ſo furious an Antipathy to the *Church* and *CROWN*, but they would have been willing to have continued in the *one*, and to have ſerved the *other* in *Poſts* and *Places*; which alſo the *King* had not yet reſolved againſt; the only Difference between them, was about *Terms of Recommendation*. The King expected ſome Sort of Complaiſance, common Civility at leaſt.— But they choſe (what is now called a vigorous Oppoſition)

* Clarendon. Rapin.

tion) “ *and endeavoured* by doing all the
 “ Hurt they could, to make evident the
 “ Power they had to do him considerable Ser-
 “ vice.*”

If any shall take upon them to say, that those artful Members were more blameable than the unmeaning or undistinguishing Crowd of *Londoners*; I can agree with them; that some intriguing, enterprizing Members, underhand, and by the Assistance of some *bold factious Citizens*, did produce those Appearances, which had such dismal Effects in the Conclusion.— But then, at the same Time that we acquit the Bulk of *those Londoners* of any malevolent Intention, we must also acquit them of any profound Skill or superior Judgment, consequently of a Right to interpose (as they did) in *State Affairs*.

If it is said, that these were but common Mobs, made up of Persons inconsiderable; that therefore the City, or *any Party* in it, in Point of *Judgment* and *Loyalty*, is not to be arraigned for any thing that then passed out of their *Courts*
 and

* Clarendon.

and *Councils*: They were, it's true, said to be chiefly Apprentices, and young Persons, who, having served their Apprenticeship, were about to enter into Trade. — But this was partly Disguise and Artifice, and partly owing to the particular Loyalty of the *chief Magistrate* * at that Time. We shall see afterwards, Things as little capable of Defence, to have had the Sanction of a *Lord-Mayor* and *Common-Council*. So that if the Citizens of *London* were not the greatest Sufferers in what followed; if they had the Happiness to be of that Consequence to be courted by all Parties, as they happen'd to prevail, and were made tolerable Amends for some present Inconveniences, by good *Interest* for the Money they furnish'd towards maintaining a War in the *Bowels of their Country*: If the *Nobility*, the *ancient Gentry*, established *Clergy*, and the *whole Commonalty*, in all other Parts of the Kingdom, were the Persons chiefly degraded, deposed, suspended, plundered, quartered upon, sequester'd, decimated, imprisoned, beggared, sold for Slaves, or murdered; and the Citizens happily not only escaped that general Calamity better than most others, but

* Sir Richard Gurney.

but many of them, and those not the most deserving, were actually enriched by it; it can't be said, that *a Party* of them (which were not a little numerous by having gained the Populace, and who therefore delighted often to assume the Name of the Whole) were the People least accessory thereto. I don't mention these things out of any the least Disrespect to our *great Metropolis*, which, even at that Time, contained a vast Number of *loyal Subjects* and *good Christians*; I don't impute the Consequences mention'd, to the Intentions of *all those* (far from it) who distinguished themselves then, in the unhappy Manner I have been speaking of. — But I think it a good *Memento*, a proper Lesson of *Modesty* to *some*, of *Caution* to *others*, how they too implicitly follow such as possibly may be no better than blind, or, which is worse, deceitful Guides.

Though, in regard even to the Beginning of the *civil War*, at this Distance of Time, and especially as the Event was, there is no Difficulty in judging, that the Parliament had acted much more wisely, in sacrificing their *Fears* and *Scruples*, as well as *Fancies* and *Humours*, to the *Ease*
 E and

and *Peace* of the Kingdom ; yet a Spirit of Resentment, with a Cloud of Prejudices and Passions, made it not so clear a Point then, but that *some noble and worthy* Patriots, partly from their own Principles and Persuasions, chiefly from too great a Condescension for certain artful and designing Persons, whose *real Designs* and *Pretensions* were vastly different, engaging in the Quarrel on the Parliament Side, and embarking in the War ; in virtue of their superior Quality, Credit and Character, the chief Command, in course, devolved upon them.

But the more honest Views of these Lords and Gentlemen not answering those of others, originally the fewest and meanest among them, a peculiar Scheme was projected for raising the latter upon the Ruins of the former, which was that fatal Original, *A Place-Bill*. Upon a Motion it was voted, “ *That no Member of either House of Parliament should, during the War, enjoy or execute any Office, military or civil, and that an Ordinance be brought in accordingly.*” Of which Mr. *Whitlock* gives this Account : “ That it was set on by *that Party*, who contrived the *outing* of the Lord General, and to bring on *their own Designs* ; and
“ they

“ they could find no other Way, than by
 “ passing a self-denying Ordinance, as
 “ they called it; which would serve their
 “ Turn, as a specious Pretence of their
 “ own Integrity, and waving all *Self-ends*,
 “ and so plausible to the People, and
 “ would also comprehend the Lord Ge-
 “ neral with the rest, and without naming
 “ of him; which, for Shame and Ingrati-
 “ tude, they could not think fit to be
 “ done.”

“ Some of them confessed, that this
 “ was their Design; and it was apparent
 “ in itself; and the Reason of their doing
 “ this was, *to make way for others*; and
 “ because they were jealous, that the Lord
 “ General was too much a Favourer of
 “ Peace (a good Fault in a General of an
 “ Army) and that he would be too strong
 “ a Supporter of *Monarchy* and *Nobility*,
 “ and *other old Constitutions*, which they
 “ had a mind to alter. Such is the Ingrati-
 “ tude of People, and the Uncertainty
 “ of their Favour, no Confidence can be
 “ placed therein, for this gallant Man’s
 “ sake, who was a most faithful Servant
 “ to the Publick, and performed so many
 “ brave Services for them.”

It is a natural Reflection here, to think how Mr. *Whitlock*, who writes so honestly and well on this Occasion, would have resented that so much more unhandſome and ungenerous Uſage of the *late glorious* JOHN Duke of MARLBOROUGH.—But what would have been his Aſtoniſhment, to have ſeen the *ſame Party* that was capable of that, within the Memory of Man, ſetting up for PATRIOTS, pretending a Dread of *French Councils*; and above all, of being jealous for the *Trade and Honour* of their Country? As if no Man alive could tell of *their Treaty of Commerce with France*; as if Words and Wind was ſufficient to wipe off the Diſhonour of ſoul Deeds, and to atone for the laſting Diſadvantages of the *Peace of Utrecht*.

But I return to the ſelf-denying Ordinance, which (*obſerve the Management*) had no ſooner been voted, but † “the
 “ Petition of *divers Londoners* was read,
 “ commending the Vote; and they again
 “ had the Thanks of the Houſe.” As that Event, which cauſed ſo great and fatal a Revolution in the State of *England*, as well as the Means which ſo much contributed

† Whitlock.

buted to it, viz. the *Interposition of Londoners*, correspond so nearly with a late, if not a present favourite Scheme (*a Place-Bill*) and the extraordinary Zeal expressed for it by a *Party* of the Citizens of *London* also: I shall here give Part of the great and judicious Mr. *Whitlock's* Speech upon the Debate which was about it.

“ I shall conclude with the Examples
 “ of the *Grecians* and *Romans*, among
 “ whom, Sir, you know that the great-
 “ est Offices both of War and Peace were
 “ conferred upon their Senators; and
 “ their Reasons were, because, they ha-
 “ ving greater Interests than others were
 “ more capable to do them the greatest Ser-
 “ vice. And having the same Interest with
 “ the Senate, and being present at their
 “ Debates, they understood their Business
 “ the better, and were less apt to break
 “ that Trust which so nearly concerned
 “ their private Interests, which was in-
 “ volved with the Publick; and the bet-
 “ ter they understood their Business, the
 “ better Service might be expected from
 “ them.”

“ Sir, I humbly submit the Applicati-
 “ on to your Judgment; your Ance-
 “ stors did the same; they thought the
 Members

“ Members of Parliament fittest to be employed in the greatest Offices. I hope you will be of the same Judgment, and not, at this Time, to pass this Ordinance, and thereby to discourage your faithful Servants.”

It is to be noted, that Mr. *Whitlock* was not only one of the greatest Men of those Times; but, that he had in the Beginning of his Speech observed, that he himself was quite a disinterested Person, not a *Place-Man*; nor ambitious of being one in the Sense of that intended Ordinance. The Debate (he tells you) “ held till late at Night; and then, upon the Question, as some called it, *Envy* and *Self-Ends* prevailing, the Ordinance passed the *House of Commons*; and was voted to be sent up to the *Lords* for their Concurrence, which it did not obtain till after four Months, and then with much Difficulty:” Nor was this an inconsiderable Mischief arising from the self-denying Ordinance, that here first began to increase that Difference between the two Houses, which swelled afterwards to so fatal a Height. And here ended (says *Whitlock*) “ the first Scene of our tragick Civil War in the Exit of that brave Person *Essex*;” it may be added, and

and of some other *noble Lords and worthy Gentlemen of Distinction.*

If the first Scene was tragical; the second was, beyond all Example, much more so; and the Actors in it so far from being thought capable of the least Defence, that no Party since has thought fit to own them. I would not accuse *all those* of the *Londoners*, who forwarded the *Place-Bill* or self-denying Ordinance, of intending what followed, tho' it was a Consequence of that Ordinance which a *Party* of the City might very well be said to procure; as it was backed with a Petition from them, which, no Doubt, by too many who piqued themselves unluckily upon their Popularity, at that Time, was received as an INSTRUCTION from which they might not venture to deviate.

But it is really strange, that a second Attempt of the same kind should, by any Persons, have been judged prudent, or that it should be attended with the least Degree of Popularity; when the Experiment had been once before, and but once made, in the Space of near 700 Years, *viz. from the Conquest*; and then, tho' it was an Age of able Men, as any their Successors

cessors can boast of, closely followed by a total Overthrow of the Constitution, and that succeeded by an absolute Tyranny. With what Views, and upon what Motives some have acted in this Affair lately, I won't pretend to say, hope future History will never have Occasion to record them. But in 1644, besides what Mr. *Whitlock* has told us of it, this was briefly the Ground of that Project. There was, as has been observed, among the Parliamentarians, a concealed Party of Independents and Republican Deists, whose Principles were proper to put the Kingdom into a Flame (as they did effectually) with regard to the State, *abhorring Monarchy*; as to Religion, being *averse* even to an *ordinary Ministry*. These, after having lent their utmost Assistance to the *Scotch* and *English* Presbyterians to ruin Episcopacy, as being so much in their way towards the *Destruction* of the *Monarchy*, which was the Point they drove at, perceived at last they should not be able to gain it by means of their old Allies; for that it was not the Intention of the *Scotch* or *English* Presbyterians, Laity or Clergy, to proceed *so far*; which made it expedient for them to take the first good Opportunity of setting up for themselves, and to undermine them as a Rival Power; not
openly,

openly, for fear of being oppressed before they had well laid their Measures; but secretly, and by Artifice. To that purpose, “ the Leaders of this Party began (*in the* “ *Art and Dialect of modern Patriotism*) to “ make themselves very popular, and express a great Zeal for the Publick, in “ order to gain the good Will of the People. They had their Emissaries everywhere, who diligently aggravated the “ Faults committed, or *supposed* to be “ committed, since the *Beginning of the* “ *War*, as well in the *Administration of the* “ *Government*, as in the *military Operations*; and insinuated, they were entirely “ to be ascribed to the private Views of “ *selfish Members* of Parliament, who possessing all the *Places and Offices* were “ unmindful of the *Interest of their Country*.”* All this, as preparatory to a *Place-Bill*, the self-denying Ordinance, to which *Cromwel* leading the way, *Zouch Tate* made the Motion, and was seconded by Sir *Henry Vane*; the *Success* whereof was, as has been related; the *Event* we shall see presently. One would have supposed, by this Account, the Republicans to have been the Majority in *this Case*. But we are † told the contrary; that Hy-

F pocrisy

* Rapin.

† Rapin.

pocrisy and Disimulation having been too much a reigning Vice in some of *those first Patriots*, they had pretended Disinterestedness to such an *incredible* Degree, that being pressed upon that Point, rather than pull off the Mask, they suffered themselves to be drove into the Snare.

And thus the Independants or Republicans became possessed of the Army; which tho' it was modelled by Lord *Fairfax* the General, supposed to be of a better Principle; *Cromwel* had such an Ascendant over him, that he made him do whatever he pleased; consequently those, whom *he* and *his Party* considered as Enemies, were cashier'd. As CROMWEL and *his PARTY* could not possibly execute their Designs, but by compassing the *King's Destruction*, all Risks were to be run by them to effect that; in course, the War must be carried on with uncommon Vigour; and was so, in which they had the joint Assistance of the Presbyterians; for tho' the two Parties had different Views, as it suited *both their Interests* to disable the King, the *Coalition* held till they got him under their Power; THEN — (as ALL Divisions after a while, especially after *certain Points* gained by *them*, are, for some Reason or another, attended with Subdivisions)

visions) *they*, who before had seem'd united, began to separate openly; each plainly perceiving this was the critical Time to make the Advantages gained, *in common*, turn to *their own particular Benefit*.

The Presbyterians were superior in the Parliament: But the Independants or Republicans were, in effect, Masters of the Army; and by that their Party was grown very considerable; it was therefore the Interest of the former to have the Army disbanded.— But the Commanders being chiefly of the latter Party, they begged their Pardons for that. Mr. *Whitlock*, with his usual Wisdom, had, in a manner, foretold this as a natural Consequence of the self-denying Ordinance, in one Part of his Speech against it: “ One Argument
“ is (says he) that the Members of Parlia-
“ ment, who are Officers, being of equal
“ Power in Parliament, will not be so
“ obedient to your Commands, as others,
“ who have smaller Interests, and would
“ not so much dispute one with another.

“ Surely, Sir, those, whose Interest is
“ the same with yours, have the more
“ Reason to obey your Commands than
“ others, and have more to hazard by Dis-
“ obedience than others can have; and in

“ your Commands all your Members are
 “ involved; and it were strange, if they
 “ should be backward to obey their own
 “ Orders.”

Cromwel, who had great *Craft* and equal *Disimulation*, cajoled the *General Fairfax*, by pretending to be of his Principle, and amused the Parliament for a while; at the same Time, that by other Hands, he found Means to inspire the Army, both Officers and Soldiers, with Discontent against the Time of their going to be disbanded. The Army shewing their mutinous Disposition by Petitions; the Parliament answered with Declarations; and beginning to disapprove the very Practice of petitioning, had justly retorted upon them their own Declaration in *November 1642*, in Favour of *such Petitions*. To make short the Story; the Parliament persisting in their Resolution to disband the Army; and the Army, intending nothing less, signed a solemn Engagement to stand by one another, and not suffer themselves to be disbanded, but upon such Terms, as they, both Officers and common Soldiers (by their Representatives chose out of each Regiment) should agree upon. It is easy to perceive, this being the Case, that their Terms

2

would

would not be very reasonable, (especially now as they consisted, not so much of the Nobility and Gentry of *England*, as before the self-denying Ordinance) and that, in the End, they must prevail. Accordingly, upon their approaching *London*, the Parliament and City resigned all Power into their Hands; and here commenced a *real Stratocracy*.

The Nation was now in very deplorable Circumstances; Things being changed from very bad to much worse. As what followed; the Murther of the King, the Dissolution of the Monarchy, the voting the *House of Lords* uselefs and dangerous; in a word, the entire Subversion of our Constitution, with all the Desolation and Destruction thereby occasion'd, is to be laid at the Door of the Army new modelled, and thereby become chiefly Independant or *Republican*; which is to be ascribed to the self-denying Ordinance, which was supported by a *Petition of Londoners*. As a great Party of them fell in with the first Cry of, No Bishops! As in my Lord *Strafford's* Case, they offer'd the first Violence to that essential Part of our Liberties and Constitution, the Freedom and Privilege of Parliament. As, after all Grievances both publick and private were redressed,

fed, the *Remonſtrance* could not be judged otherwiſe than needleſs, except for the ſake of quarreling with the King, and that for the ſake of altering the Conſtitution. As a ſtrong Party of *Londoners* were deeply concerned in that *Remonſtrance*, and the *Petition* attending it; although many even of *that Party* might be very honeſt Men in their private Capacities, undeſtanding well the Buſineſs they were bred to; only governed, impoſed upon indeed, and greatly abuſed in *publick Affairs*, by one *Cornelius Burgeſs* and *Company*, who were under Direction, led by the Noſe by Mr. *Pym*, and ſome other intriguing, leading Members of Parliament; no vaſt Compliments are due to the Memory of thoſe Citizens, conſider'd as *Politicians*; and if any body has ſaid that their *ſeditious Temper* was a principal Cauſe of the *civil War* in this Reign; altho' it may be thought an odious*, a harſh Reflection, I cannot ſay with the ſame Writer, *it is a falſe one*. Were they Enemies to arbitrary Power? It was very unfortunate, that chiefly by their Means the People were drawn into real Servitude; it being allowed, on all hands, that *England* never enjoyed leſs Freedom, than under the Government

* Livery-Man, &c.

vernment of the long Parliament and afterwards of *Oliver Cromwel*. Were they eager for the Redress of Grievances? Thro' their Eagerness their very Petitions became such.— But, it is said,* they expressed a Dislike of those Proceedings, which manifested a Design of changing the Constitution. *Monstrous Assurance this!* when, at the Time we are speaking of, that was the very Thing in question between the King and Parliament, or Part of a Parliament; the Ground of that War against him, which a Party, that then unhapily over-ruled all the City, so eagerly promoted, and so strongly aided.

The nineteen Propositions sent to the King, *June* the 2d, 1642. puts that beyond all Dispute. The King understood it: No one better, as appears by his Answer; wherein he foretold the Consequences of their *Republican Schemes* (for that was gained by *Force*, which could not be extorted from him by Treaty) just as they came to pass. “ That Changes in
 “ the Church would follow those in the
 “ State. That the second Estate (the
 “ *House of Lords*) would, in all Probability,

* Liveryman, &c.

“ lity, follow that of the first (*the regal*
 “ *Power*) till all Power being vested in
 “ the *Commons*; and thence retrusted ne-
 “ cessarily to a *few of them* (*a Committee*
 “ *of Safety*) the common People (whom
 “ in the mean time, (*that is, to compass*
 “ *these Changes*) they must flatter and in-
 “ dulse in all licentious and wild Hu-
 “ mours, how contrary soever to the esta-
 “ blished Law or their own real Good)
 “ would discover this Secret. That all
 “ was done *by them*, not *for them*, and
 “ would grow weary of Journey-Work,
 “ and set up for themselves; call Parity
 “ and Independance Liberty; devour that
 “ Estate which had devoured the rest;
 “ destroy all Rights and Properties, all
 “ Distinctions of Families and Merit; and
 “ by that Means, the antient and excel-
 “ lently distinguished Form of Govern-
 “ ment, would end in a dark Chaos or
 “ Confusion, and a long Line of Kings,
 “ not in a *free State* or *Commonwealth*,
 “ but a vile Tyrant and Usurper.” For
 which Reasons, our Answer is, (*said the*
King) and it is a good Answer to all
 Schemes tending to alter the Frame of our
 present happy well-mixed Constitution,
 or Form of Government) *Nolumus Leges*
Angliæ mutari!

The

The Parliament, and their Abettors, either did not, or would not see things in the same Light as the King did, although the Event, which shewed he was not mistaken, sufficiently convinced some of them who lived to see and to feel it. Indeed the City of *London*, *i. e.* a predominant Party there, however right it was in them to promote a Redress of Grievances, and protect the five Members, acted nevertheless some Parts, about that Time, very far from being defensible.

In *August* 1643, the House of Lords proposing to send Offers of Peace to the King, and having resolved upon the Propositions, had a Conference with the Commons, who concurred.—* “ But the
 “ next Day the *Lord-Mayor* of *London*,
 “ attended with a Crowd of People, came
 “ to the *House of Commons*, of which he
 “ was a Member, and delivered from the
 “ *Common-Council* a Petition, wherein the
 “ House was intreated to reject the Propositions of the *Lords* for Peace. And
 “ upon this Petition, and the *Lord-Mayor*’s Assurances of a Party in the City to support them, a Majority determin’d to reverse the Resolution of the foregoing
 “ Day, which was *for Peace*.”

G

Now

* Rapin.

Now to shew, how the Sense of other wise Persons, besides the *Lords*, differed from that of the *Lord-Mayor* and *Common-Council*, in that very Affair, at that very Time, here is Mr. *Whitlock*'s Speech, as I take it, the Day before, when the Matter was debated in the House of Commons.

Mr. Speaker,

“ It would be no wonder, to see an
 “ unanimous Concurrence of the whole
 “ House in furthering Propositions for a
 “ good Peace. The Calamities of our
 “ Distractions have brought us to it; and
 “ who is there amongst us hath not felt
 “ the Strokes of them. The Land is
 “ weary of our Discords, being thereby
 “ polluted with Blood. Which ever way
 “ Success inclines, the poor *English* are
 “ still Sufferers. Whose Goods, I pray,
 “ Sir, are plunder'd? Whose Houses are
 “ burnt? Whose Limbs are cut or shot
 “ off? Whose Persons are thrown into
 “ loathsome Dungeons? Whose Blood
 “ stains the Walls of our Towns, and de-
 “ files our Land? Is it not all *English*?
 “ And is it not then time for us, who are
 “ all *Englishmen*; to be weary of these Dis-
 “ cords,

“ cords, and to use our utmost Endeavours
 “ to put an end to them? I know, Sir,
 “ you are all here of the same Opinion
 “ with me in this Point; and that it was
 “ an unhappy Mistake in those, who told
 “ us in the Beginning of our Warfare,
 “ That it would be only to shew ourselves
 “ in the Field with a few Forces, and
 “ then all would be presently ended. We
 “ have found it otherwise. Let us now
 “ again seek to recover those Blessings of
 “ Peace, than which nothing is more
 “ pleasing to be desired, and more profi-
 “ table to be enjoyed. If the Lords will
 “ not come into our Measures [*about treat-*
 “ *ing*] let us go into theirs. Let us con-
 “ sent to any thing that is just, reasonable
 “ and honourable, rather than, in the
 “ least, to neglect to seek Peace, and en-
 “ sue it.”

The Character of this Gentleman con-
 sidered, with the Matter of his Speech,
 I am not ashamed to oppose his Sense sin-
 gly to that which seemed to be the Sense
 of the *Lord-Mayor* and *Common-Council* of
London. But laying all other Circum-
 stances together, they were most palpably
 in the Wrong. And here again, in Sup-
 port of what I have all along supposed,
viz. Parties, with different Opinions, in

the *City of London*; I am to observe, that, tho' the Violence of Times, and the Rigor of the prevailing Faction in Parliament, against all Opposers whatsoever (whom they termed and treated as Malig-nants, that is, in a most severe and arbitrary manner) was too great a Discouragement to the cautious Part of well disposed Citizens to hazard their Persons and Fortunes, yet they suffered their Wives to the Number of 5000 to attend the House with a Petition, the Reverse of that from the *Common-Council*, viz. *for Peace*.

And thus we have seen, that Appear-ances *there* depended pretty much, in *those Days*, upon the Disposition of the *chief Magistrate*; that in, and of, this great City, there *then* was, as there *now* is, and ever will be, Men of all *Seets and Parties*; in which if *one* does but get the Ascendant, so far as to make an easy Majority in their popular Assemblies; that which is opposite must subside in Course, as being no more to be heard and regarded, than was good *Archbishop Cranmer* and other *Protestant Confessors*, in their Disputations by *Queen Mary's* Appointment: They are self-applauded, which, with too many inconsiderate Persons, passes readily for the *general Sense of the Londoners*, consequent-

frequently, next to infallible. But, surely, it is needless to spend time to prove the Fallibility of *Parties* there, as in other Places, unless it shall be granted that Contraries may be true. Even within the Times, of which we have been speaking ; besides what has been already mentioned, we meet with Petitions from *Londoners* very various and contradictory ; sometimes in one Strain, sometimes in another. When the Parliament and Army quarrelled, sometimes making court to one ; sometimes to the other : Nay, to and from the same, in all outward Appearance, Petitions, Counter-Petitions, Petitions craving Pardon for the Error of former Petitions ; Petitions censured, avowed : Petitioners thanked, called in and reprimanded : Petitions disapproved, laid aside, and one Petition burnt. If we descend to later Times, we shall see them the same variable uncertain Pilots : To instance only in one short memorable Period of about 12 Months. In *October* 1687. The Lord-Mayor, &c. expressed a “ *deep Sense* of “ *King James’s Condescension and Goodness* “ in dispensing with the Laws ;” which, every Body knew, was intended to facilitate the *immediate Introduction* of POPERY. A few Months after, we hear of their inviting the *Prince of Orange* to
rescue

rescue them from the *Danger of it*. Twenty-eight Days before his landing at *Torbay*, they assure King *James* of their "Fidelity" to him, at the *utmost Hazard* of their "*Lives and Fortunes*." Though (*to do them Justice*) no sooner was his *Highness* safe at St. *James's*, but they congratulated his Arrival there.* So that if any peculiar Stress is to be laid upon the *Authority* of *Londoners*, it will be no less difficult where to fix *such* Authority, as a Point we may subscribe to, than that of the pretended Infallibility of the Church of *Rome*.

Indeed it is a most fallacious Way of arguing about publick Measures, from the Sense of those, who are apt to differ from themselves, and one another. Admit *Londoners* to have superior Skill in Trade; that they best know how to buy and sell, and get *Gain*; that by their Situation and Dealings, their Experience in many things is great, which makes some of them competent Persons to speak of *Facts*. Yet does it not therefore follow, that in Matters of *Reason* and *Policy*, in the great and arduous Affairs of State, such as *War*, *Peace*, *Treaties*, &c. their Judgment, that is, the Judgment of any mixed Number of

* Hist. of Addresses, *Lond.* 1709. p. 142, 186, 187.

of Persons, such as constitute their great Assemblies, is sufficient to determine a *Legislator* (who is or should be a Man of Leisure and Learning (*those of the Ancients were all such*) against his own Reason, and the Reason of those much better Judges, which, in the Course of Debates, he must needs hear, and by which he should be finally determined. Which shews that there is not a more absurd, as well as anti-constitutional Practice, than that of *presuming* to instruct *Members* authoritatively, either by a select Body, even a *Grand Jury*, for Instance, or by a Multitude of Hands. A Number of Objections lie against both; and this is none of the least, that *it proves nothing*; but is capable of being managed to serve *any Purpose*. Witness again the Addresses of King *James's* Reign from almost all Parts of the Kingdom, and from which can be inferred only *Want of Judgment* in the People, if they were real; *Want of Honesty* in *some other Persons*, if not so. Mr. *Whitlock* makes this Reflection, at a certain Juncture, upon the original Practice of petitioning, from whence this Copy of *instructing* is taken. “ This Way
“ of petitioning by a Multitude of Hands,
“ which was formerly promoted by some
“ of both Houses, as a Means to carry on
“ their Designs at that time, began now
“ to

“ to be made use of, and returned upon
 “ them, to their great Trouble and Dan-
 “ ger ; wherein we may observe the Ju-
 “ stice of God in punishing sometimes
 “ *undue* and *indirect* Means, by the very
 “ same Means, afterwards brought about
 “ against the Users of them.”

I forbear any farther Comparisons be-
 tween the Policies, &c. of *those* Times and
these, which the little Sketch of History I
 have here given, has, to a common Obser-
 vation, in many Instances, made to my
 Hands. Only we have the Happiness to
 observe this Difference ; that, as we have
 had none of the Provocation on the Part
 of the CROWN, so what prevailed *former-ly*
 to the absolute Ruin of the Kingdom,
 has only been imitated and aimed at *of*
late ; that the Style, &c. of the Majority
 and reigning Interest *then*, is only that of
 the *Opposition*, and *some* of the Minority
now ; many of whom, I doubt not, de-
 test the Thoughts of any such Consequen-
 ces, as attended the *Divisions* and *Reforms*
 of those Days : and so, it is certain, did
 Mr. Pym, and many others. But alas !
 they kindled a Fire they could not quench :
 they thought themselves, and were esteem-
 ed very wise, and appeared to have vast
 Influence in *Parliament* ; but they were
 outwitted

outwitted and overpower'd (*when things were ripe for it*) by Persons they did not suspect of a *Design*, or so much as a *Capacity* to supplant them.

Rapin's Method of accounting for the several sad Occurrences of which we have been speaking, upon the Foot of PARTIES, makes his History of them, not only, more entertaining than otherwise it would be, but *instructive*; which is the great Use of all History. As he seems to think the Republican Opinions had their Rise in *England*, from an Aversion to the arbitrary Maxims of *James* the 1st, and of the former Part of his Son's Reign: So, upon that Supposition, besides that ill Weeds are not easily eradicated, those of *Charles* and *James* the 2d were not proper to extinguish them. Accordingly, tho' there is no Doubt to be made of *such* having concurred heartily in the *Revolution*, for many Reasons; yet we find them early in King *William's* Reign recurring to their own Principles, and thereby distressing his Administration, at very improper Junctures; and the more so, in that they were always sure of being joined, on those Occasions, by the *Jacobites*. Bishop *Burnet* tells us, that when the Ducheſs of *Hanover* and her Issue were first proposed

to be put next in Succession to Queen Anne and her Issue, ALL the Republican Party opposed it. He says,* "*their secret Reason seemed to be a Design to extinguish MONARCHY, and therefore to substitute none, beyond the three that were named, that so the Succession might quickly come to an End.*" And tho', in the Decline of Queen Anne's Reign, when the Pretender and Popery, &c. began to stare us in the Face, they made no Scruple of adhering to the *Protestant Interest* for their own Sakes; yet did they not so entirely relinquish their favourite Notions, as not upon the first Disobligation, at least, to resume them. There are some, who are free to say, (and tell us, they have good Authority for it) that a Patriot,† some Time since deceased, one of the first and the chief of *the Opposition*, had actually an "*extraordinary Scheme of this Sort in his Head; tho' no Head in the Party was found capable to take it up, or bring it to Perfection when he was gone.*"‡

So that we may very well conceive the Parties in *Great Britain*, to be, at this Time,

* *Burnet's History of his own Times*, Vol. 2. p. 16.

† D——l P——y.

‡ *Historical View*, &c. 1740.

Time, principally *Three*; of which JACOBITES and REPUBLICANS, notwithstanding *present Coalitions*, are to be accounted *two* distinct ones; the *other* consisting of Persons well affected in the main, tho' some are discontented for Reasons which will subsist everlastingly; it being *always* necessary for *some* to have the Preeminence. As this is a constant inexhaustible Fund of Disgust; so that Disgust as readily supplies Pretences of Complaint against *any Administration whatsoever*. We know from History, as well as Reason and *present Experience*, that *Parties discontented*, however opposite in themselves, and odious to one another, will combine against the Power in being; and, which is more, they will be sure to put on that Appearance, which, for the present, is least exceptionable, and most likely to accomplish the Downfal of that particular Power or Interest; without doing which, in the first place, they cannot make the least Advances towards the Accomplishment of their *chief Design*. And as many little Streams uniting form at length one great River, this well accounts for big Appearances against a Ministry of so long standing as the *present* is; which yet if any make (as I know some would have it to be) an Argument for changing

Hands, without a more substantial Cause, History, in the Example of Queen ELIZABETH, who did not, and of King WILLIAM and Queen ANNE, who did, is full against them.

Now because *some*, for Reasons best known to themselves, (and because all JACOBITES to a Man, as well *others* as *Papists*, do Credit to the Opposition by their Numbers, and Service by their constant certain Zeal) take upon them to deny even the Existence of such a Party in the Kingdom at this time, I would desire *them* to remember the intended Invasion in 1708, in favour of the *Pretender*, when the same thing had been industriously given out (*to lull the Queen and State into Supineness and Security*;) altho' it afterwards appeared, that *he* depended chiefly upon his Adherents in *England* and *Scotland*, whom he had Reason to think very numerous. 'Tis true, he was providentially defeated.——But Bishop *Burnet* says, “ *The Queen was much alarmed with this*
 “ *Matter; and was very sensible with what*
 “ *Falshood she had been abused, by those who*
 “ *had pretended to assure her, there was not*
 “ *then a Jacobite in the Kingdom.*” * And
 I should

* Burnet, Vol. II. p. 502.

I should be glad to learn when it was, that *such* as were in the Interest of the Pretender at that time, and have, several times since, been justly accused of those Principles, as well as some Overt-Acts too, gave any Proof, *as a Party*, or indeed any Sign of having renounced them.

With regard to *those* then of the Opposition, who are *Jacobites*, and, being *Protestants*, intend, under all Events, to continue in *that Faith*; as Consideration certainly is not their Talent, it is in vain to argue with *them*; they plainly, either, cannot see, or don't regard *Consequences* in the least. But, as for some others, who seem rather too intent upon *them*, your timorous Politicians, who are always harping upon the worst that can happen from the *Prerogative* of the CROWN, never sufficiently secured from arbitrary Power, &c. as well as those, who being tinctured more deeply still with Republican Principles, are mere Visionaries in Politicks, and, under the Name of *Liberty*, constantly promoting, as much as in them lies, *Confusion*: I would wish them *both* to recollect; the *former*, how much Gentlemen of their Complexion were duped, and how soon brought to Repentance in the Time of *Charles the 1st*; the *latter*, how they had
no

no sooner effectually superceded the anti-ent Constitution, and erected themselves, at a *vast Expence of Blood and Treasure*, into what they called a *free Commonwealth*; but the very Man (*Oliver Cromwel*) who had a chief Hand in promoting the *Remonstrance*; in *modelling the Army*; in designing and passing the *PLACE-BILL* or self-denying Ordinance; in *over-awing* the Parliament by the Soldiery; in the *King's Murther*; in abolishing the *Kingly Office*, and the *House of Lords*; in turning out the *Commons forcibly*; in erecting this *Commonwealth* and reducing the *three Kingdoms* to its Obedience, (as if he had intended from the Beginning to tantalize all Parties in their Turns, and serve himself only at last) faced about against his *Masters*, and assumed the *supreme* or rather *sole Power* into his own Hands. Immediately, upon which, the *City of London* invited the *USURPER* to a splendid Entertainment, where the Solemnity of his Reception, was such as had been, at any Time, performed to the *KING*. It was after this, that a *REPUBLICAN* cast down and *shocked* with Disappointment, awaked from his *Political Slumber*, and (as *Dives* looked up in *Hell*, and saw *Abraham afar off*) directing himself to his *Sovereign* in Exile, made an Offer

Offer of his Duty, in a penitential Letter :
Beginning thus :

May it please your Majesty,

“ Time, the great Discoverer of all
“ things, has at last unmasked the disguised
“ Designs of this mysterious Age, and
“ made that obvious to the dull Sense of
“ Fools, which was before visible enough
“ to the quick-sighted Prudence of wise
“ Men, *viz.* That *Liberty*, &c. the Engines
“ of Politicians, are but deceitful
“ Baits, by which the easily deluded Multitude
“ are tempted to a greedy Pursuit
“ of their *own* *Ruin*. In the unhappy
“ Number of *these* *Fools*, I must confess
“ myself to have been *one*.” *

* Clarendon, Echard.

F I N I S.



An Impartial

ENQUIRY

INTO THE

PROPERTIES

OF

Places and Pensions, &c.



[Price One Shilling.]

THE HISTORY OF

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ENGLISH

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2)
An Impartial

ENQUIRY

INTO THE

PROPERTIES

OF

Places *and* Pensions,

As they affect the

CONSTITUTION.

Humbly

Inscribed to the serious Perusal of the
ELECTORS of GREAT BRITAIN.

Wherein

The Danger of the COMMUNITY is consider'd,
as the REPRESENTATIVE is subjected to the
Influence of MINISTERIAL DONATIVES.

WITH

An effectual and honest Proposal to establish her
Liberties beyond the Reach of future Contin-
gencies.

*Ubi Militem Donis, populum annonâ, Cunctos dulcedine
paci pellexit, insurgere paulatim Munia Senatus,
Magistratuum legum in se trahere.* TACIT.

*Nullos non honores ad libidinem cœpit & dedit spreto
Patriæ More.* IBID.

L O N D O N :

Printed for H. GOREHAM next the Leg-
Tavern in Fleet-street. 1740.

FINOUI

1808

Place des Religions

COMPTON

The first part of the work is devoted to the history of the city of London, from its foundation to the present time.

The second part contains a description of the city, its streets, squares, and public buildings, with a list of the names of the principal families and persons who have been connected with the city.

The third part is a collection of the most interesting and curious anecdotes and traditions of the city, with a list of the names of the persons who have been connected with them.

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An Impartial

E N Q U I R Y

I N T O

Places and Pensions, &c.

Gentlemen,



T would be Presumption, as well as an unnecessary Piece of Impertinence in Me, to advance farther Proofs to clear that Point, which already, upon your mature Deliberations, appears unquestionably evident : *viz.* A Necessity to *preserve our Parliaments free from the Pollutions of ministerial Donatives*, in order to maintain that *Equilibrium* of Power, which the People claim as their natural, hereditary,

B

and

and lawful Birth-rights, in the Administration of the Common-wealth. It has not been carried so far indeed as to deny positively our Pretensions to these Rights; but yet I apprehend We shall equally suffer in Consequences, whether our Liberties be forcibly extorted from us at one Blow, or may be left in a Posture that admits a Possibility to be gradually filched away by the undermining Practices of some canting Impostor.

Our State Physicians have argued very logically on the present Occasion, in informing Us that there are no Benefits receiv'd by Remedies, where there is not an actual Disease; or, which is the same, We should suspend our Complaints of Grievances under the Dominion of a mild and merciful Prince. I must sincerely concur with Them, in their Notions of his present Majesty's great Clemency and Benevolence; and persuade Myself that his apparent Successors promise as much Virtue as can be expected from Those, whom We have not yet experienc'd. But I think every Patriot should endeavour to have his Properties settled on a less precarious Footing, than to be dependant on the uncertain Principles of Posterity. Had

Had the Wisdom of our Ancestors been exerted under the peaceful inoffensive Reigns of preceding Kings, to obtain Preservatives from future Evils, the *English* Histories had not handed down to Us so many barbarous Examples of Slaughter and Desolation, perpetrated on their Descendants by succeeding Tyrants.

The Inclinations of Futurity are only intelligible to the all-wise Creator: A vicious Race may succeed the best of Kings. If therefore We should find a Defect in our present Constitution, or see any Opportunity unguarded for the Defence of our Liberties, it is the Duty of the present Age to anticipate, to prevent those Inconveniences, which by a Negligence We may transmit to our Successors with terrible Effects. And I think it undeniable, that timely Applications are necessary to prevent a small Wound from being provoked into a large Gangreen.

The *Instructions* of the great Metropolis of *London*, seconded by (almost) all the other free Boroughs of *England*, to their Representatives on this Occasion, are irresistible Arguments of the Sentiments of the People, with respect

to their Convictions of the imminent Dangers to which their Liberties lye expos'd : And I think it palpably evident to the meanest Capacity, that if the Representatives of the People borrow a *Dependance* from the Gifts of the Crown, there is an indisputable Necessity for such Representatives to concur with the Crown, in all her Acts, either advantageous or prejudicial to the Rights of the Constituents.

Some few Instances there may be of the Spirit of true Republicans left, who shall act agreeable to the Dictates of Conscience and Equity, when the Interest of the People demands their Votes in Opposition to this suppos'd *Badge of Slavery* : But short, very short is the Space of Time till the mistaken Favours are to be withdrawn, and the presumptuous Offender *unregimented, kick'd out of Employments, and displaced.*

Places, (such as are in themselves supernumerary, extravagant, and idle, such as borrow a virtuous Name to conceal a more odious Appellation) are modern Contrivances, perhaps the Intrigues of a *Minister*, to circumvent and pass over the Barrier of a Constitution ;

tion; and lay a Plan for innumerable arbitrary Proceedings, strew'd over with the *Appearance* of a legal Sanction. This Position possibly may seem ludicrous to some hireling Advocates of their Country's Ruin; but it is too capable of Demonstration — For how slender is the Difference, whether a *Minister* dictates Laws directly by the Force of his own Authority, or fetters the Delegates of the People, so firmly his Votaries, that They must obey his Mandates, without any Respect to the Councils of their Constituents?

It may be objected against Me here, that *Places* are essentially incident to every Form of Government; and that the *Donor* can best distinguish the Persons on whom He may confer his Favours; Therefore it cannot be otherwise interpreted than a *severe, abusive Construction to traduce* an Act, lawful in such strong Circumstances, or criminate a Conduct warranted by Justice, the Oeconomy of a Constitution, and universal Precedents. I am, not without some Reason, apprized that these are the Arguments to be laid hold of, to divert the Dangers of Scrutinies, and to prevent the unfledg'd Designs of a Political Schemist

Schemist from being seasonably detected. In Consequence to these Conjectures, I shall observe, by Way of Reply, that there is a very material Difference between *Places*, as they are to be consider'd *necessary* or *super-errogant* in a Constitution ; the former, wisely dispos'd of, are advantageous to Society in general ; the latter were neither calculated for, nor can be serviceable to the Publick ; but must clash with her Interests, as I shall endeavour to illustrate in the following Discourse.

The *Minister* who prefers personal Benefits and private Ends to the publick Good ; to establish an Interest with his Prince for Continuance in Authority ; and, at the same time, to place Himself beyond the Reach of a Resentment of the Community, whom He may have injur'd ; must endeavour to disproportion the Ballance of Power *originally* settled in the *People* ; and ingratiate Himself, by Insinuations, to be protected from the Punishments due to his Demerits. To accomplish these iniquitous Purposes, the less fortified Parts of *our Constitution* are to be founded, to overthrow, effectually, the whole Foundation
of

of *our Liberties*, purchas'd and seal'd with the Lives and Fortunes of our Ancestors; and by clandestine, indirect, oblique Means that *Voice of the People* is subverted, so strictly necessary to validate a lawful Decree. It is the very Essence of Liberty, that the Concurrence of the People, by the Votes of their Representatives, shall be unavoidably necessary to give force to an *obligatory Act*. But how miserable would the Reflection be, should we see the very Persons, whom we have *entrusted* with our Liberties, pinn'd fast to a *Ministerial Sleeve*, to be dragg'd and hawl'd as He thinks proper?

The prodigious Encrease of PENSIONS and PLACES of late Years, have engag'd the curious Examinants into the Mysteries of Art, to employ their utmost Meditations to solve this uncommon *Phænomenon*. And the cautious Writer of the *Gazetteer* (who, by the by, has not been over tender of his Patron's Reputation) has saved them a wonderful deal of Time and Trouble in their Enquiries, by his Informations, * *That such is*

* *Vide Gazetteer of January 25, 1739-40.*

the Conduct of the great Destroyer of Liberty, Cardinal Fleury. This is undoubtedly a very great Compliment to the *English Nation* ; but I hope our Constitution will not be so very obliging as to permit the *Great Cardinal's Rival* to practice his Pranks on a *British Parliament*, and reduce Them to the same counterfeit Representation of Power, as is the *Original* from whence Hé may take his *Copy*.

But to set-out a Matter in the clearest Light, which seems to admit of no Degree of Controversy. There must, certainly, be some Design in this Species of PLACES we treat of, or there must not. If there is no *Design* in them, they are an oppressive Burthen to the Commonwealth. If there is a *Design* in them, I should be glad to have it explain'd ; for I really can find none—except I force my Imagination to harbour the disagreeable Idea, that it may proceed from an Inclination to extend Opportunities, to subtract the Liberties of the Subject without open Violation to the Laws.—I should be glad to wave the Thoughts——But the Nature of their Applications prevent Me——

In

In Millions of Men, some other deserving Objects should be found than our Representatives in Parliament, (or which answers the same Purpose) their *appointed Substitutes*. Or could a *national Request* be rejected, except the Interest of the People irreconcilably jarr'd with such *suspected Views*? And for a Confirmation that it is a *national Request*, to *limit the Number of Place-men in the House of Commons*; I hope no Champion of the *Projector's* Cause will be so resolutely abandon'd to all Sense of Shame as to insist, *That the Majority of Free Boroughs, headed by the capital Cities of the united Kingdoms, by London, York, Bristol, and Edinburgh, are not more declaratory of the Sentiments of the People, than a few inconsiderable Boroughs, more immediately expos'd to the Influence of Corruption.* The People are therefore very justly alarm'd at the *Insecurity of their Liberties*; and surely with Abundance of Reason, if the Votes of their Representatives should happen to be alienated by *mercenary Gratuities*, or cajol'd by the *awful Nods* of such a *worthy Statesman*, who may Farm-out his *Places* to the best Bidder, at the publick Expence, upon

the old Condition, *That there shall be no Purchase without Payment.*

But let Us forbear Hostilities a-while, and suspend Arguments of this serious and severe Composition; Let Us play the *Wanton*, and admit the favourable Construction which the ingenious Mr *Freeman* * is pleas'd to varnish a new-invented Branch of Mathematicks, this *pensionary Multiplication* with. Let Us suppose, that these Places and Pensions are design'd for collateral Satisfactions, to reimburse the Representatives the Expences consequent to their Attendance at Court; to repay the Exorbitancies of their *Wives* at Plays, Cards, Operas, Masquerades, Al-frescoes, and at other such fashionable Places; nay, let Us go a little farther, and suppose them as Equivalencies for *contingent Expences*, such perhaps may be the Loss of Reputation in some 'Squires innocent Lady, brought up from the Country to be more *politely initiated in Town Mysteries* — But can these humorous Suppositions be satisfactory to Posterity for the Loss of their Liberties; Or, to gratify this merry Gentleman, shall we blindfold Ourselves

* *Vide the same sad Author and Paper as before.*

not to observe an Exaggeration of Opportunities for *eternal Slavery*? — No — There still is a Passage left open in our Constitution for innumerable Calamities to force their Course; and We are not to suppose those Events impossible, which the Ignorance of some of our Royal Predecessors, or perhaps the Goodness of Others, has not already perpetrated — In a few Years, we know not but some *Heliogabalus* may rule the Imperial Throne, and with his Train of *Mercenaries* leave no Occasion for further Doubts, whether a *national Revolution* may not ensue from this unhappy Possibility of Destruction? In such a Case, will not our afflicted Posterity imprecate, with the greatest Justice, the guilty Ashes of their Ancestors? Men who were convinced of the Danger, if the Flame should gather Strength, yet suffer'd it to wax to such a Head, that the Efforts of human Nature are insufficient to controul its Rage? We see, We are conscious of the Apparency of everlasting Misfortunes, and shall we be indolent in Affairs of this last Moment; whose Consequences may be outrageous, irreparable, and infinite?

It is different from my Purpose, to consider how deeply an indebted Nation must be affected with a Pressure of Employments, contriv'd to embezzle large Salaries, without having any visible Use — I shall not even Glance at the Thoughts of Thousands *per Annum* annex'd to the Function, where one hundredth Part would be more than a sufficient Competency ; or of infinite Shoals of nominal Agents crouded into those *Sine Cure* Offices, where the Business is transacted by a few Secondaries. — I shall avoid the Notice of either Grants or Reversions of Patent-Offices to such Men as perhaps cannot have any Notions of the Nature of the Gifts hammer'd into their Brains, tho' by indefatigable Inculcations. For I have laid out my Plan not to consider these inferior Qualities of *our Sufferings*, but to prove the main Article ; *That a Majority of Votes, influenc'd by Ministerial Gifts, is an infallible Way to subvert a Constitution.*

It would be ridiculous to the highest Degree to suppose, That a Majority of *Place-men* should deny their Votes to HIM from whom They receive such extraordinary Benefits

fits, as cannot be otherwise recompenced. Self-Preservation is the first Law of Nature; and we must know what Thunder-bolts of Revenge are levell'd against the Criminal who dare to disobey the Mandates of his *Patron*. Has Length of Time obliterated the Effects of an *Excise Scheme*? Consider the *Tenancy of Places* is but a Tenure *at Will*; — He must be ousted of Possession who refuses to perfect the Terms of his Lease. Examples have prov'd my Assertions; and further Reasons need not be assign'd. — Is then a private Man to engross that whole *legislative Power* to Himself, by indirect Means, which *our Ancestors* thro' many wise and well-judg'd Motives thought too extensive, and, upon this Consideration, vigorously refus'd to entrust to the Direction of any *single Power*? Or shall a MINISTER have a more unconfined Authority, than was thought safe to lodge in OUR KINGS.

As every Man desires to have his Memory regarded or disrespected by future Ages, He should endeavour to hand down to Posterity their Liberties as sacred and inviolated as He has receiv'd them from his Ancestors; and make
such

such additional Improvements as Common-Sense, Equity, and universal Approbation proclaim necessary. The Majority of the People, for Reasons not to be controverted, have foreseen the hazardous Situation of their most inestimable Properties, and have made seasonable Remonstrances for Redress. But if neither Instructions nor Entreaties are to be observ'd; If the *deluded Constituents* have elected Instruments rather to *support* than *obviate* the Dangers, They must finally appeal to their future Policy and Wisdom in the Choice of such Representatives, as will not *thwart*, but *obey* them.

Men who barely personate, are not, I presume, to act from their own private Sentiments. I humbly apprehend, that there is some Analogy between the Deputation of the *Representatives* of a People, and the *Ambassador* of a Prince; and that consequently the Instructions, Limitations, and Councils of their respective Constituents, are implicitly understood as the *Rule* of their *Duties* and *Safeties* in their several Civil Actions. If They exceed the Confines of their Commissions, or arrogate a Privilege to act in Opposition

tion

tion thereto, I must think that They alter the Design of their original Institution, and are as highly punishable, as may be in the Power of their distinct Superiors to inflict --- But where the Constituents, upon serious and weighty Deliberations, have come to Resolutions, solemnly ratified, to address their Representatives, to apply legally in Parliament for the Redress of Grievances, which in all Probability must endanger the publick Tranquility ; and the Representatives either neglect, or venture to act contradictory to such Instructions, can any Excuse palliate the Offence? — It is certainly the most enormous Insult that can be offer'd against the Constitution ; and should be resent'd with such adequate Punishments, as are naturally vested in the Constituents to dispense, in order to support that fundamental Equality of Power, which, by a common Consent, is ordain'd as the Standard of universal Government.

If *Trustees* in Power, are design'd to personate and manage a Trust, reposit'd in Them to such Purposes as their Electors shall think proper to direct : In such a Case it is beyond Doubt,

Doubt, that the Rule of such Trustees Duty, consists in the strict Observance of such Instructions, as the Majority of Constituents shall prescribe for their Obedience; And this is more fully explain'd by Reflections on the Design of the Representatives Creation, and the Force of his Suffrage in Parliament. For as it would be a heavy, national, annual Expence to have the Elector's Presence in Parliament to declare his Opinion and Vote on every Occasion: Our wise Constitution has so contriv'd it, that to avoid this Inconvenience, *the People at a full Meeting* shall elect those Men, whom They judge to have the greatest Capacities, Integrity, and Abilities, to represent Them; and the End for which They elect Them, is to *speak the Peoples Voice* on every Emergency; and like faithful *Echoes*, to return those Sounds without Alteration that are intrusted to their Delivery. — So in Parliament, upon this Supposition, that the Voices of the People are epitomiz'd in their Representatives, every Act and Resolution must have the Concurrence of a Majority to lend it Strength and make it valid. It is then as morally certain, as any human
 Thing

Thing can admit, that the Power lodg'd in the Representatives of the People, is *derivative*, and *limited* to this Condition ; *That They, in all their Councils and publick Acts, proceed with Reverence to the Instructions of Those, who have delegated and confided a Power in Them* ——— But where this Power is mismanag'd, perverted, or abus'd, there the Constituents are necessitated to look out for Succour, and the Delinquents guilty of a most extensive Breach of Trust. The publick Security sounds the Alarm, and every Member of the Society is indispenfibly oblig'd to concert fuch legal Measures, as are juft and necessary to preserve his Frame of Existence.

Should any State-Sycophant advance his slavish Doctrine, that in the Compact of Society the Individuals have transfered fuch an unlimited and exorbitant Share of Power to the executive Part ; that They have made no Referve of Defence from its injurious and oppreffive Exercife. Should it be faid, that the Members, to be govern'd, muft submit without Reluctance to the unlawful Proceedings of their Governors, would not this be *Dictator-*

ship revived? This would be an unhappy Transformation of a free Government into an absolute Dominion; and a flagrant Alteration of the fundamental Laws, tho' clouded and disguised by the specious Delusions of a ministerial Rhetorick — A Trust, is for the greater Convenience of the whole People, substituted in a *few Voices* for particular Purposes; and if this Trust be not executed agreeable to the original Intention, and apply'd to the Uses for which it had its Birth, it is void in Effect. The Design is annihilated. The Donors are deceiv'd, and the Delegates have made an apparent Forfeiture, in not observing the Conditions of their Power, *viz. to consult and advise for the publick Security, and act with Deference to the Dictates of their Constituents.*

My Lord Coke, in his fourth Institute of the High Court of Parliament, expressly says, *That every Freeholder of a County (not a Lord) is a Member of the House of Commons, either in Person or by Representation:* And This is so undeniable a Truth, that I might have saved Myself the Trouble of Appeal to such an excellent Authority. It shall now be my
Business

Business to make my Inference just and conclusive to the material Point which I have lately advanced, *That the Actions of a Representative in Parliament are not to be solely directed by his private Sentiments; but are to be finally determin'd by the Resolutions and Instructions of a Majority of the Persons He represents.*

As every Freeholder, who by Representation gives his Suffrage to publick Acts, is said by a tacit Implication to bind Himself, and must accordingly submit to the Ordinances established and ratified by his *own Assent*, it follows that the Representative is constituted to collect and speak the *Opinion* of a *Multi-tude*, who have qualified Him with a proper Authority to give Sanction to their Councils. Upon this Principle it is indisputably the Representative's Duty to *sum up seriously the Voices of his Electors, and be determin'd by the Majority*, before He proceeds to the ultimate Use of his Trust, *viz.* to speak the Resolutions of his Constituents, as They are disposed to establish or reject a Law. If this Argument is deny'd me, then the Maxim of *English Government* is overturn'd, *That*

the People shall only be bound to observe Laws which They Themselves enact ; For when the Representatives presume to act contrary to the express Commands of their Constituents, there the People may literally be said to resemble the *Dutch Criminal* ; for They, with just as much Consent, sign the Death Warrant of their own Execution.

I have been tediously long on this Subject purposely to shew, that the Power committed into the Hands of the Representative is derivative and in Nature of a *Trust* ; to be manag'd in such Methods and Uses, as the Constituents shall judge conducive for the publick Interest. The Trustees cannot pretend to justify a Title to convert those Weapons against the Commonwealth, extended to their Exercise for her Defence. And when the *Cries of a People* implore their Assistance to ward off a national Destruction, it cannot be consistent with the Duty of the Protector not only to neglect the Security of his Client, but to lend force to the *Blow*. — A Power, which is deriv'd from the Individuals of a Society, and confer'd upon such Men as promise to exert the Parts of honest, able, deserving

serving Agents, seems to admit a Possibility of Revocation, when the Persons in Trust shall argue Themselves *unable* or *unwilling* to administer the Functions of their circumscribed Employments. And this Assertion, if it may seem extravagant, receives a full Confirmation from the Design, Nature, and End of Government, according to the Laws of Nature, and from several honest republican Considerations; *Lex Summa est Salus Populi* — For the better Regulation of Society, and the Security of its Civil Properties, every Member of the Commonwealth has transfer'd his natural Rights to the Directions and Managements of the Legislature; But it cannot be said, that he has absolutely surrender'd and given up his Life, his Liberty, and Fortune to be dispos'd of at the Mercy of the Legislators. In the *original Compact* They are even restrain'd by fundamental Laws, by salutary Principles, and cautious Regulations, as Fences and Bulwarks to strengthen, secure, and defend the Community from the unjust Measures of *Magistrates*, whom the *Body* in general have *empower'd*, in a *confined Sense*, either to execute the Laws already made,

made, or enact such Laws as shall be advantageous for the Constituents. Nor can I force Myself to think, that their Creation was framed upon any other Account, than to promote the publick Felicity — Therefore to close my Argument ; Suppose the *Magistrates* in any Government whatsoever extend their Authority beyond the Prerogative, pervert the publick Benefits into a national Grievance, and violate the Reins of Superiority to curb and oppress the *Members of the Society* who have submitted themselves to their Directions, with Designs of another Nature than Ruin or Destruction ; Is there no *dernier Recours*, no *ultimate Refuge* left to succour the deluded Appellants from *eternal Misery* ? Is *passive Obedience* the Argument of Consolation to an unhappy People, defrauded out of their Liberties by Usurpers of their own Ordination ? — The *Roman Senate*, through prudential Motives, introduced a new Form of Government, by instituting a *Decemvirate*, a Sovereign Power to continue for the Space of *one Year* ; but when these *despotick Decemvires* abused their Privileges, and alter'd the Regulation of their Constitution, in Stratagems

to protract an *annual* into a *perpetual* Administration, and to reject the Limitations annexed to their Authority ; could not, nay, did not the Constituents, by legal and justifiable Means, abolish the tyrannous Dominion ? Certainly (no Effect can be greater than its Cause) no executive Part have larger Authority than That which gave it Birth ; or can with Justice pretend to exceed the Restrictions, with which the Constituents have at their primary Institution pinn'd Them down ; and when the Society oblige Themselves to submit to the Injunctions of the Legislature, it must be upon this Presumption, *that the Power They have constituted shall not exceed their Trust, nor dictate any Rules contrary to Reason, and the Interest of the State* — It is not inconsistent with the Character of a good and faithful Subject to make his Remonstrances, and try all warrantable Means of Redress to be reliev'd from those Inconveniences, which the Sense of the Nation apprehend to threaten a general Dissolution of the fundamental Laws, and the Majority of the People are convinc'd to be opposite the Interest and Welfare of the People : And not only this

Instance,

Instance of the *Roman* Spirit seems to Me justifiable, but a similar Conduct in all Governments whatsoever must be necessary, where the Powers in Trust have so extravagantly transgress'd their Bounds.

A Digression of this large Extent has been occasionally introduced, to explain the Confines a People prescribe to the political Actions of their Legislators, and to delineate the Quality of their Obedience, justly examin'd according to the establish'd Laws of Society. I should be sorry to give Occasion for the Imputation of a disaffected Subject, or an unwholsome Member of the Community; as such odious Appellations are vastly distant from my Nature and Principles. The Blessings of a *Hanover* Succession, and our glorious Delivery from Bondage by the late happy Revolution, are the indelible Objects of my most grateful Meditations. The same Love of Liberty which engrafts the Instruments of our Felicity in my Affections, will, I hope, plead an Indulgence for the Freedoms I have taken to expatiate thus, without Dissimulation, on the important Subject. I flatter Myself, that the calumnious Interpretation of

no galled Person whatsoever, can distort my Thoughts into an evil and criminal Construction, as I have offered them pure, and abstracted from the Infatuations of an idle Party Business, and calculated for the general Advantage of my Country : As I have consider'd these Disorders, not already practis'd in our Nation, but *practicable* ; and only recommend these severe Remedies to the Extremities and last Convulsions of a sinking State.

I shall now, *Gentlemen*, return to my Subject, and cannot, for the Reasons I have already troubled You with, and many others unnecessary to be mention'd, apprehend that the Gifts of *Places* and *Pensions* to our Representatives in Parliament, can be reconciled with *their free and unpolluted Delivery of the Voices of the People* — I have some Foundation to think that some Prospect of this Nature, and a Desire to perpetuate to the People their original Ballance of Power, influenc'd the Parliament in the 12th Year of *William* the 3d, of immortal Memory, to make that incomparable Statute *to incapacitate every Person who had any Office, or Place of Profit under the King, or Pension from the*

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Crown,

Crown, to serve as a Member in the House of Commons ; and could wish that *that Statute* had been as grateful to every *other Power* as it was to the *People*, to prolong its Validity. If, *Gentlemen*, the Representatives of the People are Agents elected out of their own Body, to support their Rights and Privileges, and equiponderate the Weight in the opposite Scale, I think there is a Necessity that they observe their establish'd Distances ; that thereby the Motions of the One may, by an absolute Independancy, be able to correct the Violence of the Other, and restore the Equilibrium as often as It endeavours to recede from the appointed Situation. But (to proceed in my Allegory) suspend both Powers on the same Brachium, and the Ballance is destroy'd. Suffer the Representatives to be dependant on the *Ministry*, and the *Ministry* may act as she pleases, without Fear or Controul.

Reflections of this Nature have employed my most unwearied Deliberations, in order to obviate the Distresses, and remove the Difficulties which surround our State. I have survey'd with some Concern the Ambuscades
through

through which I am to pass in conducting a Point of this dangerous tender Consistency; but hope with Caution and Care so to order my Enquiries, that I may give Umbrage to *no Person*, nor contribute to incur any *merited Resentment*.

At the Commencement of an *Election* for Representatives to serve their Country in Parliament, the Elector is, in Conscience, oblig'd to revolve and debate impartially in his Mind, the Means most effectual to discharge the Duty he owes to Posterity and the Commonwealth — A Man in Concerns of less Moment, should consider the Purposes of his Undertaking, and such Methods as are necessary to reconcile the most beneficial Consequences, before he carries it into Execution. — If this should be our Conduct in Affairs of an immaterial Consideration, with how much greater Exactness should we direct our Enquiries and order our Actions in Matters of the last Importance, that bear an *eternal Reference* to the Liberties and Properties of the Subject? Nature, and a moderate Share of common Sense, suggest to every rational Capacity what Qualifications are

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requisite

requisite in the Candidate to carry him through the great Office of an *Affertor of the Rights and Privileges of his Country*. If we consult the *Writ of Election*, we shall find his Duty explain'd in these Words ; *De advisamento & assensu Concilii Nostri, de quibusdam arduis & urgentibus Negotiis, Nos, Statum & Defensionem Regni Nostri Angliæ & Ecclesiæ Anglicanæ concernentibus* ; namely, “ to assist in Parliament in his Counsel and “ Advice on Affairs of the most extensive and “ pressing Importance, touching the Safety of “ the King, and the Constitution and Defence “ of the Church and Kingdom.” — This Consideration every Elector should have engraven on the Tablet of his Heart, and should weary his Imagination with Reasonings before he determines his Resolutions on the weighty Occasion. When the *common Safety* is interested, *the Patriot* should distinguish himself by unbiaſſed Proceedings, and reject the injurious Motives of Affinity, personal Friendships, and every such private Influence as may misguide his Choice. No Title can be supported with such good Authority to the Vote of the *Electōr*, as is the Title of that
Candidate,

Candidate, who recommends himself upon no other Terms, than *his unalterable Affections for the Publick Good, his approved Ability to serve her in his Councils, and a stedfast Integrity, not to be seduced by Temptations or Menaces* from the Observance of the Declarations covenanted between Him and his Constituents, on his Deputation into the publick Trust. I hope Degeneracy has not got such Footing in this World, but that in Multitudes We may select a few Persons, in whom We may with Safety place a Confidence, especially when We consider that the Profits which arise to the Representative, on one Hand, for the Contempt of his Engagements, cannot compensate the Benefits of his Obedience on the other ——— That a stigmatiz'd, trivial, and fortuitous *Place* or *Pension* cannot make an Amends for the Loss of a Reputation, occasioned by an *irreligious Breach of solemn Trust*, or atone an everlasting Disability in the Offender from sharing any Part of the future national Administrations.

The Elector having singled out a Person, in all human Probability, equal to the Trust
and

and Confidence to be reposed in him, the next Proceedings before the Admission of the Candidate into Power, must be a serious Exhortation to the Candidate of his Duty, and of the Extent of the Authority his Constituents have transfered to his Management. He must be made sensible, that the Publick, for their greater Expediency and Convenience, have made Choice of his Services to transact their Instructions in Parliament ; and express the *Assent* necessary to give them Force — That as He represents the whole Community, He must not presume to *determine* from his own private Thoughts, where they are in Opposition to those of his Constituents ; for that the Conditions on which He received the Trust, are his Declarations to observe, inviolably, the Voice of his Superiors in every Act consequent to the Function of his Office ; which when forfeited, He is no longer to be consider'd as an Agent for the People, but an Intruder into their Rights. For though it be certain that the Power of proroguing and dissolving Parliaments is peculiarly appropriated to the Sovereign Authority, yet 'tis as certain, that where an Authority is limited upon

Conditions

Conditions, if the Conditions be not observed, the Trustee has no longer an equitable Possession ; for an Observance of the Conditions was the Tenure by which He was to Hold. And when a Representative accepts an Authority for the Service of his Constituents, if He appropriates the Authority to private Purposes, inconsistent with the Interest of the Community, I presume He surrenders the Title of an *Agent in Authority for the Service of his Country*. Such an Absurdity as would follow from the Denial of this Argument, would be too favourable a Compliment to support the Endeavours of such *Jacobites* as would justify the Title of the late King *James*, and a *Popish* Succession to the Throne ; for He certainly became lawfully seiz'd of the Crown, and if He did not forfeit his Authority by not observing the Stipulations of his Acceptance, I believe the bigotted Tools of *Popery* will insist on no further Condescensions to corroborate their treasonable Doctrines — A legal Power is ever restrained for specified Uses — He argues Himself incapacitated to *personate* who refuses to comply with the Regulations of his Trust.

Trust. And I persuade Myself that every unprejudiced Individual of the Society will concur with Me in this Opinion, “ That the
 “ Person who had covenanted on his Election
 “ to make the Instructions of his Constituents,
 “ perfected at a full Assembly, to be the Rule
 “ of his Duty, on his Failure to observe the
 “ Obligations should thenceforth be deem’d
 “ insufficient and disabled to serve the Publick
 “ in any future Trust.”

This should be an united Resolution solemnly ratified by the Electors, and communicated to the Candidate at his Entrance into Power; and He who would not accept the Office upon such Conditions, should not, by my Approbation, participate the Favour of the Publick in any other Occupation.

Having advanced so far, my next Purpose is to examine by what Means We may so depreciate the Value of *Places*, as to make the Terms of a Ministry incompenfatory for the Loss of the publick Esteem, (or in other Words) to make the Abilities of the *Minister* insufficient to find a *Place* or *Pension* for every *discontinued Voter*. In Pursuance hereof, it must be unanimously insisted on, as a fundamental
 Rule

Rule of the Constitution, that to *enlarge the Continuance of a Parliament* cannot be otherwise interpreted than a *notorious Infraction on the Liberty of the Subject*. For as an *Annuity* is of greater or less Value, according to the Circumstances to which it is appendant, so the *Pension* (which answers the same Purpose) bears a like Proportion to the Number of Years in which the Vote is to have Effect: — For Example ; The *Minister* whom I consider on one Hand the Purchaser in respect of *Votes*, will give a larger Gratuity for a Vote to continue *thirty Years*, than for *One* that must determine in *seven*. And on the other Hand, the *Representative*, whom I consider as a Purchaser in respect of *Places* and *Pensions*, will more readily come into a Bargain, where the Length of Enjoyment will repay him the heavy Fine of his Purchase, than where he is certainly to suffer an equal Expence, and not receive one fourth Part in Security and Value ; Therefore, I say, that Prolongations of Parliaments would be an indirect Way of striking at the Root of the Constitution, and such an unlawful Piece of Policy as not to be reconciled with

the *Liberty of the Subject*. — The inestimable Benefits of *short Parliaments* were Blessings too great to be handed down to Posterity. Our *Ancestors*, conscious of the Effects of *long Parliaments*, confined their Limits. — *Annual Parliaments* had a long Continuance — *Triennial* crept into the World but of late Years — *Septennial* have been recently introduced — By a few of these *Arithmetical Progressions* We may expect in a few Years to have the Space protracted into a most prodigious Excess, if not universally protested against by every Constituent, who would establish a *free, uncorrupted, and independant Parliament*, and avow the Sentiments of Mr *Pryn*, in his *Sovereign Law of Parliaments*, that the Laws should properly be the Acts of the People, and not the Acts of any other Power. If the original Compact of Society has, through a tender Regard for the Interests of the People, so contriv'd it, that the People are to dictate the Acts, by Force whereof their Obedience is to be exacted: If it is so establish'd, that the Delegates, to ratify these Acts, shall be of the voluntary Election of
the

the People ; and has appointed *short Parliaments* with a Design to give the Constituents more frequent Opportunities to *reward* or *punish*, to *continue* or *remove* the Delegates according to their Managements ; It is to be lamented that *these constitutional Ordinances* should be evaded by the Schemes and Policies of some subtle but pernicious Artist, or made of none Effect by oblique and sinister Contrivances. — The Elector undoubtedly has a great Share in the Regulations of the State, whose Representative is suck'd from his natural Direction by some attractive Court-Loadstone ; and by this primary Institution of a Title, dependant on the Approbation of the Elector, into a Certainty for Years, is there not a new Kind of *Saturnalia* invented for every *Davus* to thwart his Superior ?

It is then, *Gentlemen*, inconceivably incumbent on the Constituents to concert such Measures as are lawful and necessary to preserve the Constitution, to reverse the Model of an Inheritance for Life, and restore it to the primitive circumscribed State. It has been pretended that such Practices must *alter* the Constitution ; but I imagine They only would

inculcate these wild Notions, who would not desire to have it *reform'd*. Frequent Opportunities to punish or reward must influence the Representative to be cautious in his Conduct. And if every third Year was re-manded for the *Lustrum* of our Managers, this happy Consequence must ensue ; That either the Constituent must conform to the Admonitions of his Constituents, or that a Ministry *must split her Employments into Piece-meal* to make any Sort of Provision for her *large Troops of disbanded Pensioners*. In the first Case, the obedient Delegate, by his Dependance on his Constituents Affections, retains his Seat in the House ; in the last, the Premium must be so inconsiderable, that He who would not be honest out of Principle, would be so out of Policy.

It may not be impertinent in the present Observations, to take Notice, that *Julius* and *Augustus Cæsars* were the first Politicians, who traduced the *Roman* Freedom into a State of Slavery ; the former by prolonging his Power, contrary to the Mandates of the Senate, merely by his own Authority ; the latter by heaping his Donatives on the People ;
 insomuch

infomuch that not even the unparallel'd Exploits of the one, or the flattering Muses of the other can redeem their lost Characters from the black Notes of Infamy. The same Arguments which may prevail upon a *Statesman* to imitate their Examples, point out the Probability of our Fate, if We continue to resemble their slavish Forbearance.

A *Parliament*, independant on the Gifts of a Ministry, and more immediately under the Direction of their respective Constituents, is a national and honest Sollicitation. The Voice of the People cries out loudly for these their natural and indubitable Rights. 'Tis a melancholy Expression to say, *not long since* We know that our Birth-rights were fortified by the Laws; That no *Place-man* could attempt to represent the People, as it was plainly foreseen that his Voice could not be sincere and unpolluted, whose Services were anticipated in an opposite Interest. We remember to have heard of the Necessity under which the Representative was was tied down to discharge his Duty to the Commonwealth,

to

to make his * Actions correspond with his Denomination, and speak the Resolutions of his Constituents. *Short Parliaments* were Touchstones of the most distinguishing Nature, interpreted Blessings or Misfortunes, as the Conscience of the Representative was good or evil. The virtuous Man ever approved of Prospects to reward his Merits: The vicious dreads the Possibilities of a Punishment.

To reconcile one View, and disconcert the Schemes of the other; to recover the Blessings of *short Parliaments*, and render the Stratagems of Places *useless*, the Constituents have still one, and but one Remedy reserv'd; and this Remedy is of such a delicate Composition, *so grateful to the Taste, so inoffensive in Operation, and so salutary in Effects*, that it must be balsamick to every Patient.

Therefore the following Resolutions must be positively enter'd into, confirm'd, and ratify'd by the Constituents, in a full Assembly, to be religiously observ'd by every

* *A Parler le Ment: Hence the Etymology of Parliament.*

Member of the Society, as the only practicable Means to preserve the antient Partition of Power appropriated to the Subject, from being suppress'd by the Ambition of a Ministry.

R E S O L U T I O N S.

I.

That it is undoubtedly a Liberty of the Subject to instruct his Representative in Parliament.

II.

That it is the highest Contempt that can be offered against the Constitution, for the Representative to disobey his Instructions.

III.

That in Consequence to this Resolution, the Representative who shall presume to act contrary to his Instructions, or elude their Force by trivial Pretences, shall be, ipso facto, disabled from ever serving the Publick in any future Trust.

IV.

IV.

That the Sufficiency of the Excuse shall be referred to the unanimous Arbitration of the Constituents.

V.

That it shall be strongly recommended to, and peremptorily insisted from the Representative, as an essential Part of his Duty, to promote, forward, and perfect, as far as in Him lies, a Statute to restore us the laudable Custom of Triennial Parliaments.

A few positive Rules of this Substance, severely maintain'd without Favour or Affection to any Delinquent, would be a glorious Basis to support a decay'd Constitution from being undermined by the most expert Engineer — That We have a Power to enter into such Resolutions, is a Truth, I flatter Myself, no Party Advocate will venture to dispute; And surely something more than Infatuation must lull the blinded Senses astray, if We do not try our last Endeavours, and practise our ultimate Efforts, before We tamely dedicate our Necks to the Yoke, or even argue a Propensity

sity to receive it. — If a Legion of *Place-men* must obey their Commandants, (and that They must obey, or be cashier'd, I have already suppos'd) how ticklish must be the Situation of those Liberties that lye under their Feet to be trampled on as the giddy Passions shall direct? I must frankly confess that I can see no Necessity to run any Risques, or to hazard our Liberties in a Lottery, when We have it actually in our Power to establish them beyond the Reach of a fortuitous Chance — A rigorous Execution of this Compact with our Representatives, must oblige Them to pay Regard and Attention to the Instructions of the Constituents.

New Elections, according to our present Conjectures, will soon present Us with favourable Opportunities to put these Schemes in Practice; and He must be besotted beyond his Reason, who will not heartily concur to the Proposals offer'd on the great Occasion. — He that trifles longer, must expect to be trifled with. — *Honest, plain Dealings* are to denounce the Consequences that shall attend the Observance or Neglect of the Delegates Duty — And when He shall have

the Rule of his Proceedings explain'd to Him *under Penalties*, He cannot fly to the Plea of *Ignorance* for Refuge, as his Actions are then too open to be veil'd under any Disguise; and it is my Opinion You may as well whistle to the Winds, as prescribe any Directions to Him, if not enforc'd by Penalties, and a rigorous Execution — Let Us, before it be too late, search out for the Man of Integrity, Morals, and Virtue, unmov'd in our Enquiries by any partial Considerations ---- Such are the Preliminaries requisite in the Candidate — And He who will not prefer the Man recommended by such *valuable Perfections*, to the mercenary, corrupt *Occupant* of unbounded Possessions, is an offensive Branch of the Community, hoodwink'd to his own and his Fellow-Creatures Destruction. History shews Us that the After-ages of *Greece* receiv'd more Advantages from the prudent Councils of *Solon*, than the Posterity of the wealthy *Attalus* from his unlimited Dominions and great Riches. — Honest Men, with sufficient Abilities, are such as We have occasion for. We want not to have our Liberties purchas'd, We want to have them secur'd; and if We
 please

please to reflect, We may partly find that Remedy in Ourselves which We ineffectually may apply for to another Power.----Their Concurrence may be necessary to stifle the Disease; our Applications are useful to relieve its Extremities----Therefore, *Gentlemen*, once more, I shall advise You to make an unbiaſ'd Choice of *honest Representatives* ---- To concert Measures to render their Obedience necessary to your Instructions, by a severe Prosecution of the *Resolutions* I have mention'd unto You, and to insist upon their Endeavours to restore Us our glorious Institution of *short Parliaments*; which, I presume, is a Request that cannot be denied, at least with any Colour of Reason. ——— This is the Way to determine our Fears, and perhaps may have additional good Effects, (exclusive of the immediate Benefits We shall receive thereby) than a bare Limitation of *Place-men* in the House of Commons; for when the Purposes are annihilated, for which some Thousands of these Donatives are suppos'd to be contriv'd, 'tis not improbable to think that their useless Number may be abridg'd, and the Nation reliev'd

reliev'd, from the heavy Pressure of a large
unprofitable Load ——— This is the hearty
Wish of every *true Briton*, and of none
more than Him, who is,

Gentlemen,

Your faithful Friend,

and Fellow-Sufferer.

F I N I S



A
VINDICATION
OF THE
HONOUR and PRIVILEGES
OF THE
Commons of *Great-Britain.*

With the CASE of
PLACE-MEN in PARLIAMENT,
Considered Impartially.

— — — — — *tantumne ab re tua est otii tibi*
Aliena ut cures — — — — — ?
Homo sum. — — — — — Ter.

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A
VINDICATION
OF THE
HONOUR and PRIVILEGES
OF THE
COMMONS of *Great-Britain, &c.*



IN the several Disputes arising from some late and present Occurrences, concerning (*as they are stiled*) Place-Men in *Parliament*, these few, as leading Questions, are chiefly considerable. How far is that an Evil in itself? How far may it be so by Accident? In *either Case*, What Remedy does it admit of? If, in itself, it is really no Evil, so far there is nothing to be said against Place-Men. If, *by Accident*, it may be, but yet in the Nature of Things, that *possible* Evil is not to be avoided by any Cau-

tion or Contrivance of *Law*; it is in vain to urge a Complaint about it, at least, to endeavour at *such a Law*.

This is certain, that there neither is, nor can be any Form of Government, any Method of Administration wholly free from Exceptions; so that the utmost which may be expected, or should be desired, is that Form and that Method, which is liable to the least and fewest; and whoever aims at more Perfection in either, than consists with human Establishments and human Frailties, must be looked upon as a mere Visionary, or *something worse*: If his Schemes of Reformation strike at the Essence, the necessary constituent Parts or Appendages of Government in general, of ours in particular, and there is room to think it no Error of his Judgment, but the Fault of his Will, he deserves the heaviest Censure; instead of being reputed a Patriot, to be stigmatized as an *Incendiary*,* as an avowed Enemy to the Peace and Happiness of his Country.

That a Member of Parliament holding a Place of Trust, &c. under the Government is not *malum per se*, a Thing absolutely Evil, I take

* CROMWELL tampering in this Sort, *viz.* to render the People jealous of the Parliament; a Consultation was held at the Earl of *Effex's* House about accusing him as an Incendiary; it was even moved (according to the Temper of those Times) to arrest him as such, and only waited in Expectation of plainer Evidence; by which the Opportunity was unhappily lost, as the Sequel of that Story but too plainly shews. *Rapin* Vol. II. Page 512. (Note 3.)

take for granted, both from the Nature of the Thing, and because our Reformers plead only to reduce and limit the Number of them. To judge then of the accidental Evil, which the present Number, according to them, may occasion; we are to consider the Complaint, which is, the *Possibility* of a *Suspicion* of *undue* Influence, by Means of these Places, upon the Votes of *such* as may happen to enjoy them. In this View, we have heretofore seen printed Lists of Members distinguished by their Posts and Offices, and their Manner of voting, in certain Instances, offered in Proof of their Partiality, or, as some have chose to call it, Corruption, thereby, intended to be insinuated. The common Answer to which (*by Way of Reprisal*) has been, the Possibility of, at least, equal Partiality, or Corruption of *those* in the Opposition, through the Want and Desire of those Places that others have; and their Hopes, thereby, of, *one Day*, obtaining them; and their *general Method* of voting has been urged in Support of this, I can't but say with equal Probability; and, no doubt, one Extreme is as blameable, being equally pernicious, as the other; for, certainly, supposing any *such Cases* to be, he that opposes against his Conscience, to get a Place, is as much bribed as he that *complies* to keep one: And if too great a Complaisance to the *Crown* may endanger our Liberties on the one Hand; so from a
pre-

pretended Maintenance of them, under a contrary Disposition in Parliament, the People of *England* have experienced *real Servitude* on the other.* However, with regard to Party Merit, thus to accuse, and recriminate, is alike begging the Question on both Sides; it remains, therefore, that some other and more certain Rule of judging be pitched upon, whereby to determine the respective Merits of each dividing Party; a Disquisition foreign to my present Purpose, which is only (as a Matter of necessary Speculation *at this Time*) to consider *impartially* the Expediency or Inexpediency (*as it may be at all Times*) of passing a Law *to reduce and limit the Number of Place-Men in Parliament*. A Question not a little interesting, even in this Respect, as different Persons are intended to gain or lose Reputation by the different Reception it meets with; and for *that Reason*, as well as on Account of its *natural Tendency*, it deserves to be well considered; and, in the first Place, apart, wholly detatched from any other Matters, with which it has no necessary Connection, (especially such as have already been the Subject of Controversy among us) as a mere Problem, in the most abstracted View of *Men and Things*; after which to give every Consideration its due Weight, some collateral Reasons may take Place; as Physicians, besides the present acute Complaint,

* *Rapin* of the long Parliament.

plaint, will always have Regard to the chro-
nical Habit and Humours of their Patient.

It would certainly argue great Ignorance, to say, that Honour, Favour, Power, Profit, conferred, are Things of such Indifference, as to make no Impressions upon ingenuous Minds; and, if possible, a yet greater Degree of Credulity, to think that a Thirst after *any* of them, attended with Disappointment, is not also a Bias, liable to raise our Passions, to prejudice our Affections and Judgments, and to *influence* our Actions accordingly: And in what Body of Men may we *ever* expect to find any Number of Persons, so philosophical, so wholly *disinterested*,* as to be quite regardless of these Things?

If then, to act with the common *Passions* of a Man, be the Mark of *Corruption*, to whatever Excess *they* may be carried, or in whatever Sense *that* shall be understood, there is Danger of its being so much *greater* on the Side of the *disappointed*, by how much they may happen to be, (as they will, *must* generally be) the Majority; and so much *worse*, as Persons, in those Circumstances, are apt to be carried away with Anger and Impatience, to be less careful, less judicious about their Measures; by which Means, it often
comes

* A Qualification no where existing, yet absolutely requisite in a M——r of P——t, according to *Common Sense*,
November 17.

comes to pass that the Innocency of them is wholly owing to their want of Success.

This, it will, perhaps, be said, is granting, if not proving the Evil complained of, and pointing, (*as a Remedy*) to the proposed Expedient of *reducing and limiting the Number of Place-Men in the House of Commons*. As the whole Controversy proceeds upon what has been, and may be, (it being an agreed Point, that there is nothing like it at present) I may grant the Possibility of the Evil, without affronting or exempting any Party. I wish, I could as readily concur in thinking the proposed Expedient a Remedy; on the contrary, I suspect it would be a Means to heighten the Disease, and to increase the Malignity of it. For, to put a probable Case; If, at any Time, there may be many more Places, in *Imagination*, than in Reality, or, more Persons contending and expecting than *can* succeed and be satisfied in their Expectations, in that Case, the reducing and limiting the Number of Places will but heighten the Odds, increase the Number of Expectants in Proportion, consequently make Disappointments more frequent, Resentments, in Course, more strong, and Contests and Struggles about them proportionably more violent; and as the *Consequences* thereof seem to be what we complain and are afraid of, this Scheme, instead of preventing, is most likely to promote them.

But

But these being Evils only by Accident, which may or may not happen, though they should be found not to admit of a Remedy by any human Law, we may be under less Fear and Apprehension about them, if they can be thought not so frequent and general, as it has been affected to represent them ; and which may not seem incredible, if it shall appear that the very same Effects, which are there attributed to *Places*, may be derived from other Causes often confounded with them, and which would subsist in the same Force, if *those* were reduc'd and limited, or even entirely taken away.

Admitting the Possibility alike to *all* Parties, it is not necessary to involve Numbers of *any* in the Suspicion of real Corruption. It is equally possible to act right upon wrong Principles, as for a Mistake to be attended with an honest Intention: particular Persons may go corruptly with a Party, even where the Majority have the purest Views imaginable. Suppose, for Instance, in any future House of Commons, some great Place-Men to be of the Privy-Council, where *some Measures* must necessarily be concerted, which, as necessarily, must have the Approbation and Sanction of Parliament ; there is no Absurdity in believing *these* may be the Subject of free Discourse and Debate *in Council*, and the Result, what *should* be the Result of all *such* Consultations, a general Acquiescence in

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those

those Measures, for which the 'strongest Reasons shall appear, in the Opinion of all, or most of them. If then, the *same* being reconsider'd by them in their Legislative Capacity, they should find no Reason to alter their Judgments, *notwithstanding their Places*, there would lie no just Objection to their Conduct; nor could it be thought strange, that what seemed right and reasonable to them, should appear so to many others also, while yet it might not be impossible for some to be with them implicitly, in the Spirit of Party, and with a View to Party Advantages.

The like may be supposed of Gentlemen, who may happen to be in the Opposition, in which some may be governed by Principle and Opinion, while others may fall in with them merely for the sake of Opposition, without giving themselves the trouble of considering, or even against the Convictions of their own Minds; and if an anonymous Testimony was not quite ridiculous, I have an Example * before me, after which I cou'd, with at least equal Truth, say something here to the Purpose.

In this way much may be accounted for, of what we see in *Parliament*, without recurring to those invidious Insinuations, and odious Appellations, which have been so liberally dealt out by *some*, by which it has
been

* *Address to the Electors, and other free Subjects of Great Britain.*

been endeavoured to represent us in a very bad Situation; *such as* * confessedly, *it is far from being credible, that we either now are or ever shall be in,* to borrow an Argument from the Writer I have just quoted, the contrary is *a Calumny too gross to be imposed upon the most prejudiced, and the most credulous; the bare Recollection of the Names of the Gentlemen concerned, the Quality of many, the Property of most of them, their private Characters sufficiently confute it.*

However, such, it seems, is the Nature of Party Acrimony; and what is highly improbable to be the Effect of Corruption of the *low, sordid, venal* Kind, is plainly *Faction*, another Species of it, not less dangerous for being of a more complicated Nature, taking in some *noble*, with some *ignoble Passions*: a Misfortune we might not expect to be more free from, were there no Places; or, which comes to the same thing, were ALL Place-Men alike. We might not, even in that Case, expect a Harmony of Votes. Mens Understandings will be as different as their Statures and Complexions: Hence will arise a Diversity of Opinions, and most Men will be apt to contend earnestly and warmly for their own, and what comes nearest to their own; this Pride alone is sufficient for all the Purposes of Contention, as Contention is

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sufficient

* *Address to the Electors, &c.*

sufficient to produce every other Evil incident to Society.

It is hard to say upon what Principles Men always act; several Persons will have their several Motives; but if we consider what is most likely to be the *ruling Motive* in those who aspire to a Seat in *Parliament*, it can't be thought to be *Avarice*, the *Desire of amassing Wealth*, because every body, who knows any thing of the World, knows it to be, of all Methods for *that Purpose*, most fallible. A Man may with less Hazard, and almost equal Certainty, depend upon making his Fortune out of a Lottery. It may with much more Probability be judged to be no illaudable Desire of making a Figure in their Country, of being conspicuous and useful in Life.

It is Matter of Honour and Distinction, to be chose the Representative of any *Body of Men* in Parliament. This induces Candidates; and the same Spirit, which brings Gentlemen into the *House*, will generally be found to attend them *there*. Many of them will be Members of *Consequence*. That indeed is not in every one's Choice; however, they who have it in their Power, *i. e.* are blessed with superior Talents, and are not depressed with Modesty, will exert that Superiority, as Occasion offers; they will be Leaders, and, according to the Side they take, and the *Chance* of that Side, they will be *nominally* Patriots,

Patriots*, or *really* Place-men, if it suits their Taste; and one of their great Ends will be answered, with no small Share of Self-complacency, in *thus* finding, they are of Weight and Significancy with their *Friends* or *Party*. And upon these Principles, and for these Reasons, were Places entirely out of the Question, Divisions would be a Passion for Fame and Victory, Self-Love, and Self-Will would operate in much the like Manner, and have much the same Effect, we see them have in the present State of Things.

The Effects of *Faction*, we know, are bad enough; a *strong Instance* of it we have, not long since, seen, in a violent Clamour for a War (not without just Occasion of War) and, at the *same Time*, from the *same Quarter*, a Cabal formed, or endeavoured to be formed, to obstruct the necessary Means of carrying it on; a wonderful Instance this of *true Zeal* for the Honour and *Trade of their Country*. But can we hope that *Faction* would abate, in Proportion, as the Number of Place-men in Parliament are reduced and limited? No: If Places are a Stem, on which *Faction* grows, the lopping off Part will but make it take deeper Root, and shoot forth in more luxuriant Branches; if they are Matter of Strife and Contest in Parliament, in their present Number; by reducing the Number, the Strife will

* And tho' they changed their Titles, that would not alter the Nature of Persons and Things.

will be increased; and according as Debates, and Struggles, and Divisions are *within Doors*, so will *Faction* be *without*. It increases with the Increase of them, and strengthens with their Strength; and *as much* Strength as *Faction* gains in the Kingdom, *so much* does the Government lose of its Power at home, and Weight and Credit abroad. The best to be expected from Increase of Faction, is Weakness of Government — A Blessing, which no Man, but a good Subject, a good Friend, or faithful Ally will envy us. FRANCE and SPAIN would rejoice in the Success of *such our present* PATRIOTISM, as I doubt not but they heartily approve, if they don't contribute something to the Appearance of it. Certainly, *other Powers* will always take some of their Measures, from what they observe of that Kind; as it cannot be doubted that one of the chief Encouragements of the late Conduct of the Court of *Spain* toward us, arose from *the Heats and Animosities which were so industriously fomented among us*.

Of all the Efforts we have lately seen from that Side, whence the present Project is known originally to proceed, it is what most People see through clearly, as a Piece of *mere Grimace* and *shameless Hypocrisy*, while the Party Inclinations of too many will not permit them to explode it, in the Manner they know it deserves — Nay, some, who think tolerably of the *Thing*, have nevertheless a
very

very mean Opinion of the *Persons* who are chief Actors in this Farce. For it must not be dissembled, that there are some few, who, not having sufficiently considered the Point and Mankind in that particular View, are almost persuaded that no Place-men should be in Parliament. *Eutopian Notions!* All Schemes too fine spun for human Nature, are so many Cobwebs in *civil* or *ecclesiastical Polity*; tho' that has not hindered worthy Persons, of warm Imaginations, from sometimes falling under Delusions of this Sort.

It is allowed by all Persons of Experience and Consideration, that some are, by the Nature of their Places, very properly Members of Parliament; and should an Opinion, or rather a Faction, at any time prevail so far, as to limit the Number, I deny that it would answer the End proposed, alledged at least, which is, *so far*, to procure an absolute Bill of Divorce, an entire Separation between *Members of Parliament* and *Places*, and all Regard to the Disposition of Places. For, notwithstanding the vehement Outcry made for this Regulation by weekly Writers, &c. with *some* witty, *more* dull but rude Invectives, I take it to be an *Impossibility* owing to the *Nature* of our Government, which is mixed, and to *that* of Mankind, who are not to be divested of their *natural Appetites* and *Passions*.

Our

Our Government (by the very Design of it) consists of three distinct (not independent) Parts, of which the *King* is as the *Head*, the *Lords* and *Commons* represent the *Body*, What an *Union* as well as *Balance* is hereby intended and created, and how they *jointly* contribute to the common Peace and Safety, I need not say. For the Defence of the Kingdom and Support of Government, a suitable Revenue is allotted by the Wisdom of the whole Legislature, divided into two unequal Parts; *one*, called the *Civil List*, is rightly appropriated to the Use of the *Crown*, to support the *Honour* and *Dignity* thereof; *the other* constitutes a great *Fund*, or *national Purse*, for the Supply of all the other *Exigences* of *State*. This *Honour* and *Dignity* of the *Crown*, these *Exigences* of *State*, necessarily require many *Heads* and *Hands*, and consequently create a large Number of *Places*, both of *Trust* and *Power*, which must necessarily be filled by Persons of *Ability* and *Integrity*, who in course must have Appointments equal to the *Dignity*, and *Trust*, and *Trouble*. The only Objection here is, that Gentlemen sit in *Parliament* in one Capacity as Representatives of the Body of the People, but as Place-Men they sustain another Character, *may* serve another Interest, that of the *Crown*, by which means we are told * we may become *Slaves* to the *Crown*. — A most invidious Suggestion!

As

* *Adâress to the Electors, &c.*

As if the Interest of the Crown and the People, *rightly understood*, were not exactly the same; or, as if the temporary Advantages of Places could easily be thought an *Equivalent* to *such* Gentlemens Honour, their Consciences, and their COUNTRY; in which last (I speak of the present Gentlemen in that Situation) the most angry and the most prejudic'd *must* acknowledge them to have no small Share, at the same time that they *do* acknowledge them to have a very quick Sense of and due Regard to their own particular Interests. What then if the Crown hath *two Parts* in these Gentlemen? If *their Country* have *ten*, it is a reasonable Security for their Attachment to the Country, especially in all fundamental Cases; and we have the more reason to be satisfied with it, if it is the best Security which the nature of Things will allow of, as indisputably it is, if moving and keeping Place-Men from Parliament (*to all the Intents and Purposes alledged*) is found to be, as I have already hinted, and do really account it, *wholly impossible*.

For after all our Refinements in *Theory*, Power and Profit in *Fact*, according to their nature, will go together so long as *Men* are *Men*, and while *those* in *Power* are not too indolent to take the *Trouble* attending the *Profit*. And the *Power* of PARLIAMENT is too great to suffer a Restraint upon *its Members*, which is not likely to suit their own
C . Minds.

Minds. Let him that thinks otherwise ask himself these following Questions, — Who grants the Supplies for the current Service? *The Parliament.* — When is the King said to do right? *When he acts by the Advice of his Parliament;* and *vice versâ.* — When are we reputed easy at home, and in consequence thereof respected abroad? *When a good Agreement subsists between the KING and his PARLIAMENT.* — But such Agreement cannot be without a good Understanding between the *two Houses of Parliament.* Now the Scheme of this Reduction and Limitation, &c. (if it take place) rightly enough * supposes, that the *House of Lords* will share all the great *Offices of State;* and no doubt *they would be very safely entrusted with Persons of that exalted Rank and Honour.* — The Question is, how the *COMMONS*, not only *now*, but at *ALL TIMES hereafter*, may relish this *BILL of EXCLUSION?* Is not this *alone* an unanswerable Objection, the Danger of creating Discontent, Jealousies and Animosities, which might issue in open Ruptures between the *two Houses?* Might there not be danger of its inflaming *some future Commoners* with a stronger Passion for, and more ardent Desire of *Peerage* than would be convenient? Might it not, in many Views, open a wider Door for *Faction*, and be a means more effectually to let in upon us *all those Evils*, which (some would

* *Address to the Electors, &c.*

would have it believ'd) are hereby intended to be prevented?

Had the COMMONS never been admitted to any of the *great Offices*, their present *rich and powerful, growing Circumstances* might make a Door of Entrance for them *reasonable and necessary*——But, having been, for Ages, in Possession of this Privilege, what Heart-burning and Confusion a Regulation attended with a Restriction of this Sort (directly, or by Consequence) would occasion, a Man may fore-tel without the Spirit of Prophecy. Is this then the *salutary Law** we have heard so much of? Are these *the invaluable Blessings of a Place-Bill*? Do our supposed Reformers see these Mischiefs from their Scheme, which are so obvious? If they do, where is their *Patriotism* or HONESTY? If they do not, where is their POLICY or *good Sense*? If *Monopolies*, in TRADE, have always been looked upon as injurious to the *publick Good*, and CHARTERS *exclusive*, reckoned so many Clogs upon *common Wealth*, as being *Cramps* to *particular, private Industry*; by the same way of Reasoning, it would be an *Injury*, it would be *false Policy* for *great Offices* not to lye open without Distinction of *Peers* or *Commoners*, elder or younger Brothers, to Persons of the *best Capacity*, in order to their being discharged in the *very best Manner*.

“ In every regular Society, there must be
 “ Offices of Eminence and Distinction, to be
 “ filled by the most deserving Members, for
 “ the Benefit of the whole.” And to be *so* de-
 serving, “ is a laudable Emulation, or Am-
 “ bition, if you please, inseparable from in-
 “ genuous Minds — It is the great Spur to
 “ Industry, the great Incentive to generous
 “ and arduous Designs; without this every
 “ Branch of social and publick Virtue must
 “ languish and decay — The young *London*
 “ Apprentice is allowed to please himself
 “ with the Thoughts of being *Sheriff*, or
 “ *Alderman*, at least, if not *Lord Mayor*:
 “ The *Cadet* may have hopes of being a *Ge-*
 “ *neral*, and the *Student at the Inns of Court*
 “ expect to be *Lord High Chancellor of Great*
 “ *Britain*. This innocent Vanity is the na-
 “ tural Root, the real Ground of all *political*
 “ *Virtue* and *publick* Safety: It is this, and
 “ this only that distinguishes the Brave, the
 “ Learned and the Worthy, from the Ignorant,
 “ the Lazy, the Undeserving, in all Ranks,
 “ Orders, and Professions.” And is it fit this
 generous Emulation, which has furnished out
so many Worthies, should now be confined to
 those alone who are *born* Noble, and even to
 those, according to their Prospect of *actual*
Peerage? How many younger Brothers of
brave Spirit and *fine Genius*, who now are
 willing to *toil* and *expose* themselves in our
Fleets and *Armies*, and who, in *other Ways*,
 are

are at no small Pains to accomplish themselves for the *Service of their Country*, must receive some Discouragement from a Scheme, by which it is said * *the House of Lords will NECESSARILY share ALL the great Offices?*

The ancient laudable Practice of the *Crown*, has been, for the eminent good Qualities, approved Abilities and Services of Gentlemen, in their respective *difficult high Stations and Offices*, to enoble *them*, and, for *their Sakes*, their Posterity. — But, according to this Scheme, until *those* of the very best Talents have the Honour of sitting in the *upper House*, they can have no great Opportunity of exerting them in the Service of their *Prince and Country*. This reminds me of a ridiculous Edict, I have heard of, *restraining Youth from going into the Water before they could swim*.

Might we not under such a Policy fear a greater Scarcity than at present we have of Persons duly qualified for *all* the several great Offices which the *State* cannot be without? What if there are never wanting Instances many among the *Peers*, and we have, at this time, an *illustrious one*, of a *Nobleman* of the first *Rank and Fortune* adorning a *great and arduous Office*, with equal *Abilities and Application?* The Examples of *Noblemen*, *so able*, and *so willing*, it must be said, are not *too many*, nor probably *ever* will be, considering, that besides a natural Genius and Turn of
Mind,

* *Address to the Electors, &c.* p 49.

Mind, it requires *Use* and *Præctice*, *Experience* and *Habit*, to perfect any Person for a *momentous Employ*, which is best attained by beginning *early*, and rising *gradually* in what they profess; which is not *ordinarily* the Province of *elder Brothers born to ample Fortunes*.

Of such as have signalized themselves as *able Statesmen* (any more than good Poets) there have arose but few in any one Age. It has been thought a plentiful Harvest, which produced, at the same time, a *Cecil* and a *Walsingham*; as it is notorious, that of *all those* who are celebrated *as such* by our *English* Historians, the far greater Part of them made their first Appearance in the *House of Commons*; in *which respect*, if that *honourable House* may, at this Day, compare with (as I verily think it may) if it does not excel any Period of Time we can read of, I hope it is none of the Reasons why they should put on their own Chains, by submitting to the proposed Indignity. As to the Difference just observed, without any Reflection, there may this good Account, which I have in a manner hinted already, be given of it. If we consult the Temper of Mankind in general, it is not *Difficulty* and *Danger*, *Hard-studying*, *Watching* and *Labour*, which are the ultimate Object of Desire, but *Reputation*, *Riches*, *Titles*, *Ease* at last; and it is not easy to imagine, that *too many* of those who are blessed with a competent Share of them
before-

before-hand, should be over and above solicitous to repeat those Labours, which their *virtuous Ancestors* undertook, in some measure, for *their* Benefit.

This can't be denied, that all Men of good Parts, and natural or acquired Abilities, with sprightly Industry, will ever make their Application where Promotion may be expected, (and no where else) as Rewards for their Hazard and Labour; whoever makes that a Question, needs go no farther than to himself for an Answer. To love Trouble *upon its own Account*, is like the Love of *fighting for fighting sake*; which is agreed by all Mankind to be the certain Sign of a *Coward*, where-ever that is pretended. If then all Men of *Parts, Ability* and *Industry* must be supposed alike inclined to some of the desirable Advantages in Life, and none of these are to be had in the *House of Commons*; who then, of course, are left to be our worthy Representatives? Why, truly, the Dull, the Illiterate, and the Slothful, whom no People, not quite infatuated, would pick out for their Legislators, and to support the Honour and Interest of their Country abroad, and the Liberties of their Fellow-Subjects at home. I think I need not pursue this Argument any farther, to which I have been led by the *allowed* Consequences of a *Place-Bill*. I return to that taken from the *Possibility* of a *Suspicion of Corruption*.

These

These Possibilities Party-Prejudice has a good Knack at improving into Suspicion, and from thence to Certainty. How often have we seen this vicious Circle of reasoning made use of? *Votes* first disparaged on account of Place-Men, and *then* Place-Men condemned upon the Evidence of *those Votes*. Whereas Corruption is seated in the *Heart* of Persons, and not in *Places*; and a corrupt Heart, if the *Wisdom* of Parliament cannot descry, their *Power* will not be able to hinder. Chuse an uncorrupt *Parliament* without *Limitation of Places*, and where is the Danger? Suppose a corrupt one without *any Place-Men*, and where is the Security? — But *Places*, it is said, give Life and Birth and Nourishment to Corruption, *whenever that happens*. Shall we then utterly extinguish them? That is impossible! They have their Foundation in the *Exigencies* of the *State*, they are *essential* to the *Honour* and *Dignity* of the *Crown*; in regard to *both*, they are *necessary constituent Parts* and *Appendages* of *Government*; and to make them incompatible with a Seat in *Parliament* (*to all the Intents and Purposes alledged*) is beyond the Power of Law. Any one for that Purpose, contrive it as you can, will be evaded by one means or other, where the Disposition to do it is strong; and if the Number is reduced and limited, there will be the same Resource for corrupt Dispositions.

It is a Rule in Law, That *all Obligations* (where the Condition is impossible) are mere Nullities, void in course; and that is a sufficient Reason why we should not expect it from a *wise Body of Men* to go about to enact a Law, with a View to *Ends* and *Purposes* which common Understandings (as in this Case) must see it cannot answer. It may indeed lay Bars in the way of *some* more sincere and open Tempers, which *some others*, less scrupulous, will break thro' without any Difficulty; and what is that but exposing us still more to the very Tempers and Persons against whom we are supposed to be fencing? The Watch-word upon this Occasion is, a Free Parliament, a *Cant-Term* lately * made use of to convey false and mischievous Ideas, as also to cover (what their Friends were not a little conscious of) the unparliamentary, unprecedented, not to say seditious and dangerous Conduct of certain Gentlemen in a former, and threatening † us with the like in all subsequent Sessions of the same, in case this Affair particularly should not go according to their Wishes. Suspending for a Moment all Regard to the Merits of a Place-Bill, a little History may be of use to help our Judgments in this Case. In the Year 1648, when Colonel *Pride*, with Soldiers, possessed the Doors of the House of Commons, taking into Custody such of the Members as he

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* *Address to the Electors, &c.* † *Address, &c.* p. 57.

thought fit (in Number 41.) Mr. *Whitelock* says (p. 355.) “several Members were at a Stand, whether they should any more attend the House or not, in regard to the Violence offered to many of them; and that it could not be esteem’d a free Parliament. But (adds he) many of those, upon Debate and Advice of Friends, and Consideration that they were chosen by their Country to serve for them in this Parliament, and that the Violence was not offered to these, but to other Members (whereof they were not made the Judge, nor was it *left in their Power* to desert the Parliament and their Trust, whilst they might have liberty to continue in that Service) these Reasons persuaded many to continue in that Trust and Service.” Here was a manifest, an egregious Violation of the Freedom of Parliament, in the Persons of a large Number of Members; which yet we see was not thought sufficient to warrant a Secession in others. So far then from vindicating our late Seceders, who will take upon them to insinuate the least Colour of a Reason for it, from any want of Freedom in a Parliament, where it is notorious that at least all proper usual Liberty is both allowed and taken? Why, not to mention the *worthy Craftsman*, a certain Writer * has done it, who presuming he also may impose upon his Countrymen at pleasure, and studying what will serve his Purpose,

* *Address to the Electors, &c.*

pose, rather than to say what is true, has had the marvellous Assurance to tell us, that the late Secession *arose from no previous Concert among any of the Members, but was the Result of every Gentleman's private Judgment* *. This is an Evidence so thorough-pac'd, that *it*, with all he affirms besides, deservedly goes for nothing with unprejudiced thinking Persons.

We are told by another Hand †, that a Place-Bill is nothing less than a *reasonable, legal Security whether we are to continue a free People or not*; a Security, I suppose, that those who have a Share in the Legislature, shall not consent to the enslaving of *themselves and their Posterity* along with their Constituents; of which, was the Danger, *i. e.* the Probability much greater than any honest Man of *real* common Sense will pretend to say it is; yet when we talk of Security, we should consider what Things in their nature will bear.

All Power is a delegated Trust, for which no Pledge can be contrived that is an exact Equivalent; consequently, wherever it is lodged, there will always remain some Danger, *i. e.* a *physical Possibility* of its being abused; and a good moral Assurance to the contrary, is what, in many Cases, we must be content with. After having used our best Judgments in electing Gentlemen of Family and Fortune,

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with

* *Address, &c.* pag. 56.† *Common Sense*, Nov. 24.

with good private Characters, and of known Affection to the present Government, and our Constitution, we must (*for a Time*) depend upon the Honour and Consciences of our Representatives. If they are disposed to accept, and his Majesty think fit to confer on them a publick Employment, their Elections are, in most Cases, vacated; when they are rechosen, or they are not. If they are not, the Question is at an End. If they are, 'tis a manifest Approbation on the Part of their Constituents, and the *King* must be said, *so far*, to take *their* Sense in what he does; which, if it will not be taken as a Compliment, cannot be looked upon as an Injury; as little can it be esteemed, in *any Member of Parliament* (what the Writer, I have so often had occasion to quote, has ridiculously affirmed) a * Desertion of their Trust equal to, nay worse than that of *seceding*. And, considering that Places, and consequently Place-men must be, and that (humanly speaking) they will *always* be, many of them, *Members of Parliament*, under *any* Administration *whatsoever* (the contrary Supposition (*however it may serve a present Turn*) being a direct Affront to common Sense, as it is a plain Contradiction to the Experience of all Men in all Ages) no Body of Men have Reason to take Offence at their Representatives, *merely* for accepting a *Trust* or *Power* from the *Crown*,
without

* *Address, &c.* p. 54, 55.

without some other Ground of Dislike, or Suspicion; they ought rather to be pleased, and rejoice at it, among others, for this obvious Reason, Who are so proper to fill Places of Trust, as they who are best to be trusted? Who are so fit to represent us in Parliament, as they, whose Ability and Integrity is best to be relied on, in our own Opinions? the same good Qualities being requisite in both, if the same Person is so happy *at once* in the good Opinion of his *Prince and Country* too, it is a good sign, at least, of an *honest, worthy, able* Man. It is a sign of a good natural Interest well founded, that, tho' he is not carried upon the Wings of false Popularity, he has *real Merit*, a more solid Support, which upholds him in the Opinion of the most *considerate and valuable Part of his Electors*, than which nothing is more desirable, except, (*what is impossible*) Persons and Things which shall content or rather extinguish all Parties.

THEY will exist in some Shape while the World endures; where LIBERTY is, there will be *Faction*, and where there is an Inclination to it, there will never be wanting some Pretence for it. But, what is the *real Opinion* of the Promoters of this Scheme, may well be suspected from the *Self-denying Ordinance*, in 1644, supported by a Petition from the *Citizens of London*, when so many gallant Men, and true Defenders of the Liberty of their Country were excluded, not with In-

tent

tent really to keep all *Place-men* out of Parliament, but to let *themselves*, a RIVAL PARTY, in, as appeared too plainly by the Event; *which Ordinance* was not only the *Forerunner*, but the *Cause* of the total Dissolution of the Government, and was foreseen by Mr. *Whitelock* (as true a Lover of the Liberty of his Country, as ever did, or possibly ever may sit within St. *Stephen's* Chapel) who (*Page 115 of his Memoirs*) (after quoting a Speech at full Length made against that Ordinance, which it is above the Reach of our *weekly Scribblers* to answer) has these Words. “ The Debate
 “ held till late at Night, and then, upon the
 “ Question, (as some called it) *Envy* and
 “ *Self-Ends* prevailing, the Ordinance passed
 “ the House, and was sent to the Lords.” This was the Judgment of that great Man, both of the *Thing*, and of the *Motives* of *those* who carried it on; which was fully justified by what followed, for in less than five Years time, not only the KING was murdered, but the *Monarchy* was dissolved, which they pretended only to restrain, the House of PEERS voted *useless and dangerous*, and *that they ought to be abolished*; and in three Years after that, the COMMONS themselves were by Force turned out of Doors by the Principal Contriver of that Ordinance *in Person*, and bid, with Scorn, to take away that Fool's Bawble (*the Mace*;) after which, so weary were the People justly (even the City of *London* itself) under the Government

vernment of these *Self-deniers*, after having tried it in all Manner of Shapes, that rather than bear it longer, they threw themselves (with unparallel'd Joy) into the Arms of a Prince they had so often provoked (and just before abjured) without so much as securing one single Liberty, or even stipulating for an Indemnity, to save their *Self-denying* Friends and Leaders from the Gallows. This may be a proper Lesson, not only for such as are too apt to judge of Men's Designs by their open Professions, but also to the Successors of *those* who were so feelingly concerned in the Consequences of that *never to be forgotten Law*. A fatal Original! which, (with uncommon want of Modesty, again, as contrary to all the Rules of Prudence) we are told* it is quite necessary we should Copy after for *our future Preservation*, that otherwise *our Constitution will be at an End*†. But surely, as *Place-men* have always sat in the *House of Commons* beyond any Memory or Tradition, till that *memorable Year* 44, the Precedent will afford no Reason to make the proposed Alteration; since it is notorious that the Nation and its Liberties subsisted many more *Ages* under that Distemper (if it was one) than they did *Years*, under that pretended Cure. *wise Men* won't follow *Quacks*, tho' they sometimes perform great Cures.——But to follow *such of them* as have been remarkable only for
killing

* *Address*, &c. p. 53.

† P. 49.

killing their Patients, is a Degree of Folly, of which NO MAN knowingly was ever guilty.

Thus far I have treated, what is apparently a particular *Party-Project*, abstractedly as I well could from all Party Considerations, *properly such*; my Purpose being to see the real Merits of it, upon what good Foundation it stood, and how feasible it was, *Men and Things considered*; and therefore I proceeded in it, not otherwise than as if ALL the Subjects of *Great Britain* were equally Friends to our Constitution, and alike well affected to the Person and Government of his present Majesty, and to the *Protestant Succession*; as if we were generally agreed about the same *good End*, only apt (*as Men*) to differ about the *Means*, or rather about certain Emoluments, which SOME must necessarily enjoy, and ALL in the same Situation cannot possibly partake of; in which View the reducing Scheme seems (at best) to be but a *chimerical Cure* for an *imaginary Cause* of Complaint, a *Complaint* exaggerated not only beyond Truth, but even beyond Probability; a *Cure* not capable of reaching the *Evil*, if it was *real*.

And therefore when the Cause assigned appears (as in this Case) to be no Cause, or next to none, some other latent Reasons, which will not so well bear the Light, are much to be suspected. One indeed there is, which

which almost every one more than suspects, and which therefore I need not name. Besides which, 'tis observable there is hardly in *England* one single *Papist*, *Jacobite*, *Tory* or *Passive-Obedience Man*, who is not zealously inclin'd to this Scheme. Let any Man reflect upon the known Principles and Opinions of these Gentlemen, and judge whether their Motive be a superstitious Regard for the Year 1644, and a Veneration for the Memory of *those* who had a chief Hand in that Transaction; or whether it is the Preservation of the Protestant Religion, the Support of the present Royal Family, and the Defence of the Liberties of the People; or whether, recollecting the Consequences of that Event, it is not more likely to be with a View to the Destruction of *them all*. I allow the Gentlemen called *discontented Whigs*, to be as free from any such View, as the most zealous Courtiers.— But the Question is not what they intend, but what the Consequence may be of their joining with those Men. Few of the Presbyterians, in the Beginning of the Year 1660, thought of bringing in the King; but when they joined with the *Cavaliers*, a Restoration soon followed. The City of *London* itself thought fit to swim with a Stream that then was out of their Power to stem, tho' *they* before had chiefly supported all the Schemes against the *Constitution*, from the Beginning to the End of those *distracted*

E

Times,

Times, as they are often called by Mr. *Whitlock*. If then it is remember'd, (and methinks it should not be quite forgot) *that there is a Popish Pretender to the Throne*,* that there are many Papists in *England*, &c. particularly that the City of *York* is remarkably full of them; which (*it is to be noted*) was the *first* Place in the Kingdom, where the *Common-Council* thought fit to follow the Example of the *Livery-Men* at *London*; WHERE also it is neither *impossible*, nor at all *improbable*, that *Popish Priests* and *Jesuits* may swarm in Disguise, even in *Republican* Shapes, in short, in *any Shape* which may do hurt; WHERE *they* may be as active, as they are *always* artful, and as successful *now* as *formerly* in fomenting Divisions. — If we consider, that the *TORIES* among us are not a few; that, at certain *Times*, they have *ALL* of them been *consequentially* *JACOBITES*; that many of them

* This was *Q. Elizabeth's Case*; her Right to the Crown was always contested openly or tacitly. The Papists, in general, considering her but as a Queen *de facto*, believed they might, with a safe Conscience, assist in deposing her, whenever an Opportunity offer'd. *To which End*, she had for her constant Enemies the *Pope* and *Spain*; always *some*, sometimes *all the other* Catholick Powers in *Europe*, with all the Papists in *England*, *Scotland* and *Ireland*. As she was constantly in Danger on this Account, so it was her principal Care to guard against it: It was always uppermost with her; the whole Policy of her Reign turned chiefly upon this Hinge. Thus, never losing Sight of her Danger, she *wonderfully* kept her *Crown*, and preserved her Protestant Subjects in great Tranquillity, amidst the secret and open Attacks of her own and their Enemies both at home and abroad. *Rapin*, Vol. II. p. 57, &c.

them were *directly*, *notoriously* and *avowedly* in the Interest of the *Pretender*, at the *Accession* of his late Majesty ; that (as a *Party*) they have never given any tolerable Proof, ——— Proof did I say? not the least Sign of being reconciled to the *Protestant Succession*; unless a constant virulent Opposition, for twenty-five Years successively, to all the Measures of the established Government, upon all Occasions, and in all Shapes whatsoever, can be accounted *such*. — If we consider what has been the Practice of *France* heretofore upon our *Elections* and *Councils*, and what is her *present Power* and *Policy*; how, besides what * Bishop *Burnet* tells us of *French Gold* in K. *William's* Reign, we can many of us recollect the current Plenty of it, in the Time of a *Tory Parliament*, and a *Tory Administration*, at the latter End of Q. *Anne's* (but which has disappeared since that Time.) ——— If it is considered that we have Reason to apprehend the Readiness of FRANCE, at a particular Juncture, to ply us again in the same Way, she having lately practised her *Liberality* †, with much Success, upon other States in *Europe* ——— If in the present Conjunction of Affairs, we have particular

* *Burnet's History, Vol. 2. p. 257.*

† Monsieur *Colbert*, the *French Ambassador* in *London*, sent to gain or corrupt the *English Court* and *Council* of K. *Charles II.* in order to induce them to break the *Triple League*, which was made to check the Power of *France*, has this Expression in a Letter denoting the Success of his Negotiations: *I have at last made them sensible of the whole Extent of his Majesty's Liberality.* Rapin, *Vol. II. p. 653.*

ticular Reason to be upon our Guard against her *Arts*, as well as *Arms*—— If we consider how much *this Scheme* is made a Point of, and *by whom*, there is room to suspect the worst about it; inasmuch as if this Power should be taken out of the Hands of the *Crown*, which, at present, is but a reasonable, a *moderate* Counterbalance to the *Designs* and *Practices* of our *so potent Neighbour* and *natural Enemy*, the Scene would then be changed from what, in another View, is, at best, Absurdity, to *real* and *imminent Danger*. I hope we shall not be sensible of it, when it is too late! —— that we shall not thus give Occasion, not the Chance of an Occasion to have it said, —— Oh BRITAIN, **Thou hast destroyed thyself!**

P. S. **I**T was owing to an Accident that this Tract, tho' committed to the Press above a Fortnight before, was not wholly printed off on the 29th of *January*; when it was laid aside, with an Intent to be suppressed, as a Work then judg'd *out of Season*. But the Author finding since that the Controversy to which it relates, has not wholly ceased *without Doors*, for the same Reasons, and upon the same Motives which induc'd his writing at first, has upon second Thoughts resolved to publish it; which, as the Case was, he thought he might do, *jure quasi postliminii*.

F I N I S.



An Impartial

ENQUIRY, &c.



[Price Sixpence.]

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OF THE

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4)

An IMPARTIAL
ENQUIRY

INTO THE

Reasonableness and Necessity of a
BILL for reducing and limiting
the Number of PLACES in the
House of Commons.

SHEWING,

That the passing such a BILL
would be attended with the most
mischievous and fatal Consequen-
ces to this Nation in the present
Conjuncture of Affairs.

L O N D O N :

Printed for J. ROBERTS, near the *Oxford-*
Arms in *Warwick-Lane*,

M DCC XXXIX.

ALPHABET

YMOGAE

CHAPTER

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An Impartial

ENQUIRY, &c.



THE *Gentlemen* who withdrew themselves from Parliament the last Sessions, for Reasons which they have not yet thought fit to entrust their Friends with, or to publish to the World, have at length declar'd by the Mouth of the *Craftsman*, their Intention to return to their Stations in the approaching Sessions,

Sessions, in order “ to use their ut-
 “ most Endeavours to promote a
 “ Bill for reducing and limiting the
 “ Number of Places in the House
 “ of Commons, as the only Method
 “ to secure the Independency of
 “ Parliament, and consequently the
 “ Prosperity of the whole King-
 “ dom.

The *Livery-men* of the City of
London have been spirited up upon
 this Occasion ---- “ to *require* it of
 “ their four Members, that they
 “ make the passing of a *Place-Bill*
 “ a previous Step to the passing of
 “ any *Money-Bill* whatsoever.

And the *Craftsman* has declar’d;
 ---- “ That an effectual Bill is pre-
 “ paring for this Purpose, and
 “ wishes there may be as full a
 “ House, as ever was known, to
 “ support it.

He has likewise made this farther
 Declaration, ---- “ That, in Case
 “ the

“ the *Place-men* should be found
 “ strong enough to defeat this Bill,
 “ those *Gentlemen*, who withdrew
 “ themselves from Parliament the
 “ last Sessions, will have a stronger
 “ Reason to withdraw themselves
 “ this Sessions.

When Things are carried to such
 an exorbitant Length, when the
 Prosperity of the whole Kingdom
 is made to depend upon the Pas-
 sing of this Bill, and when the
 Rejecting of it is given as a Rea-
 son for that most *infamous Conduct*
 of deserting a Trust of the high-
 est Nature ; ---- when this is the
 Case, it is fit and necessary that
 the *Merits* and the *real Consequen-*
ces of this Bill should be thorough-
 ly examin'd, and set in a true Light;
 which has not, I think, been yet
 done by any Writer on either side
 of the Question.

I do agree with the *Craftsman*, and the Writers on that side of the Question, ----- That it is a Consideration of the greatest *Importance*, ---- whether the Number of Places in the House of Commons ought to be reduced and limited, or not.

And I doubt not to make it evidently appear to every impartial Man, ---- That the present Number of Places possess'd by Members of the House of Commons, is so far from endangering our Liberties, by placing too great a Power in the Hands of the Crown, that, if the Number of them was to be reduc'd, in our present Circumstances, the next House of Commons would be entirely under the Influence of a *Foreign Power*.

The great Evil and Danger to be guarded against in this Nation, and especially at this Conjunction, is, ---
2
That

That *French* Influence does prevail in any of our Councils.

This was what ruin'd all King *William's* Measures, and made his Reign so unprosperous; ---- *France* was in all his Councils.

The Truth of this cannot be controverted. Bishop *Burnet*, not to quote any other Writers, has put this Matter beyond all Doubt and Dispute.

“ As soon as our Parliament was
 “ opened, it appeared that the
 “ *French* had a great Party in it.
 “ It is certain, great Sums came over
 “ this Winter from *France*; the Pack-
 “ et-boat came seldom without
 “ 10000 *Louis d'Ors*, it brought
 “ often more; the Nation was fill'd
 “ with them, and in six Months
 “ time a Million of Guineas was
 “ coined out of them. The Mer-
 “ chants indeed said, that the Ba-
 “ lance of Trade was then turn'd so
 B “ much

“ much to our Side, that, whereas
 “ we were wont to carry over a
 “ Million of our Money in Specie,
 “ we then sent no Money to *France*,
 “ and had at least half that Sum sent
 “ over to Balance the Trade; yet
 “ this did not account for that vast
 “ Flood of *French* Gold, that was
 “ visible amongst us. And, upon
 “ the *French Ambassador's* going a-
 “ way, a very sensible Alteration
 “ was found in the Bills of Exchange;
 “ so it was concluded, that great
 “ Remittances were made to him,
 “ and that these were distributed
 “ among Those, who resolved to
 “ merit a Share in that Wealth,
 “ which came over now so copi-
 “ ously, beyond the Example of
 “ former Times*.

Corrupting the *Councils* of her
 Neighbours, has always been the
 Policy

* *Burnet's Hist.* Vol. II. pag. 257.

[II]

Policy of *France*; but never more so, than at this Juncture.

It is a common Remark, ---- That the *English* always beat the *French* in the Field, but the *French* were too hard for them in the Cabinet. The meaning of which is, not that *France* had more able Ministers, but that she found Means to influence the Councils of *England*, and turn them to her own Interest and Advantage.

I believe no Man suspects, this Influence prevails at this Time. But should this Bill pass, and the *Tory Party* be the Majority in any future Parliament; we might boast indeed of a Parliament uninfluenc'd by the *Prince* on the Throne, but entirely govern'd by *French* Councils.

There cannot be a plainer or a stronger Proof that this would be our Condition, than that all the

Partizans of *France*, and every profess'd *JACOBITE* and *Papist* throughout the Kingdom, are at this time, as the *Craftsman* expresses it, “using
“ their utmost Arts and Endeavours
“ to promote a Bill for reducing
“ and limiting the Number of Places in the House of Commons.

This cannot be denied. And can it possibly be true then what the *Craftsman* asserts, - - - - “that
“ such a Bill is the only Method to
“ secure the Prosperity of the whole
“ Kingdom?

Is it not on the contrary most certain, that, in the Opinion of our Enemies, this is the only Method to have *French* Councils prevail in that great Assembly?

A Government which is entrusted with Power and Influence, may possibly enslave their Subjects; but a Government that is poor, and divested of all Power and Influence,
must

must inevitably fall a Prey and a Sacrifice to some rich and powerful neighbouring Prince.

The History of our own, and of almost all other Nations, is an incontestable Proof of this; and we need but look around us at this time, and behold too many melancholy Instances of it.

Is not this the present deplorable State and Condition of *S*——? That Nation, jealous of their Liberties, having suffer'd so much from the arbitrary Power of the preceding Reign, divested their present *King* of all Power and Influence; and by that only Means, and no other, have given *France* an Opportunity to influence and direct all their Councils.

The very *Expedient* by which they inconsiderately design'd to preserve their Liberties, has been the occasion of their becoming the Slaves
and

and Tools of a *foreign* and a *Popish* Power.

And is not this the *Expedient* which a *Faction* are now using their utmost Endeavours to put in practice in this Nation?

Lists of the *Place-Men*, as they are *odiously* call'd, have been publish'd and dispers'd at the great *Expence* of the *Faction* throughout the Kingdom.

The City of *London* has been deluded and infatuated by a *few violent* and *republican* Spirits, to give Instructions to, nay, *inconsistently* with their own Clamour for the *Independency* of Parliament, to REQUIRE it of their Members, - - - -
 “ that they make the passing of a
 “ *Place-Bill* a previous Step to the
 “ passing of any *Money-Bill* whatsoever;” and this, tho’ they declare in the same Instructions, - - -
 “ that the Nation is threaten’d with
 “ the

“ the most imminent Dangers from
 “ *Abroad.*

If the *Faction* were able to carry this Point, can any Man imagine they would stop here? No, the Mask would then be laid aside, and we should be told, that the *Crown* had still too great Power and Influence, and there were more Branches that must be lopp'd off; nor would they desist till they had, after the Model of *S——*, left their *Prince* nothing but the Name of a *King*.

What Confusion must this raise in the Nation at this time?

This Method was chalk'd out to them by that *Man*, who was once at the Head of, and directed all their Councils, tho' they are now *asham'd* of him, the renown'd Author of the *Dissertation upon Parties*.

He had Penetration enough to see that this was the only *Scheme* that
 could

could overturn and ruin the present Establishment; and that if once the Power of the *Crown* were *reduced* according to his *Scheme*, that is, according to the Model of the *S——* Government, *England* would soon be brought to the Condition in which we now behold that unhappy People; and that it would be absolutely in the Power of *France* to impose the *Pretender* upon us.

This ought to awaken and alarm every *Englishman*, who is a Friend to the present Establishment, when he sees a Bill of this Nature push'd on with so much *Vehemence*; when he sees, that *Corrupting* the Councils of all the Princes and States of *Europe*, who are either so blind that they do not, or their Ministers so wicked that they will not see it, is that great *Engine*, by which *France* is now aspiring to universal Monarchy.

And

And is this a *Time* for *England* to reduce the Power of the *Crown*? Must not *France* rejoice to see this done? And do we not see the fatal Consequences and Effect of it in *S* — ? By reducing the Power of that *Crown* to its present low Condition, they are now entirely govern'd by *French* Councils; which, in all probability, will involve them in the greatest of all Miseries, that of a bloody *Civil War*.

This is the true Light, in which we ought to view this *Scheme* for reducing the Power of the *Crown* in this Nation. Nor can any possible Reason be assign'd, why it will not operate, in case it were to succeed, just in the same manner it has done in *S* — , only with this Difference, of having a *Papish Pretender* impos'd upon us.

There is not indeed the least Reason to apprehend that the present

Parliament could be influenc'd by *French* Councils, even if this Bill were to pass. But the Case would most certainly be quite otherwise with respect to a future Parliament.

This is certain, that, if this Bill were to pass into a Law, it would greatly discourage the *Friends* of the Government from endeavouring to come into Parliament.

Whereas, a Man, who is an *Enemy* to the present Establishment, does not stand in need of *this* Encouragement of obtaining a Place to use his utmost Endeavours to procure a Seat in that House.

As his Design of coming into Parliament, is to betray his Country, so he is sure to receive his *Reward* from another *Quarter*.

This is the true State of the Case, and that Man must be infatuated, who does not, or will not see.

I am not pleading for a *Dependency* of the *Parliament* upon the *Crown*, or for *Corruption*, as it is *plausibly*, but very *falsly* call'd.

No, it is to prevent Corruption, that Corruption, which must be our Ruin, if it prevails, the *Corruption* by a *Foreign Power*, and which, it is notorious, prevail'd in every Parliament throughout the Reign of King *William*.

It is no Argument against the Truth of what I have here laid down, and that this Bill, if it were to pass, would not be attended with any of these fatal Consequences; that we see Men very vehement in obtaining such a Bill, who not only are possess'd of great Property, but it must be confess'd are not Enemies to the present Government; for there have been Instances, at all Times, of such Men being led away by the strong Passions of Ambition

and Revenge, and by not attending to the unavoidable Consequences of their Conduct, and by joining themselves to the Enemies of their Country, so as to involve the Nation in great and inextricable Difficulties and Dangers.

But it is an unanswerable Argument, that the Consequences of passing such a Bill would be what I have describ'd them, when it is most notorious, that every disaffected Person in the Kingdom, as well *Papist*, as *Protestant*, cannot help discovering the warmest Zeal for the passing of this Bill.

These Men plainly see the *fatal Turn*, which the passing of such a Bill must necessarily give to *Elections* throughout the Kingdom.

For, if, by their own way of reasoning, the present Number of Employments is the chief Encouragement to the *Friends* of the Government

ment to endeavour to obtain Seats in Parliament; when these Employments are taken away, the Friends of the Government will be much less anxious to come into Parliament; which must not only give an Opportunity to the *Enemies* of the Government of being Elected, but they will spare no Expence to obtain their Elections, when they are sure to be rewarded by a *Foreign Power*, whose Interests they are determin'd to promote.

This is the Light, in which every impartial Man will consider those Places, which are given to Members of Parliament.

They are the great *Inducement* and *Encouragement* to Men of ancient Families and *large Fortunes*, who are *Friends* to the present Establishment, to undergo the *Fatigue* and *Expence* of serving their Country in that Station.

Take

Take away this Encouragement, and it will not only be the sure Means to fill the House of Commons with Men of *low Birth and Fortunes*; but you at the same time open a Gap to the *profess'd Enemies* of the present Establishment, to be the only Representatives of their Country in Parliament.

So that the Law, as it now stands, and allows of so many Places to be held by Members of the House of Commons, is so far from being dangerous to the Liberty of the Subject, or to the Constitution; that, next to the *Affections* of the People, it is the *strongest Security* of the present Establishment.

It will, I am sensible, be objected to this, ---- That, though it be true, that the permitting so many Places to be held by Members of the House of Commons is an *Encouragement* to Men of Rank and Fortune,
 who

who are Friends to the Government, to be at the Expence and Fatigue of serving their Country in Parliament; yet these Places do nevertheless *bias* and *influence* Men in giving their Votes in that House; and consequently, that what I urge, is no Answer to the Objection, - - - That Members of the House of Commons are influenc'd by Places.

Now allowing that Places do in some Cases influence Members of that House; I appeal to every impartial Man, whether there be the least Probability that a House of Commons, composed of Men of the greatest Rank and Property, which will always be the Case whilst these Places subsist, and which is an unanswerable Argument against reducing their Number; - - - I appeal to every unprejudic'd Person, whether it be not the height of Absurdity and Contradiction, to suppose
such

such Men can be influenc'd by any Means to give up their Liberties, or to suffer any Breach to be made in the Constitution.

It were easy to give Instances in several Parliaments, of many Things that have been carried but by small Majorities, which it will be confess'd did not in the least affect or endanger Liberty or the Constitution.

And can it be thought then that a Parliament, composed of Men of the greatest Rank and Property, will be influenc'd to approve of any Measures which visibly and undeniably strike at the very Foundation of our Liberties and the Constitution?

In this Case then there is no other possible Rule to direct us how to act, but this, of two Evils to chuse the least.

Suffer none, or a very small Number of Places, to be held by
Members

Members of the House of Commons, the certain Consequence will be, that you open a *Gap* to fill that House with Men of low Fortunes, and such as are *profess'd Enemies* to the Government.

On the other hand, let no Reduction be made of the present Number of Places, it is probable there may be *Cases* in which Influence may prevail against Mens Judgment.

What now is to be done? If one or other of these cannot be prevented, and must be endur'd; if you must either admit of *some* Influence in Matters of *less* moment, or if the only Means to prevent that Influence will of necessity, in our present Circumstances, open the way for another and a *foreign Influence*, which must destroy this Government, and impose the *Pretender* upon us; — must not the

D People

People of *England* be deluded, and I may say *providentially blinded*, not to see their own Destruction, in requiring it of their Members to promote a Bill, which in our present Circumstances, and in the present Conjunction, must bring immediate and inevitable Ruin upon their Country, and entail *Poper*y and *Slavery* upon themselves and their Posterity ?

Had we never seen *British* Parliaments influenc'd by *French Gold*, — had not those Parliaments been chiefly composed of *Tories*; — and were it not as impossible for a *Tory* to change his *Principles*, as for an *Ethiopian* to change his *Skin*, — I would be as zealous as any Man to limit the Number of Places in the House of Commons.

But to do it at this Juncture, when we see what Influence a neighbouring Power has gain'd
over

over the Councils of too many of its Neighbours, and know by what Means this has been done, and when a general *Election* is at hand; — to pass such a Bill at this time, must, I am firmly persuaded, be attended with the most fatal Consequences to this Nation.

It may perhaps be inferr'd and concluded from what I have asserted, *viz.* That if this Bill were to pass, it would open the way for the Enemies of the Government to be the prevailing Party in the next Parliament; — that if this be true, *Disaffection* must generally prevail throughout the Kingdom.

But, God be thanked, this is very far from being our *Condition*.

But then this is not to be deny'd, that *Corruption* has got such an Ascendency in all, or most of the *Boroughs* of *England*, that no Regard is had by the Electors to the *Prin-*

ciples of any Candidate, but the best *Bidder* is sure to carry his Election, even tho' the Majority of the Electors be in the Interest of the Government, and they have the most convincing Proof that the Person they elect is a *profess'd Enemy* to the present Establishment.

This is a farther Proof, and a very strong one too, of the fatal Consequence of passing such a Bill.

For if this Bill will *discourage* all Men of large Fortunes, who are Friends to the Government, from being Candidates at the next Election; and if the profess'd Enemies to the present Establishment, and Men of low Fortunes, will be almost the *only Candidates* in an ensuing Election; — what can possibly prevent it, but that these Men will be the *Majority* in the next Parliament?


Upon

Upon the whole : If it be true, that Parliaments , throughout the whole Reign of *King William*, were influenc'd by *French* Councils. — If the permitting so many Places to be held by Members of the House of Commons, be the great, and in our present Circumstances, the only *Hindrance* to the Enemies of the Government coming into Parliament. — If in case this Bill should pass, very *few* of the Friends to the Government will undertake the Fatigue and Expence of representing their Country in Parliament. — If by the passing of this Bill a *Way* will be open'd to fill the House of Commons with Men of *low Fortunes*, and such as are *profess'd Enemies* to the Government, and consequently *French* Councils will prevail in that great Assembly. — And if the present Number of Places is a certain, and perhaps

perhaps the only sure *Method* to have that House fill'd with Men of the *greatest Rank and Property*. ———

If these Things be true, and will admit of no Reply, it is to be hoped “the Eyes of the People” (as the *Craftsman* expresses it) “will be fully opened,” and they will discover the *secret* Springs of pushing on this Bill with such an uncommon Spirit and Vehemence at this critical Juncture; and that the Nation in general, instead of following “the glorious and exemplary Conduct of the City of *London*,” which can serve only to throw the whole Kingdom into a Flame, will declare, - - - *That they do not think this a proper and a seasonable Time to bring in a Bill of this Nature.*

F I N I S.



AN
ENQUIRY
INTO THE
DANGER
OF

Multiplying Incapacities on the Gentlemen of
England to sit in Parliament.

OCCASIONED

By the late Writings in Favour of a *PLACE-
BILL*. In a *LETTER* to a Member of
Parliament.



L O N D O N :

Printed for J. ROBERTS, at the *Oxford-Arms*, in *Warwick-
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*An Enquiry into the Danger of
multiplying Incapacities on the
Gentlemen of England to set
in Parliament, &c.*

S I R,

A BILL for incapacitating Members of Parliament from holding Places under the Crown, must work the greatest Change in our Constitution, which hath been known for some Ages, and, instead of lessening the Power of the Crown, the Consequence of it must be the lessening the Power of the People. *A Bill to secure the Freedom of Parliament, by multiplying Incapacities on Englishmen, to set in Parliament, is of the Nature of a Bill to secure the Church, by taking away the Liberty of Conscience : The one must be as dangerous to our Civil, as the other hath always been to our religious Rights.*

By the ancient Laws of *England*, no Man was to find himself in a worse Condition from being a Representative of the People, than had they never conferred that Honour upon him. There was but one Order of Men in *England* that could not sit in the House of Commons, which was the Clergy ; and the Reason was, they had an House of Representatives, to sit in Convocation, where the Aids of the Clergy were granted to the Crown. There was but one *civil Officer* who could not be return'd to sit in Parliament, which was the *Returning Officer* of the Writ of Election ; and even
A this

this was a Grievance loudly complained off, when any Man was appointed *Sheriff*, with a Design to prevent his Election.

By the Statutes of the Kingdom, we find no Laws in former Ages to disqualify Gentlemen from being Members by Reason of any Employment : The Journals of the *House of Commons*, shew the Sense of our Ancestors strongly against every Thing of this Nature : when any one was chosen to sit in Parliament, they asserted it to be both his Right and his Duty to sit there, whatever Employment he held, or whatever Summons he had to attend in any other Station.

In the Commons Journal 8 and 9 *Eliz.* [October 1, 1566.] RICHARD ONSLOW, *Solicitor-General* “ to the Queen, being chosen a Member for the “ Borough of -----, in the County of *Suffex*, “ the House was moved, that they would use some “ Means to have him restored to them (he having “ till that Time attended in the House of Lords) “ to join with them in the Election of a *Speaker*.

This was not a new Parliament, but the *second* Session of *Queen Elizabeth's second* Parliament, which having set about eleven Weeks in 1562, was not assembled again till very near *four Years* afterwards. In this long Prorogation the *Speaker* died, and the Lords were possessed of the *Solicitor-General*, as their Assistant, by the Duty of his Office, in Obedience to the Queen's writ ; but the Commons would not allow that Office to vacate his Seat in their House, nor would they chuse their *Speaker* till their Members was restored.

The Journal proceeds, “ Notice being given to “ the Lords, upon Consultation had amongst them, “ *Mr. Onslow* was sent down with the Queen's Ser- “ jeant at Law, *Mr. Carus*, and *Mr. Attorney-Gener- “ al*, to shew for himself, why he should not be a “ Member.

“ *Member of this House, who alledging many weighty Reasons, as well for the Office of Sollicitor, as for his Writ of Attendance in the other House, was nevertheless, adjudged to be a Member of this House; and thereupon, the House proceeding to the Election of their Speaker, Mr. Comptroller nominated Mr. Onslow to be Speaker, who humbly disabled himself, as well for Non-ability of Substance meet for that Place, as also for the Oath made to the Queen’s Majesty, and required them to proceed to a new Election; upon whose Arguments the House divided, and the Number to have him Speaker was 82, and the contrary 69; and immediately Mr. Comptroller [Sir Edward Rogers] and Mr. Vice-Chamberlain [Sir Francis Knollys] brought him from his Place to the Chair and there set him down.*”

‘This Passage is full in Point before us, and is the JUDGMENT OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS *in the Reign of Elizabeth*, that an Office under the Crown could work no Incapacity by the Law of the Land, or by the Law and Usage of Parliament.

In the 23d Year of Queen *Elizabeth*, the Commons Journal, January 18, 1580, says, Mr. Treasurer declared unto the House, that he and others had just now seen in the other House, one that is a Member of this House, to wit, Mr. John Popham, her Majesty’s Sollicitor-General, being one of the *Citizens of Bristol*; and therefore he moved, that a Message might be sent to the Lords, with Request, that Mr. Popham might be forthwith remanded and restored. Upon this Message it was complied with, and the Sollicitor-General was sent down between the Queen’s Serjeant Anderson, and Sir Gilbert Gerrard, Attorney-General; and was chosen Speaker.”

It was doubtful whether the Lord Chief Baron
A 2 Bell;

Bell, the former *Speaker*, who died in the Interval of Session, had he been living at the Time of this Meeting of Parliament, could have been discharged of the *Chair* by accepting of that Employment.

In the 35th Year of this Reign, the Usage of Parliament was so well understood, that *Coke*, then *Solicitor General*, did not obey the Writ of Attendance on the *Lords*; but being elected *Knight of the Shire* for *Norfolk*, attended in his Place in the *House of Commons*, and was (says the Journal!) *with one full Consent and Voice of the whole House, chosen to be their Speaker*.

It is therefore apparent, that the making the Discharge of any other Trust inconsistent with the Discharge of the Trust reposed in a Member of the *House of Commons*, is a *Novelty* in our Constitution, and a *Modern Abridgment* of the natural and *ancient Rights* of the People, who had Liberty to chuse such Representatives as were most able to serve them; and have in all Ages considered such Men to be so, as enjoyed Publick Offices, or Authority; the Influence of which gives Weight to every Member possessed of such Office or Authority; and their aggregate Power must give an additional Weight to the whole *House*, wherein they are admitted.

The People of *England* judged it their greatest Security, that when they elected Members to represent them in Parliament, they thereby made Choice of the only proper Persons for all the Offices of the Government; thinking they could not safely depend on a just Administration of Government from Strangers, with whose Characters they were entirely unacquainted.

This being the Nature of our Constitution, and the declared Sence of Parliaments in former Ages, it will scarcely be any Advantage to the contrary Doctrine, that it was never broach'd 'till within this Century; that in the *first Instance* thereof, the
Design

Design and Effect of it was to destroy the Rights of the Parliament, the Person of the King, and the Liberties of the People ; and that in the subsequent Attempts of this Kind, the Intent was to load the Settlement of the *Protestant Succession*, to make the Descent of the Crown on the *House of Hanover* precarious, and the Government under that Family impracticable.

The first Attempt which ever was made to destroy this *vital* Principle of the ancient *British* Constitution, was the famous SELF-DENYING ORDINANCE of the *long Parliament*, which met in 1641, when this was conceived to be the *leading Motion* to an entire Change of the *legal Frame of Government*. The *Noble Historian* tells us, in the Year 1644, ' That the violent Party which obstructed all the ' Approaches towards Peace, found that they had ' finished as much of their Work, as the Tools ' which they wrought with could be applied to, ' and what remained to be done, must be dispatched ' by new Workmen. They had been long unsatisfied with the *Earl of Essex*, and he as much with ' them ; both being more solicitous to suppress the ' other, than to destroy the King : They bore the ' Loss, and Dishonour. He had sustained *Cornwall* ' very well, and would have been glad that both he ' and his Army had been quite cut off, instead of ' being dissolved ; for most of his Soldiers and Officers were corrupted in their Affections towards ' them, and desired nothing but Peace ; so that ' they resolved never more to entrust or employ any ' of them : But that which troubled them more ' was, that their beloved *Earl of Manchester*, upon ' whom they depended as their fast Friend, by ' whom they might insensibly have divested the ' *Earl of Essex* of all Authority inconvenient ' to them, appeared now as unapplicable to their ' Purpose

Purpose as the other; and there was a Breach between him and *Oliver Cromwell*, which was irreconcilable.

The Independant Party, which feared and abhorred all Motions towards a Peace, were resolved to have no more to do with either of their Generals; but how to lay them aside was the Difficulty; especially the *Earl of Essex*, who had been so entirely their Founder, that they owed not more to the Power and Reputation of Parliament than to his sole Name and Credit. He being able to raise an Army, and conducting it to fight against the King, was purely due to him, and the Effect of his Power; and now to put such an Affront upon him, and to think of another General, must appear the highest Ingratitude, and might provcke the Army itself, where he was still exceedingly beloved; and to continue him in that Trust, was to betray their own Designs, and to render them impracticable.

They knew not how to propose the great Alterations they intended to the Parliament; and, of all Men, the *Scottish* Commissioners were not to be trusted. In the End, they resolved to pursue the Method in which they had hitherto been so successful, and to prepare and ripen Things in the Church, that they might afterwards, in due Time, grow to Maturity in the Parliament: They agreed therefore in the *Houses*; and in those Combinations they were always unanimous, that they would have a solemn *Fast-Day*, in which they would seek God, and desire his Assistance, to lead them out of the Perplexities they were in; and they did as readily agree in the Nomination of the Preachers, who were to perform that Exercise, and who were more trusted in the deepest Designs, than those who named them were.

When

‘ When the *Fast-Day* came, which was observed
 ‘ for *eight* or *ten* Hours together in the Churches,
 ‘ the Preachers prayed the Parliament might be in-
 ‘ spired with those Thoughts as might contribute to
 ‘ their Honour and Reputation; and that they
 ‘ might preserve that Opinion the Nation had of
 ‘ their Honesty and Integrity, and be without any
 ‘ selfish Ends, or seeking their own Benefit and Ad-
 ‘ vantage. After this Preparation by their Prayers,
 ‘ the Preachers, let their Texts be what they
 ‘ would, told them very plainly, That it was no
 ‘ Wonder there was such Division amongst them in
 ‘ their Councils, when there was no Union in their
 ‘ Hearts: That the Parliament lay under many Re-
 ‘ proaches, not only amongst their Enemies, but
 ‘ with their best Friends, who were the more out of
 ‘ Countenance, because they found that the Asper-
 ‘ sions and Imputations, which their Enemies had
 ‘ laid upon them, were so well grounded, that they
 ‘ could not wipe them off: That there was as great
 ‘ Pride, as great Ambition, as many private Ends,
 ‘ and as little Zeal and Affection for the Publick as
 ‘ they had ever imputed to the Court: That, whilst
 ‘ they pretended, at the Publick Cost, and out of
 ‘ the Purves of the poor People, to make a general
 ‘ Reformation, their chief Care was to grow great
 ‘ and rich themselves; and that both the City and
 ‘ the Kingdom took Notice, with great Anxiety of
 ‘ Mind, *that all the Offices of the Army, all the profit-
 ‘ table Offices of the Kingdom were in the Hands of the
 ‘ Members of the two Houses of Parliament, who,
 ‘ whilst the Nation grew poor, as it needs must do
 ‘ under such insupportable Taxes, grew very rich,
 ‘ and would, in a short Time, get all the Money of
 ‘ the Kingdom into their Hands; and that it could
 ‘ not reasonably be expected, that such Men, who
 ‘ got so much, and enriched themselves to that De-*

' gree, by the Continuance of the War, would
 ' heartily pursue those Ways which would put an
 ' End to it, the End whereof must put an End to
 ' their exorbitant Profit. When they had exag-
 ' gerated these Reproaches as pathetically as they
 ' could, and the Sense the People generally had of
 ' the Corruption, even to a Despair of ever seeing
 ' an End of the Calamities they sustained, or having
 ' any Prospect of that Reformation in Church and
 ' State, which they had so often and so solemnly
 ' promised to effect, they fell again to their Prayers,
 ' that God would take his own Work into his Hand;
 ' and if the Instruments he had already employed
 ' were not worthy to bring so glorious a Design to
 ' a Conclusion, that he would inspire others more
 ' fit, who might perfect what was begun, and bring
 ' the Trouble of the Nation to a godly Period.

' When the two *Houses* met together the next
 ' Day, after these devout Animadversions, there
 ' was another Spirit appeared in the Looks of ma-
 ' ny of them. Sir *Henry Vane* told them, If ever
 ' GOD had appeared to them, it was in the Exer-
 ' cise of Yesterday; and that it appeared it pro-
 ' ceeded from GOD, because as he was credibly
 ' informed by many who had been Auditors in other
 ' Congregations, the same Lamentations and Dis-
 ' courses had been made in all other Churches, as
 ' had been made before them; which could there-
 ' fore proceed only from the immediate Spirit of
 ' GOD. He repeated some Things which had
 ' been said, upon which he was best prepared to
 ' enlarge, and besought them to remember their
 ' Obligations to GOD, and to *their Country*; and
 ' that they would free themselves from those just
 ' Reproaches which they could do no otherwise
 ' than by *divesting themselves* of all Offices and Char-
 ' ges, that might bring in the least Advantage and
 ' Profit

‘ Profit to themselves, by which only they could
 ‘ make it appear, that they were *publick hearted*
 ‘ *Men*: And as they paid all Taxes and Impositions
 ‘ with the rest of the Nation, so they gave up all
 ‘ their Time to their County’s Service, without
 ‘ Reward or Gratitude.

‘ He told them that the Reflections of Yesterday,
 ‘ none of which had ever entered upon his Spirit be-
 ‘ fore, had raised another Reflection in him than had
 ‘ been mentioned; which was, that it had often been
 ‘ taken Notice of, and objected by the King him-
 ‘ self, that the Numbers of the Members of Par-
 ‘ liament were too few to give Reputation to Acts
 ‘ of so great Moment as were transacted in their
 ‘ Councils, which, tho’ it was no Fault of theirs
 ‘ who kept their proper Stations, but of those who
 ‘ had deserted their proper Places; yet that, in
 ‘ Truth, there were too many Absent, tho’ in the
 ‘ Service of the House, and by their Appointment;
 ‘ and if all the Members were obliged to attend
 ‘ the Service of the Parliament in the Parliament,
 ‘ it would bring great Reputation to their Num-
 ‘ bers; and the People would pay more Reverence,
 ‘ and yield a fuller Obedience to their Commands;
 ‘ and then concluded, that he was ready to accuse
 ‘ himself for one of those who gained by an Of-
 ‘ fice he had, and tho’ he was possessed of it be-
 ‘ fore the Beginning of the Troubles, and owed it
 ‘ not to the Favour of the Parliament (for he had
 ‘ been joined with Sir *William Russell* in the Treas-
 ‘ urer-ship of the Navy by the King’s Grant)
 ‘ yet he was ready to lay it down to be disposed of
 ‘ by the Parliament, and wished that the Profits
 ‘ thereof might be applied towards the support of
 ‘ the War.

‘ When the Ice was thus broke, OLIVER CROM-
 ‘ WELL, who had not yet arrived at the Faculty of
 speak-

' speaking with Decency and Temper, commended
 ' the Preachers for having dealt plainly and im-
 ' partially, and told them of their Faults which
 ' they had been unwilling to hear of, that there
 ' were many Things upon which he had never re-
 ' flected before ; yet upon revolving what had been
 ' said, he could not but confess that all was very
 ' true ; and till there were a perfect Reformation
 ' in those Particulars, which had been recommend-
 ' ed to them, nothing would prosper that they took
 ' in Hand ; that the the Parliament had done very
 ' wisely at the Entrance into the War, to engage
 ' many Members of their own in a most dangerous
 ' Parts of it, that the Nation might see they did not
 ' intend to embark them in Perils of War, whilst
 ' themselves sat securely at home out of Gun-shot ;
 ' but would march with them where the Danger
 ' most threatned ; and those honourable Persons
 ' who had exposed themselves this Way, had me-
 ' rited so much of their Country, that their Memo-
 ' ries should be held in perpetual Veneration ; and
 ' whatsoever should be well done after them, would
 ' be always imputed to their Examples ; but that God
 ' had so blessed their Army, that they were grown
 ' up with it, and under it, many very excellent Of-
 ' ficers, who were fitter for greater Charges than
 ' they were possessed of ; and desired them not to
 ' be terrified with an Imagination, that if the high-
 ' est Offices were vacant, they should not be able
 ' to put as fit Men into them ; for, besides, that
 ' it was not good to put so much Trust in any
 ' Arm of Flesh, as to think *such a Cause as this*
 ' depended upon any one Man, he did take upon
 ' him to assure them, that they had Officers in their
 ' Army, who were fit to be Generals in any En-
 ' terprize in *Christendom*.

‘ He said he thought nothing so necessary as to
 ‘ *purge and vindicate the Parliament* from the Par-
 ‘ tiality towards their own Members, and made a
 ‘ proffer to lay down his Commission of Command
 ‘ in the Army, and desired that an Ordinance
 ‘ might be prepared, by which it might be made
 ‘ *unlawful for any Member of either House of Par-*
 ‘ *liament, to hold any Office of Command in the Ar-*
 ‘ *my, or any Place or Employment in the State ;*
 ‘ and so concluded with an Enlargement upon the
 ‘ Vices and Corruptions which were gotten into
 ‘ the Army, the Prophaneness and Impiety, and
 ‘ Absence of all Religion, the Drinking and Gam-
 ‘ ing, and all Manner of Licence and Laziness,
 ‘ and said plainly, that till the whole Army were
 ‘ new modelled, and governed under a stricter Dis-
 ‘ cipline ; they must not expect any notable Success
 ‘ in any Thing they went about.

‘ This Debate ended in appointing a Committee
 ‘ to prepare an Ordinance, *for the Exclusion* of all
 ‘ *Members from their Trusts* aforesaid ; which took
 ‘ up much Debate, and depended very long be-
 ‘ fore it was brought to a Conclusion, and in the
 ‘ End was called the SELF-DENYING ORDINANCE ;
 ‘ the driving on of which exceedingly increased
 ‘ the Inclination of the other Party to Peace, which
 ‘ they did now foresee would only prevent their
 ‘ own Ruin, in preventing that of the King-
 ‘ dom.’

WHITLOCK, in his Memorial, p. 118, speaking
 of this *Self-denying Ordinance*, says, ‘ It was
 ‘ moved by Mr. *Zouch Tate*, who brought it in
 ‘ with the Similitude of a *Boil upon his Thumb*, and
 ‘ was set on by that Party who contrived the Ou-
 ‘ sting of the *Earl of Essex*, and to bring on their
 ‘ own Designs ; and they could find no other Way,
 ‘ than by passing a *Self-denying Ordinance*, as they
 ‘ — called

‘ called it, which would serve their Turn, both as
 ‘ a specious Pretence of their own Integrity, and
 ‘ waving all Self-Ends, and so plausible to the
 ‘ People; and would also comprehend the *Lord*
 ‘ *General* with the rest, and without naming of him,
 ‘ which for Shame and Ingratitude they could not
 ‘ think fit to be done.

‘ Some of them confessed that this was their
 ‘ Design, and it was apparent in it self; and the
 ‘ Reason of their doing this, was to make Way
 ‘ for others; and because they were jealous that
 ‘ the Lord General was too much a Favourer of
 ‘ Peace, and that he would be too strong a *Sup-*
 ‘ *porter of Monarchy* and of *Nobility*, and *other old*
 ‘ *Constitutions* which they had a Mind to alter.’

LORD CLARENDON, in giving an Account of the
 Means by which this Ordinance passed both
 Houses, tells us, that ‘ As soon as the Commis-
 ‘ sioners were returned from *Uxbridge*, that a
 ‘ Treaty could be now no further urged, the *In-*
 ‘ *dependant Party* appeared barefaced, and vigo-
 ‘ rously press’d on their *Self-denying Ordinance*,
 ‘ that so they might proceed towards modelling
 ‘ their new Army, by putting out the old Officers.
 ‘ The Debate continued many Days in the *House*
 ‘ *of Commons*, with sharp Reflections upon Things
 ‘ and Persons, whilst the House of Peers look’d
 ‘ on, and attended the Resolution below. Of
 ‘ the *Presbyterian Party*, which passionately opposed
 ‘ the Ordinance, the Chief were *Hollis, Staple-*
 ‘ *ton, Glyn, Waller, Long*, and others, who be-
 ‘ lieved their Party much superior in Number;
 ‘ as the *Independant Party* was led by *Nathaniel*
 ‘ *Finnes, Vane, Cromwell, Haslerig, Martin*, and
 ‘ others. Of the House of Peers, there was
 ‘ none thought to be of this last Party, but the
 ‘ *Lord Say*; all the Rest were supposed to be of
 ‘ the

the *Earl of Essex's* Party ; and so it was impossible that the Ordinance should ever pass in the House of Peers, tho' it should be carried by the Commons. But they were in this, as in many other Things, disappointed ; for many who had sate silent, and been thought to be of one Party, appeared to be of the other : They, who thought they could never be secure in any Peace, except the King were first at their Mercy, and obliged to accept the Conditions they would give him, were willing to change the Hand in carrying on the War ; and many who thought the *Earl of Essex* behaved himself too imperiously, were willing to have the Command in one who was more their Equal. Many were willing he should be anger'd and humbled, that himself might be more concerned to advance a Peace, which *they thought* he had not been forward enough to do whilst he held the Supreme Command.

When the Debate grew ripe, ST. JOHN, PIERPOINT, &c. who had been thought to be of the Party of the *Earl of Essex*, appeared for passing the Ordinance, as the only way to unite the Councils and to resist the common Enemy, saying they discover'd by what they heard from abroad, and by the *Spirit that govern'd in the City*, that there would be a great Disatisfaction in the People if this Ordinance were not pass'd. Then they fell into a high Admiration of the *Earl of Essex*, extolling his great Merit and seemed to fear, that the War would never be carried on so happily, as it had been under him ; or if it were, that the good Success must still be imputed to his Conduct and Courage, which had formed their Armies and taught them to fight. By this kind of Oratory, and professing to decline their own
Inclinations

‘ Inclinations and Wishes, purely for Peace and
 ‘ Unity, they so far prevailed over those who
 ‘ were still surprized and led by some Craft, that
 ‘ the Ordinance was passed in the House of Com-
 ‘ mons, and transmitted to the Peers for their
 ‘ Consent, where no Body imagined it would ever
 ‘ pass.

‘ But what Expectation soever there was, that
 ‘ the *Self-denying Ordinance*, after it had upon so
 ‘ long Deliberation passed the House of Commons,
 ‘ would have been rejected and cast out by the
 ‘ Peers, whereby the *Earl of Essex* would still have
 ‘ remained *General*, it did not take up so long
 ‘ Time there; for after it came to the House of
 ‘ Peers, though whereby the *Earl of Essex* the *Earl*
 ‘ *of Manchester*, the *Earl of Warwick*, the *Earl of*
 ‘ *Denbigh*, (whose Power and Authority, that is,
 ‘ the Power, Credit, and Authority of the three
 ‘ first named, had absolutely govern’d and sway’d
 ‘ the House from the beginning) were to be dis-
 ‘ possess’d of their Commands, and no Peer of
 ‘ *England* capable of any Employment, either
 ‘ Martial or Civil, yet the *Self-denying Ordinance*
 ‘ found little Opposition; and the old Argument
 ‘ that the House of Commons thought it neces-
 ‘ sary, and that it would be of mischievous Con-
 ‘ sequence to dissent from the *House of Commons*,
 ‘ so far prevailed, that it passed the House of
 ‘ Peers likewise.

‘ By this *Self-denying Ordinance*, together with
 ‘ the *Earl of Essex*, the *Earl of Manchester*, Sir
 ‘ *William Waller*, the *Earl of Denbigh*, Major Ge-
 ‘ neral *Massy*, lost their Commands, as CROM-
 ‘ WELL likewise should have done. But as soon
 ‘ as the Ordinance was passed, and before the
 ‘ Resignation of the *Earl of Essex*, the Party that
 ‘ steer’d caused him to be sent with a Body of
 ‘ Horse

' Horfe into the Weſt, that he might be abſent
 ' at the Time when the other Officers deliver'd
 ' their Commiſſions, which was quickly obſerved,
 ' and therefore Orders were given to require his
 ' preſent Attendance in Parliament, and that
 ' their new General ſhould ſend ſome other Of-
 ' ficer to attend that Service, which was preten-
 ' ded to be done, and the very Day named by
 ' which it was averred that he would be in the
 ' Houſe. A Rendezvous was then appointed for
 ' their *new General Fairfax* to take a View of their
 ' Troops, that he might appoint Officers to ſuc-
 ' ceed thoſe who had left their Commands by
 ' Virtue of the Ordinance, and likewise in their
 ' Places, who gave up their Commands and re-
 ' fuſed to ſerve in the *new Model*, who were a
 ' great Number of their beſt Commanders. From
 ' this Rendezvous, the *General* ſent to deſire the
 ' Parliament, that they would give *Lieutenant Ge-*
 ' *neral CROMWELL* leave to ſtay with him for ſome
 ' few Days for his better Information, without
 ' which he ſhould not be able to perform what
 ' they expected from him. The Requeſt ſeemed
 ' ſo reaſonable, and being for ſo ſhort a Time,
 ' little Oppoſition was made to it; and ſhortly
 ' after by another Letter, he deſired, with much
 ' Earneſtneſs, that they would allow *CROMWELL*
 ' to ſerve for that Campaign. Thus they com-
 ' paſſed their whole Deſigns, in being rid of thoſe
 ' whoſe Affections they knew were not agreeable
 ' to theirs, and keeping *CROMWELL* in Command,
 ' who, in the Name of *Fairfax*, modelled the
 ' Army, and placed ſuch Officers as were well
 ' known to him, and to no Body elſe, and abſo-
 ' lutely governed the whole Martial Affairs.'

The World may now judge with what Intention
 and Tendency Propoſitions of this Nature are
 uſually

usually advanced from this History of the first of this Kind. It will be an eternal Lesson of Instruction, that they are always Jobs of Faction; always contrived to unhinge the Government of the Kingdom, and never to lay the Foundation of any the publick Good; but to serve the temporary Ends of selfish Parties, by the most destructive Means, as will farther appear from the fatal Effects of this memorable Ordinance.

WHITLOCK tells us, that the Earls of *Essex*, *Manchester* and *Deubigh*, offer'd to lay down their Commissions, on the 2d of *April* 1645, and that the next Day the *Ordinance* passed both Houses.

It was the fatal Complaint of those Times, that if the Faction which pushed with so much Violence, had been steadily disputed with in either House, they could never have carried their Designs to any destructive Ends; but they were tamely submitted to by some, whilst others would not attend to give them Contradiction. They grew wanton in their Power, because they had too little Check from Opposition: And when they had borne down and trampled on the constitutional Party, and worried Men into Compliance with their Demands, they barefac'dly boasted all that they had resented as the most infamous Slander.

This was manifest in their Measures to keep their own Creatures in Employments, after this Ordinance had removed the greatest Men in the Kingdom from having any Command.

MAY 10, 1645, both Houses ordered, that *Lieutenant General* CROMWELL should be dispensed with for his personal Attendance, and continue his Service and Command in the Army, for *Forty Days* longer, notwithstanding the *Self-denying Ordinance*.

This,

This, says *Whitelock*, was much spoken against by *Essex's* Party, ' as a Breach of that Ordinance, ' and a Discovery of the Intentions to continue ' who they pleased, and to remove the others from ' Commands, notwithstanding their former *Self-denying Pretences*; but the Houses judg'd this fit ' to be now done.'

May 12 Ordered, That Sir *William Brereton*, Sir *Thomas Middleton* and Sir *John Pryce*, Members of the House of Commons, should continue their Command where they are, for *Forty Days* longer, notwithstanding the *Self-denying Ordinance*.

And the *Speaker* was continued *Master of the Rolls*, till after *Trinity Term*.

Infinite are the Instances on this *Journal*, by which they eluded this *Ordinance*, where they had Occasion to continue their own Instruments in Office, and shewed the World what Uses this *Master Piece* of Iniquity was intended to serve.

But the most fatal and tragical Effects of this Project exceeded the Hopes and Expectations of its most sanguine Abettors; for, having divested the *Members of both Houses* of all Authority in the State or the Army, modelled all the Offices, and chosen out fit Instruments for their Designs; they turn'd that Power against the Parliament which they wrested from the Parliament; and when the Army was commanded by Men, who neither had Interests, in either House, nor Affections to their Authority, that very Army committed Violence upon both Houses, overturn'd the Constitution, overthrew the Publick Liberty, suppressed the *House of Lords*, secluded the greatest Part of the *House of Commons*, and vested the *Legislative Power* in a *Military Force*, which brought the *King* to the Scaffold, and subjected the whole People to the most lawless Oppressions.

B

These

These unhappy Divisions were the Cause of all the publick Misfortunes after the Power of the Crown was broken in *Charles the First's* Reign. *Whitelock* says in 1646, after the *Self-denying Ordinance* had passed, 'We may here take Notice of the Uncertainty of Worldly Affairs; when the Parliament and their Army had subdued the common Enemy, then they quarelled amongst themselves, the Army against the Parliament; when they were pretty well piec'd together again, then the Apprentices and others made an Insurrection against the Army and Parliament.

'Thus we were in continual Perplexities and Dangers, and so it will be with all who shall engage in the like Troubles.'

Again he observes in the Year 1649.

'This was a Year of great Perplexity and Danger as to the publick Affairs in the Cause of the Parliament. The publick Business stood on this Foot; if the Parliament had lost but one Battle, all who were engaged with them had been in Danger of Ruin as to their Lives and Fortunes; and tho' they gain'd many Battles, yet their Enemies still continued of Power to raise fresh Parties and new Troubles against them.

'When they were all subdued, so that not one Man appeared in Arms for the King, yet many appeared against the Parliament; their own Friends turn'd to be their Enemies. Those who fought against the King's Party joined with the Parliament; and *they* fought together against the *Cavaliers*.

'When *they* were subdued, then the same Soldiers fought against their own Masters and Fellow Soldiers; witness the Agitators, Levellers, and Mutineers.

'Those

‘ Those of the Army turn’d Head against them;
 ‘ from whom they had received Commissioners to
 ‘ be an Army, and bent their Arms against those
 ‘ who had empowered them to bear Arms.

‘ We may from hence take Notice, of the vast
 ‘ Hazard Men undergoe by engaging in such Af-
 ‘ fairs as these were, in which the Conquered
 ‘ were ruined, and the Conquerors did thereby
 ‘ but create to themselves new Wars and Trou-
 ‘ bles.

‘ Success rais’d in many of them an Haughti-
 ‘ ness of Mind, and a Roaming of Imagination;
 ‘ every one, or most of them, expected to have
 ‘ his private Fancy to be put in Action, and *to be*
 ‘ *little less than* Princes.

‘ To effect something dreamt on to that Pur-
 ‘ pose, many Wits were working; some were for
 ‘ doing one Thing, some for another, and all were
 ‘ violent in their Way, and brought into several
 ‘ Parties and Factions.

‘ The Army was divided into Levellers and dis-
 ‘ ciplined Soldiers; the Parliament was divided
 ‘ into Royalists and Republicans; the whole Na-
 ‘ tion was divided into Cavaliers and Parliamen-
 ‘ tarians.

‘ The Parliamentarians were again divided into
 ‘ Presbyterians, Independants, Anabaptists, Fifth
 ‘ Monarchy Men, and many other Perswasions,
 ‘ and none but the most miserable of all Cures for
 ‘ the sick State, no uniting of Divisions but by a
 ‘ greater Calamity, by the Sword.

‘ When the King’s Party grew up to any
 ‘ Strength, then those of the Parliament Party
 ‘ united together to oppose the King’s; and when
 ‘ that Work was done, then they fell at Variance
 ‘ among themselves.

‘ Thus we find it was by the precedent Story,
 ‘ and this may be a sufficient Argument that there
 ‘ is neither Safety nor Discretion for any one
 ‘ who can avoid it, to engage in Matters of this
 ‘ Nature.

‘ We who were engaged in those before-men-
 ‘ tioned, were unexperienc’d in these Things,
 ‘ and in the Consequences of them slip’d into
 ‘ them by Degrees, and before many of us were
 ‘ aware of them ; and by being once in, were, by
 ‘ little and little plunged farther in, and knew
 ‘ not how to get out again.

‘ But those that have the Examples and Warning
 ‘ of the Age preceeding, and have in part known,
 ‘ and heard their Fathers relate the Miseries and
 ‘ deep Calamities of the Civil War in their Days,
 ‘ and to both Parties, will be inexcusable if ever
 ‘ they engage in such Affairs; and may they never
 ‘ again see those sad Days, which have been in
 ‘ those Times whereof we read before.’

I shall add to these Reflections of *Whitelock*,
 Part of his Speech against this Self-denying Or-
 dinance, the first Time when it passed the House
 of Commons.

Mr. Speaker;

‘ I am one of that Number of your Servants,
 ‘ who have no Office or Employment but such as
 ‘ you are now about to except out of this Or-
 ‘ dinance, nor have Ambition for any ; and there-
 ‘ fore may the more freely and indifferently, tho’
 ‘ with all submission, offer my Reasons against it,
 ‘ as that which I apprehend, may prove prejudi-
 ‘ cial to your Service.

‘ It hath been objected that the Members of
 ‘ Parliament who are Officers being of equal
 ‘ Power in Parliament, will not be so obedient to
 ‘ your Commands as others who have smaller In-
 ‘ terest

‘ tereft and would not fo much difpute with one
‘ another.

‘ Surely, Sir, thofe whose Interests are the fame
‘ with yours, have the more Reason to obey
‘ your Commands than others; and have more
‘ to hazard by Difobedience than others can have,
‘ and in your Commands all your Members are
‘ involved, and it were ftrange if they fhould be
‘ backward to obey their own Orders.

‘ Nor will the Contefts be fo frequent and fo
‘ high between them and other Officers, as it will
‘ be between thofe who will be of a more equal
‘ Condition.

‘ But, *Mr. Speaker*, as you confider the Incon-
‘ veniences if this Ordinance do not pafs, fo you
‘ will be pleafed to confider the Inconveniences
‘ if it do pafs.

‘ You will lay afide as brave Men, and who have
‘ ferved you with as much Courage, Wifdom, Faith-
‘ fulnefs and Succefs as ever Men ferved their
‘ Country.

‘ I fhall conclude with the Examples of the *Gre-*
‘ *cians* and *Romans*, among whom that the greateft
‘ Offices, both of Peace and War, were conferred
‘ upon their *Senators*; and their Reasons were,
‘ becaufe they having greater Interests than others,
‘ were the more capable to do them the greateft
‘ Service.

‘ And having the fame Interest with the Senate,
‘ and being prefent at all Debates, they un-
‘ derftood their Bufinefs the better, and were
‘ lefs apt to break that Truft, which fo nearly
‘ concerned their private Interests, which were in-
‘ volved with the Publick; and the better they un-
‘ derftood their Bufinefs, the better Service might
‘ be expected from them.

‘ Sir, I humbly submit the Application to your
 ‘ Judgment. Your Ancestors did the same; they
 ‘ thought the *Members of Parliament* fittest to be
 ‘ employed in the *greatest Offices*; I hope you will be
 ‘ of the same Judgment, and not at this Time pass
 ‘ this Ordinance, thereby to Discourage your faith-
 ‘ ful Servants.

The Mischiefs of those treacherous Projects for
 new fangling the Constitution had so just an Ef-
 fect on the succeeding Times, that in all the Con-
 tests of *Charles the Second’s* Reign, when the De-
 mands of retrenching the Preogative grew most
 high, this Proposition for disabling the Members
 of Parliament to hold Offices of Trust in the Go-
 vernment, was not one talked of; nor was it hinted
 at, till the House of Commons were blown up in-
 to a Flame, by the obstinate Refusals of the King
 to pass the *Bill of Exclusion*.

Nor did that Parliament direct any such Bill
 to be prepared, but contented themselves with
 making a *Temporary Order*, to declare their Indig-
 nation against of the Power of the *Popish Party*, which
 then prevailed at Court.

This Resolution appears from the Journal, to
 have been as follows, *viz.*

Jovis 30, Die Decemb. 1680.

Resolved, *Nomine Contradicente,*

That no Member of this House shall accept of
 any Office or Place of Profit from the Crown,
without the Leave of this House; nor any Promise of
 any such Office, or Place of Profit, during such
 Time as he shall continue Member of this House.

Resolved,

That all Offenders herein be expelled this House.

This

This is the only Appearance of any Attempt to disable Members of the House of Commons, which is to be met with in any History or Record, from the Year 1645, till after the Year 1688: And this expired, as those who made it intended that it should, with the Session in which it was declared. Our Ancestors knew from Experience the fatal Effects of any such Project as a Law; and neither the violent Oppositions during *Charles* the 2d's Reign, nor the *Revolution* which banished his unhappy Brother, could give Reputation to a Design which had been so justly abhorred within the Memory of those Times.

But after the Revolution had established King *William* on the Throne, the *Jacobites*, who still retained their Love for an arbitrary Reign, were so wise as to carry on their Schemes, even by the Arts of Men whom they had in Abhorrence, and Remembering well the Success of the *Oliverian Faction*, in changing the Constitution by the Means of the Self-denying Ordinance; they took up the same Resolution in their Turn, and hoped that the *Old Game* which had ruined the Long Parliament, would equally tend to destroy that *Parliamentary Power*, which was the support of King *William's* Reign.

Bishop *Burnet*, in the Beginning of the Year 1692, speaking of the ill Humours which then broke out in both Houses, especially amongst the Lords, tells us [Page 104] " This was chiefly managed by the " Marquis of *Halifax*, and the Earl of *Mulgrave*; " and they drew in the Earl of *Shrewsbury*, who " was very ill-pleased with the Credit that some " had with the King. ——— These Lords had all " the *Jacobites* ready to assist them in every Thing " that could embroil Matters. A great many " *Whigs* who were discontented and jealous of the " Ministry

“ Ministry joined with them. — These Lords
 “ also set on Foot a Proposition, that had never
 “ been offered, but when the Nation was ready to
 “ break out into Civil Wars; and that was that
 “ a *Committee of Lords and Commons* should be ap-
 “ pointed to confer together concerning the State
 “ of the Nation. This once begun, would have
 “ grown in a very short Time to have been a Council
 “ of State, and they would soon have brought all
 “ Affairs under their Inspection; but this was so
 “ strongly opposed, that it was soon let fall.

“ When the Party that was set against the Court,
 “ saw they should carry nothing in either House of
 “ Parliament, they then turned their whole Strength
 “ against the present Parliament, to force a Dissoluti-
 “ on; and in Order to that, they first loaded it with
 “ the Name of an ill Sound: And whereas *Charles*
 “ *the Second's* Long Parliament was called the *Pen-*
 “ *sioner Parliament*, they called this the *Officers Pan-*
 “ *liament*, because many who had Commands in the
 “ Army were of it; and the Word that they gave
 “ out among the People was, that we were to be
 “ governed by a *Standing Army* and a *Standing Par-*
 “ *liament*. They tried to carry a Bill that ren-
 “ dered all Members of the *House of Commons* in-
 “ capable of Places of Trust or Profit, so that
 “ every Member, who accepted a should be ex-
 “ pelled the House, and be incapable to be chosen
 “ again to sit in the current Parliament. The
 “ Truth was, it came to be observed, that some
 “ got Credit by opposing the Government, and
 “ that to Silence them, they were preferred; and
 “ then they changed their Note, and were as ready
 “ to Flatter as to find Fault. This gave a speci-
 “ ous Colour to those who charged the Court with
 “ Designs of corrupting Members, or at least of
 “ stopping their Mouths with Places and Pensions.

“ When

“ When this Bill was set on, it went through the
 “ House of Commons with little or no Difficulty.
 “ Those who were in Places, had not Strength or
 “ Credit to make a great Opposition to it, they
 “ being the Persons concerned, and looked upon as
 “ Parties: And those who had no Places, had not
 “ the Courage to oppose it; for, in them it would
 “ have looked like an Art to recommend themselves
 “ to one. So the Bill passed in the *House of Commons*,
 “ but it was rejected *by the Lords*; since it seemed
 “ to establish an Opposition between the *Crown* and
 “ the *People*: as if those who were employed by
 “ the one, could not be trusted by the other.”

Though this Bill was rejected, as the *Reverend*
Prelate relates, yet the Spirit of King *William's*
 Enemies was not subdued, nor their Schemes for
 distressing his Government laid aside. As the Exi-
 gencies of the War, in which he was involved, re-
 quired additional *Customs*, all the Officers of the
 Customs were disabled to sit in Parliament, or to
 interfere in the Elections of Members, by an Act
 11 *W. 3* Cap. 2. Sect. 150. As the Excise was made
 Use of in Aid of the Publick Service, the Officers
 of the Excise were disabled in his 12th and 13th
 Years, Cap. 10. Sect. 87. And such Incapacities be-
 ing tacked to Bills of Supply, neither the King's
 Friends in the *House of Commons* had Courage to
 Dispute the Terms of such Bills; nor could the
House of Lords reject these Bills, without hazarding
 the Fate, both of King and Kingdom, till at Length,
 when such Jobs grew so common as to alarm all
 Men with the Danger of having the Legislative
 Power brought entirely into the Hands of the *Com-*
mons, and the Negative of the *House of Peers* de-
 stroyed, by tacking whatever was difficult of Di-
 gestion to *Money Bills*, and the Consideration of
 Publick Necessity must oblige them to Swallow every
 Thing

Thing that should be thus sent to them; they set their Hands at last to a solemn Declaration in the Books of their House, that they would never receive a *Money Bill* with any other tacked to it, and thereby saved the Liberties of this Country, in strenuously adhering to the Liberties of themselves, as an Independent *House of Parliament*.

This most dangerous Practice of *Tacking Bills* of a different and often contrary Nature, prevailed most especially in this Affair of *disabling Members to hold Employment*: A Point which was continually laboured with the Views of the Original *Self-denying Ordinance*, and constantly resumed, as Enemies of the Government flattered themselves with the Hopes of Overthrowing it.

At length seeing that this *disabling Bill* would never pass into a Law by itself; that the several *disabling Clauses* which they had tacked to particular *Money Bills*, weakened the Crown but in a small Proportion of what they aimed at, they determined to load the *Settlement of the Succession* with the full Weight of the Project, and tacked their *Self-denying Ordinance* to the Law for *entailing the Crown in the Protestant Line*.

Bishop *Burnet* tells us, that “when this Parliament was opened in the Beginning of 1701, it appeared that the *French* had a great Party in it. ——— Great Sums came over this Winter from *France*; the Packet-boat was seldom without Ten thousand Louis d’Ors; it often brought more. The Nation was filled with them, and in six Months Time a Million of Guineas was coined out of them. ——— A vast Flood of French Gold was visible amongst us; and upon the *French Ambassador’s* going away, a very sensible Alteration was found in the Bills of Exchange; so it was concluded, that

“ that great Remittances were made to him, and
 “ that these were distributed amongst those who
 “ were resolved to merit a Share in that Wealth
 “ which now came over so copiously, beyond the
 “ Example of former Times. |

“ Whilst Things says he again, were in a Fir-
 “ ment all *Europe* over, the declaring a *Protestant*
 “ *Successor* after the *Princess of Denmark*, and such
 “ Issue as she might have, seemed to be forgot by
 “ our Parliament, tho’ the King begun his Speech
 “ with it. The new Ministers spoke for it with
 “ much Zeal, from whence their Friends made In-
 “ ferences in their Favour, that certainly Men in
 “ the Interest of *France* could not promote a De-
 “ sign so destructive of all they drove at. This
 “ was so little of a Piece with the rest of their
 “ Conduct, that such as were still jealous of their
 “ Sincerity, looked on it as a Blind to cover their
 “ ill Designs and gain them some Credit. The
 “ Manner in which this Motion of the Succession
 “ was managed, did not carry with it any great
 “ Marks of Sincerity. It was often put off from
 “ one Day to another, and it often gave Place to
 “ the most trifling Matters. At last when a Day was
 “ solemnly set for it, and all People expected that
 “ it should pass without any Difficulty. HARLEY
 “ moved that some Things previous to that might
 “ be considered. He observed that the Haile
 “ which the Nation was in when the present Go-
 “ vernment was settled, had made us go too fast,
 “ and overlook many Securities which might have
 “ prevented much Mischief; and therefore he hoped
 “ they would not now fall into the same Error.
 “ Nothing pressed them at present, so he moved
 “ they would settle some Conditions of Govern-
 “ ment as Preliminaries, before they should pro-
 “ ceed to the Nomination of the Person, that so
 “ we

“ we might fix every Thing which was wanted
 “ to make our Security compleat. This was *po-*
 “ *pular*, and took with many, and it had so fair
 “ an Appearance, that indeed none could oppose
 “ it. Some Weeks were spent upon it. Suspi-
 “ cious People thought that this was done on De-
 “ sign to blast the Motion, and to offer such ex-
 “ travagant Limitations as *should quite charge the*
 “ *Form of our Government*, and render the Crown
 “ *titular and precarious*. The King was alarmed
 “ at it; for almost every particular that was pro-
 “ posed, implied a Reflection on him and his Ad-
 “ ministration, chiefly that of not employing
 “ Strangers, and not going too often out of the
 “ Kingdom. It was proposed that very Thing
 “ should be done with the Advice of the Privy
 “ Council, and every Privy Counsellor was to sign
 “ his Advice. *All Men who had Places or Pensions*
 “ *were made incapable of sitting in the House of*
 “ *Commons*. All this was unacceptable to the King,
 “ so many who had an ill Opinion of the De-
 “ sign of those that were now at the Helm, be-
 “ gun to conclude, that the Delays were affected,
 “ and that these Limitations were designed to raise
 “ Disputes between the two Houses, by which
 “ the Bill might be lost. When some Time had
 “ been spent in these Preliminaries, it came to
 “ the Nomination of the Person. Sir *John Bolles*,
 “ who was then disordered in his Senses, and
 “ soon after quite lost them, was set on by the
 “ Party; to be the first that should name the
 “ *Electress Dowager of Brunswick* which seemed
 “ done to make it less serious when moved by
 “ such a Person. He was, by the Forms of the
 “ House, put in the *Chair of the Committee* to whom
 “ the Bill was *referr’d*. The King was still put
 “ off for many Weeks. At every Time that it
 “ was

“ was called for, the Motion was still entertain’d
 “ with Coldness, which served to heighten the Jeal-
 “ lously. The Committee once or twice sat up-
 “ on it; but all the Members run out of the
 “ House with so much Indecency, that the Con-
 “ trivers seem’d ashamed of this Management:
 “ There were seldom *Fifty* or *Sixty* at the Com-
 “ mittee, yet in Conclusion it pass’d, and was sent
 “ up to the Lords, where we expected great Op-
 “ position would be made to it. Some imagin’d
 “ the Act was only an Artifice designed to gain
 “ Credit to those, who, at this Time, were so ill
 “ thought of over the Nation, that they wanted
 “ some colourable Thing to excuse their other
 “ Proceedings. Some little Opposition was made
 “ to it by the *Marquis of Normandy* (since *Duke*
 “ *of Buckinghamshire*) and four Lords, protest’d
 “ against it. Those who wish’d well to the Act,
 “ were glad to have it pass’d any Way, and there-
 “ fore would not examine the Limitations that
 “ were in it. They thought it of great Impor-
 “ tance to carry the Act, and that at another
 “ Time those Limitations might be better con-
 “ sidered; so the Act was pass’d.”

This Management, which the Bishop so justly
 complains of, is visible on the Journals of both
 Houses; by which it is manifest, that whilst every
 Limitation was propos’d, which might make the
 Bill as difficult to pass, as the Succession to take
 Effect on such Terms, the Conductors of this
 great Affair contriv’d every Delay which might
throw cold Water upon it, and might by protract-
 ing the Time, leave Room for such Accidents to
 intervene, as might cause it intirely to be laid
 aside.

The King’s Speech recommending the Care of
 the Succession, after the *Duke of Gloucester’s* Death,
 was

was made to both Houses on the 11th Day of February 1700. The Commons, on the 3d of March, agreed to the Resolution to declare the further Limitation and Succession of the Crown. The whole Month following was spent in declaring the Limitations of the Government in Ten several Resolutions, which had been already agreed on in a private Cabal, and had no Attendance of Members in the House, either to oppose or debate them. On the 1st Day of April 1701, the Bill was read a first Time. On the 12th of April they went into a Committee of the whole House upon the Bill, and having made some Progress therein, they postponed the Committee Five several Times, and did not return to it again till the 4th Day of May. They passed the Bill on the 14th; and the Lords returned it to them without Amendment on the 22d of the same Month; so that the House of Lords spent but EIGHT DAYS in going thro' all the Forms of Parliament on this Bill, tho' the Preparations for bringing it in by the House of Commons, were lengthened out five Weeks, and the passing it full six Weeks, in all ELEVEN WEEKS spent on this Proceeding there; so different were the Affections of the two Houses.

This was the Rise and Progress of the first Law which this Kingdom ever knew, extinguishing the Rights of Members of the House of Commons to hold Employments under the Crown.

It was accordingly one Limitation of the Government under the Protestant Succession declared in this Bill, ' That no Person, who should have any Office or Place of Profit under the King, should be capable of being a Member of the House of Commons.'

But it ought to be observed as a Lesson to all Posterity, that the Fathers of these Limitations did
not

not look upon them as Rules necessary to Government, or binding to their own Consciences; and particularly that the *great Man*, who, with so much Subtlety, proposed them in the *House of Commons*, and so pathetically complained of the bad Effects which had flowed from giving Employments to Members of Parliament: This very Patriot who made this memorable Figure in 1701, did himself within three Years afterwards, (in *May 1704*) not only as *Member* of the *House of Commons*, but in the Capacity of *SPEAKER*, accept the Office of *Principal Secretary of State*; and gloried so much in these Acts of Contradiction, that seven Years afterwards, when he was promoted to the Peerage, he caused it to be inserted to his Praise, in his Patent of Creation, *that he had reconciled two such difficult Offices in his own Person*, tho' he had loaded the *Act of Succession* with a Clause, *that they never should meet again in any other Person*.

The *Tories*, by their unexampled Abuse of Power, had lost the Hearts of the People, and the Favour of the Crown. The Lord *Treasurer*, GODOLPHIN, entered into an Alliance with the best and greatest of the *Whigs*. The Administration became entirely of that Complexion; and to satisfy the *Whigs* that their Principles were sincerely adopted by the Court, it was now resolved to make the *Succession* practicable, by *explaining the Limitations of the Act of Settlement*, and by promoting the UNION of SCOTLAND.

Accordingly, in the *fourth* Year of that Reign, after the Consideration of so much Time employed in the great Concern of our Settlement; after all Allowances had been made to the Complaints of *new-invented* Offices, and to the Apprehension that Employments would still encrease the Burden and Grievance of the People; after all due Weight had been given to the popular Argument, that Men
whom

whom the People had elected to represent them; changed their Condition without the Consent of their Constituents, and accepted Employments at Court, without regarding the Approbation of their Country; after all these Considerations, the Wisdom of the Parliament explained and amended the disabling Clauses of the Act of Settlement.

By this Act of the *Fourth Year* of the Queen, *Cap. 8.* entituled, *An Act for the better Security of her Majesty's Person and Government, and of the Succession to the Crown in the Protestant Line*, it was enacted, ' That from and after the Dissolution or Determination of the present Parliament, no Person who shall in his own Name, or in the Name of any other in Trust for him, hold *any new Office*, or *Place of Profit* whatsoever under the Crown, which at any Time hereafter shall be created or erected, or any Person who shall be a *Commissioner or Sub-Commissioner of Prizes*, or *Secretary or Receiver of the Prizes*, nor any *Comptroller of the Accounts of the Army*, nor any *Commissioner of Transports*, nor any *Commissioner of the Sick and Wounded*, nor any *Agent for any Regiment*, nor any *Commissioner for Wine-Licencies*, nor any *Governor or Deputy of any of the Plantations*, nor any *Commissioner of the Navy*, employed in any of the *Out-Ports*, nor any Person *having any Pension from the Crown during Pleasure*, shall be capable of being elected, or of sitting, or of voting, as a Member of the *House of Commons*, in any Parliament which shall be hereafter summoned.'

The Act having thus declared who shall be incapable of being elected, provides in the next Place, in what Manner others who are *not within the Description* of this Clause, shall be capable of sitting in the *House of Commons*: And accordingly it is,

' Provided always, that if any Person being cho-
' sen

' sen a Member of the *House of Commons*, shall at
 ' any Time, after the Dissolution or Determination
 ' of the present Parliament, accept of any Office of
 ' Profit from the Crown, during such Time as he
 ' shall continue a Member, his Election shall be,
 ' and is hereby declared to be void, and a new
 ' Writ shall issue for a new Election, as if such Per-
 ' son was naturally dead: Provided nevertheless,
 ' that such Person shall be capable of being elected,
 ' as if his Place had not become void, as aforesaid.
 ' Provided also, and be it enacted, that, in order
 ' to prevent for the Future *too great a Number of*
 ' *Commissioners* to be appointed or constituted for
 ' the executing of any Office, no greater a Number
 ' of Commissioners shall be made or constituted for
 ' the Execution of any Offices, than have been em-
 ' ployed in the Execution of such respective Offices
 ' at some Time before the first Day of this present
 ' Session of Parliament.'

This Law was grounded upon a fundamental and
constitutional Principle, that publick Officers in gene-
 ral ought not to be excluded from sitting in Parliament,
 if the People thought proper to chuse them; and
 that *the Bulk and Weight* of Publick Officers ought to
 be capable of sitting in Parliament.

But, in Consideration that a long continued War
 had increased the Number of Officers in all the
 Branches of the Publick Service, some Restraint
 seemed necessary; for which Reason such Officers
 as were of *Modern Institution*, were declared inca-
 pable of taking the Benefit of the *ancient Constitution*,
 and were excluded from Seats in the *House of Com-
 mons*, not meerly as *Officers*, but as *new Officers*, that
 the People might not be aggrieved by the Multipli-
 cation of Employments.

It will be rehearsed by Posterity with equal Won-
 der and Indignation, that the *Tories*, who had been

the raters of such *Disabling Laws*, under the Presence of restraining the undue Influence of the Crown, had the shameless Front to oppose them in their own Time of Power ; and that when this Bill was thus promoted, *under a Tory Administration*, they exerted all their Might to qualify it with a *Clause*, that it should not take Place 'till after the *Protestant Succession*.

BISHOP BURNET imputes the Demand for this Bill at that Time (for the Spirit of passing it was almost irresistible in the *House of Lords*) to the great Provocations of that Ministry, and to the barefaced Violation of the Liberties of Parliament, by making TWELVE PEERS IN ONE DAY, to over-power the Majority of the *House of Lords*, whilst the Corruption of the Court-Party was so flagrant, and their Iniquities so enormous, that the Mercenaries of that Administration had not only *standing Pensions*, but (as he tells us) *Bribes* for every single Vote.

From this Review of History, we are now to judge of the important Question, *Whether the Number of Officers in the House of Commons is not already sufficiently limited* ; and whether we ought not to remain satisfied with the *Laws in Being*, especially considering that the Act under which we are governed in the Point before us, had *twice the solemn Sanction of Parliament*, and was a second Time enacted by the Parliament, which sat *after the Union* of both Kingdoms, that the Operation of it might not be confined to one Part of *Great Britain* only ; and accordingly it passed both *Houses*, and had the Royal Assent in the *Sixth Year of the Queen*.

There is nothing can be considered as a more *essential Part of our Settlement*, than this Law under which the *Protestant Succession* took Place, and happily became established. And it may be questioned whether this Establishment could ever have been effected,

fectcd, had the *disabling* Clause of the *first Act of Settlement* continued unrepealed.

It will be the natural and warrantable Ambition of the *best Gentleman* in this Country, not only to represent the People, but execute the Publick Offices. If these Trusts are at any Time divided, and if Persons who execute the one, are made incapable of the other, the Misfortune will be, that the Weight of Families and Fortunes will entirely fall into one Scale or the other ; and either the *House of Commons* must be unworthily composcd, or all the Employments of the Publick *unworthily supplied*.

If the *Commons* are incapable of administering any Office of the Government, it must then naturally fall into the Hands of the Nobility : And the Weight of the Power will be so great in the Hands of the *Lords*, that this alone must destroy the Liberty of the Constitution.

If the *Lords* and *Commons* are equally disabled to hold Employments in the State, the Weight of Power will then fall into the Hands of a *separate Party*, and will create a *separate Interest*, which will be always attended with infinite Mischiefs, and may probably terminate in the Destruction of the Liberties of Parliament.

Whilst Gentlemen of great Estates and Interest in the Counties of *England*, shall, by Reason of their Credit and Weight in their Counties, be the only Persons thought capable of holding Employments in the State, the Power of Employments will not be directed to hurt the Liberties of the People ; because the Gentlemen who discharge them are interested in the most faithful Execution of them.

But if ever Gentlemen of such Estates and Interests with the People, shall be the *only Men in England* incapable of holding Publick Employments, all the Offices must be filled with others, who will

have a less Concern in the Liberty and Happiness of their Country, and must be more easily drawn into Measures against that *common Interest*, in which their own Share is so much less considerable.

It will not answer this Argument, to say that there is no Design to make Gentlemen of the House of Commons incapable of *all Employments*. If the Proposition is to make them incapable of the greatest Number of *Employments*, it will be the same Grievance ; it will deprive the *House of Commons* of its Weight in the Government of this Country.

The Liberties of *England* were always preserved by the Weight of the House of Commons. But this Weight was not in all Ages the same, and therefore their Liberties were not always the same. Before the Union of the Houses of *York* and *Lancaster*, the *Lords* and *Clergy* shared the Lands of *England* between them ; the Commons, tho' they were a Branch of the Legislature had the least Share of the Legislative Power ; but their Share of Power encreased as the Lands of the *Nobility* and of the *Clergy* diminished. The Reign of *Henry the Seventh* gained them great Advantage of the *Lords*, and the Reign of *Henry the Eighth* destroyed the Tyranny of the *Church*.

It was therefore in *Queen Elizabeth's* Reign that the *Lands of England* appeared to be justly balanced ; but here again the *Commons* were weighed down, by the constant Measure of her Reign, in trusting the whole Authority of the Government in the Hands of the *Lords*. She called them to their *Council*, where they exercised even Legislative Power. She called them to the Court of *Star-Chamber*, where they enforced by *Pillory*, *Fine*, and *Imprisonment*, the Laws which they had issued from the Council Board in the Form of *Proclamations*.

mations. They were trusted in all Offices. They had *Grants of all Wards*, whereby every great and wealthy Family amongst the Commons was brought under their Dominion, and the Heirs disposed of in Marriage, as best suited their Interest, and the Issues of their Estates received and applied without Account, by the Grantee of the Custody.

What the Weight of the *Land* anciently was, the Weight of Employments must be; and let it be thrown into any Scale whatsoever, it will still weigh down the Scale which it opposes. Make any two Parties equal in Lands, yet add Employments to one of them, it will not be a Moment's Doubt which of the Two is strongest. And as a *House of Commons*, whose Members are trusted with the Publick Offices, must have greater Weight than an *House of Commons* without them: So that *House of Parliament*, which shall be disabled to hold Employments, would soon be made sensible of its Weakness, by the Superior Strength of *that House* which shall retain them.

As an *House of Commons*, whose Members are trusted with Employments will be strongest, so the Employments trusted in such Hands, will be safest to the Publick. Give Offices to a Body of Men possessing Property, the natural Regard for the Preservation of their Property, will oblige them to a faithful Discharge of their Trust. But give the same Offices to Men less interested in the faithful Discharge of this Trust; 'tis easy to see, that when they are without the *Obligation*, they will soon be without the Virtue of a faithful Behaviour.

Come then to the other Enforcement to Fidelity in the Service of the Publick; the Power of a Parliament to punish those who are wanting
in

in Duty. And can it be thought that an House of Commons, which hath lost so much of its Weight, will obtain more Justice for the Publick, or render more Service to their Country, when they are to contend with a *separate Interest*, vested with *separate Power*? Was not this very Case their Condition once with Regard to the Church? And did they not find the *Clergy* so strong by their Weight of *publick Employments*, that the *Parliament Roll* of the 25th of *Edward 3.* [*Palm. 22. Numb. 15.*] contains the Petition, both of the *Lords* and the *Commons*, praying, that the *principal Offices of the Kingdom might henceforth be executed by the Laity.*

Consider therefore, Sir, that Power is of the same Nature, and hath the same Effects wherever it shall be trusted. What the Clergy were to the Laity, one House of Parliament would be to the other, were either of them made incapable of holding publick Employments. And as formidable would be *any other Body* of Men, if the whole Parliament disabled itself, and thereby a *separate Power* should rise in the State.

Allow me to affirm, that *England* must trust it self to an *English House of Commons*, and that we have no other Means of Preservation. To that great Assembly must be referred the *making of Laws*; and to the Members thereof must be committed the *Execution of them*. But if ever this Share of the Government be taken from that House, and the publick Employments are trusted with Men less able or less interested to Discharge them with Reputation and Fidelity, the greater Proportion of their Power is lost, and what they deprive themselves of, will stand in Obstruction to what they still retain.

The Objection of Dependance on the Crown arising from Trusts of this Nature, is merely invidious;

invidious; for a Gentleman of *One thousand Pounds per Annum* in his own Right, will never lessen the Security of his Estate on any Consideration, even of double the Sum enjoyed by Favour. He may serve the King with greater Affection for the Honour or Advantage accruing to him; but if he hath human Reason, he will not balance a Moment, when his only Option must be, whether he will Hazard his Liberty and Fortune, or his Employment.

Add to this, that if Employments could create undue Dependance, the Struggle for them must create as unjust an Opposition, which would balance the Weight of it, and would leave the disinterested Party to decide whatever should be disputed; but if there might be greater Dependance arising from Employments than ought to be approved of in a *British* Parliament, the People have it still in their Power to Remedy this Grievance on every new Election, by chusing Men of greater Fortunes, less liable to be Dependent; or Men of greater Integrity, less capable of being so. And on the whole, the Inconveniencies which can arise by undue Influence, must be infinitely less than the Mischiefs of making a *House of Commons* incapable of *publick Employments*; for it is impossible that all which the Crown can bestow, will even provide for *Half* the House of Commons; and we have at no Time seen above *Two hundred sixty* Officers in Parliament since the Union of the Two Kingdoms; and of such Officers as have at any Time sat in the House of Commons, few of them were other than Men of great *Independent Fortunes*.

The *Roman Commonwealth* was attended with perpetual Struggles on this very Point, that the *People* might share the great Offices with the *Nobility*; and they gained continually in these Contests:
But

But had it been told them, that any Man who gave his Voice in the making of Laws, ought to be incapable of all Employments in the State ; they, who so fiercely contended for this *popular* Privilege of being admitted to Offices, would have treated the Authors of such a Proposition as the worst Enemies to the *Roman People*.

In Fact, such a Proposition never was offered in any Country for the Service of the People. We have the clearest Evidence, that Projects of disabling Members of Parliament, were always intended *to change the Constitution*, and especially within these fifty Years past, *to destroy the Protestant Succession*. As these have ever been the Intentions, I shall always be afraid of such Tendencies in the Case of every Bill of this Kind, and am, for these Reasons, heartily concurring with the Opinion of those Parliaments, which have hitherto (as I think) to their Honour rejected it.

I am

S I R,

Your most humble Servant.

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EDUCATION

6

THE
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FOR A
PLACE-BILL
DETECTED,

In that False and Impudent Assertion;

That the Whigs, in the Reign of King WILLIAM, were the Authors and Promoters of that Clause in the Act of Settlement, viz. That no Person, who hath an Office, or Place of Profit, or Pension from the Crown, shall be capable of serving as a Member of the House of Commons.

I hope that no Person, who affects to be a Friend to the Revolution, or is really so, will make any Objection against quoting from Bishop Burnet, the Opinion which the Whigs had of that Proceeding.

Craftsman, Dec. 22. 1739.

L O N D O N :


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THE
ADVOCATE
FOR A
PEACE-BILL
PETITION

It is the duty of every citizen to
express his opinion on the
subject of the proposed
peace bill, and to
sign the petition
in support of it.
The petition
is now being
circulated in
all parts of the
country, and
it is hoped that
it will be signed
by a large number
of our fellow-citizens.

—
The petition
is now being
circulated in
all parts of the
country, and
it is hoped that
it will be signed
by a large number
of our fellow-citizens.

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by a large number
of our fellow-citizens.



THE
ADVOCATES
FOR A
PLACE-BILL
DETECTED, &c.



IN all Debates and Writings concerning the Reasonableness and Necessity of a *Place-Bill*, it has, with a great Air of Triumph, been constantly asserted by the Advocates for such a Bill, — That the Whigs in King *William's* Reign were the Contrivers and chief Promoters of that Clause in the

Act of Settlement, which excludes all Persons in Places of Profit from serving as Members of Parliament; and that they acted upon this Principle, — That the Constitution was not safe without such a Clause of Limitations.

At a Time therefore, when it is publicly declared, by very good Authority, that a *Place-Bill* is designed to be brought into Parliament; it is very proper and necessary, that this Affair should be set in a true Light, and that all Men may see, — who were the Contrivers and Promoters of that Clause in the Act of Settlement. — For what Reasons that Clause was inserted in the Bill. — And what Part the *Whigs* acted upon that Occasion.

I know no Writer, who has given so full and minute an Account of this Transaction, as Bishop *Burnet* has done in the History of his own Time.

To that worthy Prelate, therefore, let us appeal, and see with what Regard to Truth the Advocates for a *Place-Bill* have so roundly asserted, as if it was an incontestable Fact; — That the *Whigs* were the Contrivers and chief Promoters of that Clause

Claufe of Limitations in the Act of Settlement; when it is evident from *Burnet*, and indeed from the whole History of those Times; — That, when the Act of Settlement passed, the *Tories* were not only at the Helm, and the chief Persons in the Administration, but that Party was likewise a great Majority in the House of Commons. — That they used all their Art and Skill to delay the passing of that Bill; and when they found that was not to be done, they clogged it with Limitations, on Purpose to raise a Dispute between the two Houses, and by that Means to have the Bill lost. — And, that the *Whigs* complied with those Limitations, not as they approved of them, but purely because they were glad to have the Act passed any Way, when they plainly saw the Danger there was of losing it, and because they thought those Limitations might be better considered at another Time.

This is the Truth. And how very different is this from those false Representations, which have been given of this Affair by the Advocates for a *Place-Bill*.

It has constantly been asserted by these Men; — That a *Place-Bill* was not only founded

founded upon *Whig* Principles, but that it was perfectly conformable to the Sentiments of the *Old Whigs*; and that therefore it was a Reproach to every Man, who affected to be thought a *Whig*, or was really such, to oppose those Limitations, which the *Whigs*, in King *William's* Reign, judged of absolute Necessity for the Safety and Preservation of the Constitution.

And the Assurance, with which this has been asserted, has made it generally believed; and few, if any, have given themselves the Trouble, to examine into the Truth of it.

Now, though it be certain, that the Opinion of any single Person, or Body of Men, ought no farther to determine any Man's Judgment, than it has Reason on its Side; and that the same Law may be very just and necessary, and, on the contrary, as hurtful and dangerous, at different Times; yet as Men are too apt to be led away by the Opinion of their own Party, and are unwilling, or ashamed to be thought to act in Contradiction to the Conduct of those, whose Memories they have in great Veneration, I shall therefore shew from Bishop *Burnet* these two things:

I. That

1. That the *Tories* were the *sole* Contrivers and Promoters of that Clause in the Act of Settlement, with this View chiefly, to *defeat* the Bill itself.

2. That the *Whigs* comply'd with that Clause, not as they *approv'd* of it, but as they were glad to have the Act pass'd any way, when they saw the Danger of *losing* it from the Conduct and Designs of the *Tories*.

This is so strongly set forth by *Burnet*, that no Words can make it plainer.

I shall set down the whole that he has said upon this Subject, because nothing can be a more true and lively Description of Parties amongst us at this Time; and that the whole Nation, and particularly the *Whigs*, may be convinced, that as they were the *Tories* who contrived that Clause of Limitations; so it is the same Party who are now so clamorous for a Place-Bill: And shall submit it to the Judgment of every serious unprejudic'd Man, Whether that Party, who were the Contrivers of that Clause for the vilest and most destructive Purposes, must not have some vile and wicked Views in their Endeavours to

B

promote

promote a Bill of the same Nature with that Clause, in this critical Conjunction.

“ The declaring (says *Burnet*) a Pro-
 “ testant Successor, after the Princess, and
 “ such Issue as she might have, seemed to
 “ be forgot by our Parliament, tho’ the
 “ King had begun his Speech with it. The
 “ new Ministers spoke of it with much
 “ Zeal; from this their Friends made In-
 “ ferences from it in their Favour, that
 “ certainly Men in the Interest of *France*,
 “ would not promote a Design so destru-
 “ ctive of all they drove at. This was so
 “ little of a piece with the rest of their
 “ Conduct, that those who were still jea-
 “ lous of their Sincerity, look’d on it as a
 “ Blind to cover their ill Designs, and to
 “ gain them some Credit. The Manner
 “ in which this Motion of the Succession
 “ was manag’d, did not carry in it great
 “ Marks of Sincerity. It was often put
 “ off from one Day to another, and it
 “ gave place to the most trifling Matters.
 “ At last, when a Day was solemnly set
 “ for it, and all People expected that it
 “ should pass without any Difficulty, *Har-*
 “ *ley* mov’d that some things previous to
 “ that might be first consider’d. He ob-
 “ serv’d, that the Haste the Nation was
 “ in; when the present Government was
 “ settled,

“ settled, had made us go too fast, and
 “ overlook many Securities, which might
 “ have prevented much Mischief, and
 “ therefore he hoped they would not now
 “ fall into the same Error. Nothing
 “ press’d them at present; so he mov’d
 “ they would settle some Conditions of
 “ Government as Preliminaries, before
 “ they should proceed to the Nomination
 “ of the Person; that so we might fix
 “ every thing that was wanting to make
 “ our Security compleat. This was po-
 “ pular, and took with many; and it had
 “ so fair an Appearance, that indeed none
 “ could oppose it. Some Weeks were
 “ spent upon it. People thought this
 “ was done on design to blast the Motion,
 “ and to offer such extravagant Limitati-
 “ ons, as should quite change the Form
 “ of our Government, and render the
 “ Crown titular and precarious. All Men
 “ who had Places or Pensions were made
 “ incapable of sitting in the House of
 “ Commons. Many who had an ill Opi-
 “ nion of the Design of those who were
 “ now at the Helm, began to conclude,
 “ that the Delays were affected, and that
 “ these Limitations were design’d to raise
 “ Disputes between the two Houses, by
 “ which the Bill might be lost. When
 “ some time had been spent in these Preli-
 “ minaries,

“ minaries, it came to the Nomination of
 “ the Person. Sir *John Bowles*, who was
 “ then disorder’d in his Senses, and soon
 “ after quite lost them, was set on by the
 “ Party, to be the first who should name
 “ the Electress Dowager of *Brunswick* ;
 “ which seem’d done to make it less seri-
 “ ous, when moved by such a Person.
 “ He was, by the Forms of the House,
 “ put into the Chair of the Committee to
 “ whom the Bill was committed. The
 “ Thing was still put off for many Weeks.
 “ At every time that it was called for, the
 “ Motion was entertain’d with Coldness,
 “ which served to heighten the Jealousy.
 “ The Committee once or twice sat upon
 “ it ; but all the Members ran out of the
 “ House with so much Indecency, that
 “ the Contrivers seem’d ashamed of this
 “ Management. There were seldom Fif-
 “ ty or Sixty at the Committee ; yet, in
 “ Conclusion, it was pass’d, and sent up
 “ to the Lords, where was expected great
 “ Opposition would be made against it.
 “ Some imagin’d the Act was only an Ar-
 “ tifice, design’d to gain Credit to those,
 “ who at this time were so ill thought of
 “ over the Nation, that they wanted some
 “ colourable thing to excuse their other
 “ Proceedings. Those who wish’d well
 “ to the Act, were glad to have it pass’d
 “ any

“ any way, and so would not examine the
 “ Limitations that were in it. They
 “ thought it of great Importance to carry
 “ the Act, and that, at another time, those
 “ Limitations might be better consider’d.
 “ So the Act pass’d. We reckon’d it a
 “ great Point carried, that we had now a
 “ Law on our Side for a Protestant Suc-
 “ cessor : for we plainly saw a great Party
 “ form’d against it, in favour of the pre-
 “ tended *Prince of Wales*. He was now
 “ past Thirteen, bred up with a Hatred
 “ both of our Religion and our Constitu-
 “ tion, in an Admiration of the *French*
 “ Government ; and yet many, who cal-
 “ led themselves Protestants, seem’d fond
 “ of such a Successor : A Degree of Infa-
 “ tuation that might justly amaze all who
 “ observ’d it, and saw the Fury with
 “ which it was promoted.” *Vol. II.*
pag. 270, 271.

What a Scene of Villany, I can call it
 by no other Name, does this display !
 Surely those Men amongst us, who cannot
 be brought to believe, that the present *Tor-
 ries* have an irreconcilable Hatred to the
 Protestant Succession, must never have
 heard or read one Syllable of this Behavi-
 our of the Party.

I should

I should be glad to know of those Men, who have this charitable good Opinion of the modern *Tories*, whether they ever heard one Man among them condemn this infamous Conduct of their Party.

Not to condemn such a Proceeding is the same Thing as to justify it. But it is plain from the Conduct of the Party since that Time, they have the same Aversion to the present Establishment riveted and interwoven in their very Constitution.

And shall we take these Men into our Bosoms? Shall we be fond of a Bill, which will open a Way to let these Men into the House of Commons?

We raise a Clamour against *Place-Men*; but will any Man have the Insolence to say, or is any Man so weak as to believe, that our Religion, our Liberties, and all that is dear and valuable to us, were ever in any sort of Danger, that could bear the least Similitude or Proportion to the Dangers we have providentially escaped, ——— *when Tories were at the Helm, ——— when the Tories were the Majority in the House of Commons?*

Allowing

Allowing there is Danger to Liberty from *Place-Men*, which I am far from thinking; Did ever any wise Man chuse that Part, where there is not only the greatest Probability of Danger, but where the Danger so vastly exceeds all other?

Good God! who can read the Account which *Burnet* here gives us of the Manner in which the Act of Settlement, and nominating a Protestant Successor, was treated by the *Tories*, without the utmost Indignation?

“ A Motion for nominating a Protestant
 “ Successor entertained with Coldness;
 “ ——— as often as the Committee sat, the
 “ *Tory* Members running out of the House,
 “ with so much Indecency, that the Con-
 “ trivers seemed ashamed of it, ——— sel-
 “ dom Fifty or Sixty at the Committee,
 “ so few of the *Whig* Party was there in
 “ that Parliament; ——— and to com-
 “ plete the Farce, Sir *John Bowles*, a Man
 “ disordered in his Senses, and who soon
 “ after quite lost them, was set on by the
 “ *Tories*, to be the first that should name
 “ the Electress Dowager of *Brunswick*, to
 “ make it less serious, when moved by
 “ such a Person.”

Any

Any Man would be inclined to look upon this as a Romance or a Banter upon the Party, did it not come from the Pen of one, who, as he was not afraid to speak the Truth, so he would not dare to transmit to Posterity, what he knew to be false.

And notwithstanding this, this is the Party, who acted this vile Scene; in behalf of whom, *Instructions*, as they are impudently and ridiculously called, are sent up from several Parts of the Kingdom, to recommend them as the only fit Persons to serve as Members of Parliament.

But farther; Is there one Word in what I have here quoted from *Burnet*, that shews it to have been the Opinion of the *Whigs* at that Time, — That it was absolutely necessary, for the Safety and Preservation of the Constitution, to exclude Men in Offices of Profit from sitting in the House of Commons?

On the contrary, Was it not the Opinion of the *Whigs*, as *Burnet* observes, —
 “ That such Limitations tended to change
 “ entirely the Form of our Government,
 “ and render the Crown titular and pre-
 “ carious? ”

And

And is it not as plain, that they had never agreed to the passing of the Act with those Limitations, “ but that they were “ glad to have it passed any Way, when “ they saw so great a Party formed against “ it in Favour of the pretended Prince of “ *Wales.*”

These were the Consequences, which the *Whigs* in that Reign judged would be the Effect of such Limitations, as are proposed by a *Place-Bill*. And it is the Height of Impudence in the Advocates for such a Bill to call in the Act of Settlement in Support of it, when in Truth it is the strongest Argument against it.

The *Tories* indeed did not so much design by that Clause to make an immediate Alteration in the Constitution, as to defeat the Act of Settlement itself, and to prevent the Nomination of a Successor. This was what they had all along in View. But, as the Ministry was composed of *Tories*, and the King had recommended it from the Throne, they could not, as they were at that Time so ill thought of over the Nation, avoid bringing in the Bill; but it is plain from their whole Conduct, that they resolved if possible to prevent the passing of it; and, for that Reason chiefly, tho' no

doubt they had the Change of the Constitution in view, inserted that Clause.

This is the true History of that Clause. And to borrow the Words of the *Craftsman*, Dec. 22. 1739. "——I hope that no
 " Person, who affects to be a Friend to
 " the Revolution, or is really so, will
 " make any Objection against quoting from
 " *Burnet* the Opinion which the Friends
 " to the Revolution had of that Proceed-
 " ing."

If the Bishop has not truly and faithfully represented the Opinion which the *Whigs*, or Friends to the Revolution, had of that Clause, if he has charg'd the *Tories* wrongfully, let this Writer confute him.

But if he cannot do this; if *Burnet* has given us a faithful Relation of the Conduct of both Parties at that Time; Is it not a Shame for this Writer, or for any Man who pretends to act according to the Principles of the old *Whigs*, to insist upon that Clause as a Reason for a *Place-Bill*?

Hence it appears, how ridiculous and false it is to charge the *Whigs*, who declare their Dislike of a *Place-Bill*, with a
 I Change

Change of Principles, and acting in Contradiction to the *Whigs* in the Reign of King *William*; when it is certain, that had those *Whigs* liv'd in these Days they wou'd have oppos'd a *Place-Bill*, upon the very same Principle, as they declar'd their Dislike of that Clause, “ as thinking it wou'd
 “ quite change the Form of our Govern-
 “ ment, and render the Crown titular and
 “ precarious.”

But it is too much to be suspected, that many who would rank themselves under the Denomination of *Whigs* in these Days, are in truth mere *Republicans*; and that the true Reason of their being so anxious for this Bill is, —That they would preserve nothing but the *Name* of Monarchy, without any of those *Powers* which have always been annex'd to the Crown; much after the same Model as we now see the Power of the Crown reduc'd in *Sweden*.

The Advocates for a *Place-Bill* themselves cannot deny, but that such an Act would be an Alteration of the Constitution. But how weak and trifling is their Excuse for this?

“ To say that this is an Alteration of
 “ the Constitution, (says the *Craftsman*,
 C 2 “ Dec.

“ *Dec. 29. 1739.*) is saying no more than
 “ that every publick Act is an Alteration,
 “ as far as the Force of that Act reaches.”

Very true : But the Question is, How
far the Force of a *Place-Bill* will reach ?
 It is not *barely* making an Alteration, that
 is the Thing complain'd of ; but the ma-
 king *such* an Alteration, as will lodge so
 much Power in the House of Commons,
 “ as to quite change the Form of our Go-
 “ vernment, and render the Crown titular
 “ and precarious ;” which was the Opini-
 on of the old *Whigs*, as I shall prove more
 particularly hereafter.

The same Writer goes on, and tells us :
 “ ——— Several Laws have been made from
 “ time to time, with relation to Places.
 “ Some of them were thought too rigid,
 “ and therefore have been repeal'd or a-
 “ mended. But all these Transactions
 “ shew the Danger which was apprehend-
 “ ed from *Place-Men*.”

This Gentleman cannot be suppos'd not
 to have read *Burnet's* History, or to be ig-
 norant of the Transactions at the passing
 of the Act of Settlement, and therefore it
 is a Shame for him to speak thus.

Did

Did those Transactions shew the *Danger* that was apprehended from *Place-Men*? Apprehended by whom? By the *Whigs*? That he will not say. Was it by the *Tories*? Is it not Fact, that they thrust that Clause against *Place-Men* into the Bill, not from any *Danger* they apprehended from *Place-Men*, but purely with a Design to *defeat* the Bill.

As their Design was to have the Bill lost, so they judged the most likely Method to effect that, was to insert a Clause, which would subvert the Constitution, in Hopes it would raise Disputes between the two Houses.

The *Tories* at that Time must think that Clause a very bad one in its own Nature, or it would not have served the Purpose they intended by it, to have the Bill lost.

Thus we see, in the first Instance of a *Place-Bill*, whatever the *Tories* might pretend, they had no Apprehension of any *Danger* from *Place-Men*, nor was that Consideration any Motive with them for inserting that Clause in the Bill.

Besides, if the Danger was so great as is now pretended, Why was not that Clause

to be in Force, till the Act of Succession took place? They had indeed a very good Reason for this, because at that Time they had engross'd most of the Places to themselves. And after their open and daring Attempts to defeat the Revolution in the first place, and after that the Protestant Succession, they had very little ground to hope, that, when the Succession took place, any Confidence should be plac'd in them, as it unfortunately had been by King *William*.

But it ought not to be conceal'd, the Pretences which *Burnet* tells us they made for inserting that Clause.

It was said by Mr. *Harley*,—— “ That
 “ the Haste the Nation was in, when the
 “ Government was settled at the Time of
 “ the Revolution, had made them over-
 “ look many Securities, which might have
 “ prevented much Mischief; and there-
 “ fore he hoped they would fix every thing
 “ that was wanting to make our Security
 “ compleat.”

King *William* had reign'd twelve Years before this Pretence was started. And I should be glad to know of any Man,——
 what those Mischiefs were, during those
 twelve

twelve Years, which required that Clause to prevent them.

That Prince, with all the Power he was entrusted, was never able to take the Field against the common Enemy, till they had well nigh executed all their Designs, and the Scene of Action was so far over that it was almost impossible for him to undertake any Thing of Consequence.

Here was a Mischief indeed, and the Nation feels the unhappy Effects of it to this Day. A Mischief, that proceeded, as did all the Mischiefs of that Reign, from the unhappy Choice that Prince made of his Ministers.

I will not say that this Mischief might have been prevented, if many Securities had not been overlooked; or that some Expedient ought to have been resolved upon at that Time, by which the King might have been restrained from making such a fatal Choice of his Ministers.

No. The Power of the Crown, in the Choice of its Ministers and in the Distribution of its Favours, ought to be untroubled. I do not mean, that this should put it out of the Power of a Parliament to
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call any Ministry to an Account for their Conduct. But should this Power of the Disposition of Places be separated from the Crown, it will most certainly have this Effect, “ to render the Crown titular and “ precarious.”

King *William* had it in his Power to have prevented this and all the other Mischiefs of his Reign; but his Misfortune was, that he employed a Party, who were determined to render his Reign burthensome and unsuccessful, and consequently odious to the People.

And whilst there are two Parties of different Interests in this Nation, which will, I fear, always be our Condition, the Prince will ever be liable to make a wrong Choice of his Ministers.

It was so in King *William's* Reign. It was the same at the End of the Reign of *Q. Anne*. And may it not as well be argued, that, because very great and fatal Mischiefs attended the Choice of the Ministry in those two Reigns, therefore some Expedient ought to be found out to exclude that Party, who are justly to be suspected of not being in the Interest of their Country, from serving their Prince in that Capacity.

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This would be thought very hard, and yet the Reasoning is the same in this Case, as in the other of debarring the Prince from disposing of Places to Members of the House of Commons.

The Truth is, the Prince ought either to be under no Restraint in the disposing of Places, or he ought to have no Power to dispose of any Places. And it would most certainly end in this at last, as we see it has done in *Sweden*; — That, if once the Prince be laid under any Restrictions in this Matter, it will soon terminate in this, that the Power of disposing of Places will be absolutely taken from him.

And thus by an Expedient to preserve the Constitution, it shall be quite altered and changed.

And let the Advocates for a *Place-Bill* pretend what they please by such a Bill, This is at the Bottom of all — To take all Places out of the Hands of the Crown.

Let them therefore speak out, and declare, that they are of Opinion the Constitution ought to be changed in this Part of it; and then Men will better be able
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to judge of the Good or Evil of such a Bill.

But it will be said perhaps, — That whilst a House of Commons is kept free from the Influence of the Crown, there can be no Danger from the Prince's making a bad Choice of his Ministers.

This is far from being the Truth. But supposing it were true, are *Place-Men* the only Men that are to be excluded the House of Commons? Have we not a powerful Party amongst us, who are far from being in the Interest of their Country? Men, who, if they are not in the Interest of the *Pretender*, have an irreconcilable Hatred to the Protestant Succession; and who, if once they were the Majority in a House of Commons, would distress the Government, just as the *Tories* did in almost all the Parliaments of King *William*.

And I shall be glad to know of any Man, whether the Exclusion of *Place-Men* will not unavoidably give these Men, whom no Oaths can bind, an Opportunity to become the Majority in the House of Commons.

This is the great Evil of a *Place-Bill*, which as it is impracticable to remedy, so
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it exposes the Folly and Mischief of such a Bill.

And it is evident from *Burnet*, that the *Whigs* in King *William's* Reign apprehended this would be the Consequence of that Clause in the Act of Settlement, which was one Reason of their declaring their Abhorrence of it.

The other Reason of their Dislike to that Clause was, that they judg'd it to be a dangerous Alteration of the Constitution.

Burnet tells us, — “ That they thought
“ the Design of the *Tories*, in inserting
“ that Clause, was to change quite the
“ Form of our Government, and render
“ the Crown titular and precarious.”

And if this had not been their Opinion, why should they express such a Dislike to that Clause, when it was not to be in force till the *Hanover* Succession took place?

It might possibly have happen'd, that, before that Time came, most of the *Tories* then living might be dead, or that the Party might be better reconcil'd to the Protestant Succession.

But tho' they had little Reason to expect such a Change of Principles in the *Tories*; yet it is plain they were of Opinion, that supposing that to be the Case, yet the laying the Crown under such Restrictions would quite change the Form of Government.

Nor can any other possible Reason be given of their Dislike to the Limitations in that Clause, which were not to take place for some Years, but that they were of Opinion the Crown ought *never* to be made subject to such Limitations; and that such Limitations were invented by Men, who design'd nothing less by them, but either to overturn the Government, or to make a Change in the Form of it.

Their declaring their Disapprobation of that Clause, when it was not to be in force for some Years, is a Demonstration, that they thought it *never* ought to be in force.

It is plain, they thought the Clause an *Alteration* in the Constitution, as indeed it must be; for whatever is made a *Part* of the Constitution, that was not so *before*, is making an *Alteration* in the Constitution.

And yet the Writer in the *Craftsman*, Dec. 22. 1739. asks this ridiculous Question, —Whether an Act to limit the Number of *Place-Men* in the House of Commons will be so great an Alteration of the Constitution, as the Repeal of that Clause was?

Which is just as wise, as if he had ask'd, —Whether the making any thing a Part of the Constitution, which was not so before, and which is consequently an Alteration of the Constitution, be as great an Alteration of the Constitution, as the Repeal of that which was no Part of the Constitution, and consequently could be no Alteration of it? Or, in other Words, —Whether the making an Alteration in the Constitution be as great an Alteration of it, as that which is no Alteration, but only the restoring of it?

For as the Clause was no Part of the Constitution, the Repeal of it could be no Alteration.

And I should be glad to know of this Writer, — whether he does not in his Conscience believe, that the *Whigs* in King *William's* Reign declared their Dislike of that Clause, because they were of Opinion
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the Crown ought never to be subject to those Limitations.

Had that Clause been to take place immediately, their Opposition to it might possibly arise from hence, — That they judged it was not *then* a proper Time for such Limitations. But when those Limitations were not to be in Force for some Years, it is a plain Demonstration that they judged they *never* ought to be in Force.

If this be the Truth, and will admit of no Reply, Is it not the Height of Insolence or Stupidity in the Advocates for a *Place-Bill* to plead this Clause in the Act of Settlement, as an unanswerable Reason for such a Bill, and that a *Place-Bill* is agreeable to the Sentiments of the *Old Whigs*?

Thus have I made it plainly appear, — That the famous Clause of Limitations in the Act of Settlement was purely and solely the Contrivance of the *Tories*; — That it was inserted in that Act, with a Design to raise Disputes between the two Houses, by which the Bill might be lost; or if that should not happen, that they hoped by those Limitations to change the Form of our Government, and to render the Crown titular and precarious. — And, that
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the *Whigs* perceiving their Design to defeat the Bill itself, and to blast the Motion of nominating a Protestant Successor; and that all this was done in Favour of the pretended Prince of *Wales*, to a Degree of Infatuation, that amazed all who observed it, and saw the Fury with which it was promoted; that when the *Whigs* plainly saw this, though they could not but declare their utter dislike of those Limitations, yet they would not directly oppose or enter into the Examination of them at that Time; being glad to have the Act passed any Way, and thinking those Limitations might be better considered another Time; it being of the utmost Consequence to have a Law passed for a Protestant Successor.

And notwithstanding these are Facts not to be contested, yet such is the Assurance of the Advocates for a *Place-Bill*, that they go on to triumph in that Clause, alledging it to have been inserted in the Act of Settlement by the unanimous Consent of both Parties, and particularly of the *Whigs*, as a farther and necessary Establishment of the Constitution, and what was overlooked at the Revolution; and, in Consequence of this, charging the modern *Whigs* with acting in direct Contradiction to *Whig* Principles,

ples, and the Sentiments of the *Old Whigs*, by their Opposition to a *Place-Bill*.

This is such a Scene of Hypocrisy and Wickedness, as must amaze all who see and know it; and therefore it is fit and necessary, that it should no longer lye concealed, but be exposed to the view of the whole Nation.

And if, after this, any *Whig*, or any Man whatsoever, who is a Friend to the present Establishment, can desire or endeavour to have a *Place-Bill* passed; in the present Circumstances of Parties, and of the Nation in general; — That Man must, I think, be infatuated to such a Degree, as to make him incapable of being convinced by Reason and Argument, or indeed by any Thing less, than that *Ruin*, which such a Bill would most inevitably bring upon his Country.







